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This study contributes to the understanding of the selection decision-making 
process as it applies to project management teams. It particularly focuses on 
the elements that influence selection decisions in alliance mega-project 
structures. It uses a significant Australian infrastructure mega project as a case 
and through a retroductive approach, which combines elements from deductive 
and inductive research (Downward & Mearman 2007) examines what is going 
on in the selection process for the hiring of the senior leadership team. Although 
people selection is commonplace in business, and businesses are more and 
more using project structures, the nuanced rationale of this study and its value 
lies is in asking what does the selection of project leadership teams mean - 
apart from the obvious (Alvesson 2003)? 
 
Decision-making literature recognises the critical role that organisational context 
plays in providing antecedent conditions for decisions. This study examines the 
situational, environmental and contextual settings in which project leadership 
team selections decisions are incubated. 
 
This study shows that complex factors influence the way senior leaders are 
chosen for mega infrastructure projects. Orthodox selection processes do not 
adequately explain how such appointments are made. This study, using a 
combination of semi-structured interviews, documentary evidence and insider 
observations of the project leadership team formation processes, asserts that 
latent factors affect selection decisions more so than the espoused traditional 
selection techniques. These latent factors, such as the relative power of key 
stakeholders, the commitment of key decision makers to long term learning 
from alliance partners, and the nature of the relationship between alliance 
partners, are rarely considered, often taken for granted, and difficult to measure 
but they are powerful forces that need to be considered in selection decision 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 'Existing literature on employee selection contains an abundance of 
 knowledge of how selection should take place but almost nothing about 
 how it occurs in practice' (Bolander & Sandberg 2013, p. 285). 
 
 
1.1  Aim of the Study  
 
There are major consequences in any people-selection situation to getting it 
wrong. These consequences are amplified in alliance leadership teams in mega- 
infrastructure projects. This study contributes to the understanding of the 
selection decision-making process as it applies to project leadership teams. It 
particularly focuses on the factors that influence selection decisions in alliance 
mega-project structures. It uses a significant Australian infrastructure mega-
project as a case and, through a retroductive approach, which combines 
elements from deductive and inductive research (Downward & Mearman 2007), 
examines the selection process for hiring the senior leadership team. While 
businesses are increasing the use of project structures, the nuanced rationale of 
this study and where its value lies is in asking the question: what does the 
selection of project leadership teams mean, apart from the obvious (Alvesson 
2003)? Taking familiar subjects and familiar contexts and applying a strategy of 








1.2  The Significance of the Study 
 
1.2.1  Why Single-case Studies Are Important 
 
The research used a case-study approach to assess what factors, and in what 
context those factors were considered when deciding to select individuals for a 
project leadership team. A case study can be understood as: ‘A research method 
that involves investigating one or small number of social entities or situations 
about which data are collected using multiple sources of data and developing a 
holistic description through an interactive research process’ (Easton 2010, p. 
119). Conventional wisdom that a single case study cannot provide reliable 
information about the broader class 'is so oversimplified as to be grossly 
misleading … , if not directly wrong' (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 220). Flyvbjerg's (2006) 
research about case-study research is based on two overarching premises about 
their role in human learning: one, that case-studies produce 'the type of context-
dependent knowledge that research on learning shows to be necessary to allow 
people to develop from rule-based beginners to virtuoso experts', and two, that if 
there is only context-dependent knowledge then it rules out the possibility of 
epistemic theoretical construction. ‘Given the heuristic value, the single-case 
[research] approach, should not be abandoned’ (Cubelli & Della Sala 2017, p. 
A1). This study is not literature-centric; it is a study of one case so the findings 
and conclusions are more organisation and context-centric. This is in no way to 
diminish the value of studying a single case, as critical and paradigmatic cases 
'achieve information that permits logical deductions' and 'helps develop a 
metaphor or establish a school for the domain that the case concerns' (Flyvbjerg 
2006, p. 230). Process-based single-case research ‘provides unique 
opportunities for understanding possible configuration of underlying social reality’ 





1.2.2  Why a Project-team Case Study 
 
Project teams are formed to achieve a specific outcome. The current view is that 
the initial team composition is like assembling a jigsaw, where missing segments 
of relevant knowledge have to be found and fitted into a perfect whole  (Ratcheva 
2009).  Inter-firm resourcing of projects is commonplace as firms ‘cannot keep 
their entire set of resources in-house and at the same time capture all of the 
opportunities available’ (Lew et al. 2013, p. 1103). Understanding the 
implications for functioning and consequent success of multidisciplinary project 
teams highlights the critical need to reconceptualise the boundaries of project 
teams (Ratcheva 2009). For example, critical elements such as relationship 
capital and knowledge diversity are at best often no more than implied, if not 
ignored in the selection of project management teams. Relationship capital here 
has both micro and macro meanings. In a macro sense it is the contacts, 
networks and experience of people and cultures that the individual may bring to 
the project. The micro relationship capital is the positive personality traits, 
interests and skills that, when invested in the project, bring positive working 
relationships and teamwork synergies (Doloi 2009).  The individuals’ knowledge 
diversity has similar capital. For example, in a multi-disciplinary project an 
individual’s knowledge across disciplines makes for both ease and quality of 
communication and supportive problem-solving processes. If the worth of such 
elements is acknowledged as being unique to each project, they become more 
important and add high value to the process and outcomes. A leadership team is 
responsible for understanding and delivering client satisfaction. “Client” in this 









The study of an individual project's unique elements expands the horizon of 
decision-making and allows epistemic theoretical construction. By examining this 
as a fundamental part of selecting project management teams, particularly in the 
case of alliance mega-projects, the study will produce insights relevant not only 
to the organisations being studied but to academic understanding and broader 
decision-making issues as well as other project-based businesses.  
 
1.3  The Contribution of this study 
 
While theorists have studied project management and in particular the selection 
of project management teams (see, for example, Radu 2014), there is little 
interpretivist research on in-practice decision-making in the selection of project 
leadership teams (Bolander & Sandberg 2013).  This study aims to shine a light 
on the real-world practices of selection in these specific environments and gain 
some insight into the success (or otherwise) of some of these practices. The 
contribution of this study is in part practical - giving a perspective on decision-
making and practice orientation for selection in a specific environment - and part 
theoretical in the project and selection domains.  
 
A summary of the theoretical, methodological and substantive contributions of 
this study of factors affecting selection decisions in a project leadership team is 
set out in Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 below. These contributions will be explained in 







Table  1.1 Theoretical contributions 
 
   
 











1.4  Statement of the Problem 
 
The exponential growth of knowledge across industries and disciplines has made 
it extremely difficult for some businesses to work in isolation. Consequently, 
some forms of joint ventures (JVs), alliances or networked organisations are 
becoming increasingly common. The increasing projectification (Beringer et al. 
2013) of company activities has meant an increasing amount of company 
expenditure and management focus on project-organised ventures. The project 
approach is not new and numerous studies have shown that project success 
depends on the positive engagement of management (Conforto & Amaral 2016; 
Gomes et al. 2001; Kopmann et al. 2017; Swink et al. 2006).  
 
According to Ratcheva (2009), project teams need to overcome three boundaries 
– the project action boundary, project knowledge boundary and project social 





These boundaries are amplified when the project is undertaken in an alliance 
working construct. Project success will be determined by how well boundary- 
spanning activities are achieved, particularly in projects where a number of 
disciplines are involved (Ratcheva 2009). Although this suggests the complexity 
of working in and managing alliance project management teams, as it was in the 
case in this study, the research examines to what degree Ratcheva’s assertions 
are justified. 
 
Identifying what success looks like and what client’s value are key to the 
management of clients’ expectations during the project and the ultimate delivery 
of a result (Eskerod & Ang 2017). Financially, 'if client values are not fully 
understood in a construction project it is likely to result in either low fulfillment of 
client expectations or multiple design alterations during the project process which 
lead to additional costs and frustration among the project participants' (Thyssen 
et al. 2010, p. 18).  
 
 
1.5  Research Question 
 
The research question is as follows:  
What factors influence the selection decisions for leadership teams in 
alliance mega-infrastructure projects? 
 
The research question has two clear components of what is being researched in 











Project Project approach - as opposed to operating in a more 









For the purpose of this report, the Australian 
commercial working definition of “mega” is projects in 
excess of Aus$1bn in budget and exceeding one year 








An alliance is a group of two or more organisations 
pooling their resources to achieve the project outcome 
as opposed to traditional construction projects which 







The focus is on the senior leadership team only - the 
most senior project management group – rather than 
other stakeholders such as the board or project 
employees. 
 
Selection The process of choosing members for the team; it 
focuses only on their selection, not on performance or 
salary packages. How did they, as opposed to others, 
come to hold these positions? 
 
The scope is further tightened in that this study is a case study of a particular 
Australian mega-infrastructure project. The second component, the decision-
making process, and primarily the elements that influence this process, is the 








1.6 Background to the Study: The Case 
 
1.6.1  The Business Case 
 
The business case for Project North - the construction of a fully-integrated 
chemical plant - had been developing for years, if not decades. The final product 
of the plant had been imported and sold into Australia monopolistically for more 
than 20 years. The market for the product was increasing both domestically and 
internationally which meant both increasing volumes and margins for the 
Australian monopoly. Company A was a direct competitor of the Australian 
monopoly further down the supply chain; this left company A both supply and 
price-vulnerable. When the opportunity to purchase a plant in the USA that could 
be retrofitted came about in 2006, Company A seized on it, and the project of 
constructing a plant in Australia to serve the domestic market and potentially sell 
the surplus product into Asia, began in 2007.  
 
Project North was a hybrid alliance between an engineering specialist, a 
mechanical-construction specialist and a civil-construction specialist. According 
to the website of one of the partners, the alliance partners entered into an 
agreement with the client group's wholly owned subsidiary to deliver the 
project.  The Company’s website stated that the project involved the construction 
of a 330,000 tonnes-a-year fully-integrated chemical plant and associated 
infrastructure in regional Australia. 
 
Project North had a chequered history with two previous attempts to construct 
the plant making little or no progress. Initially the engineering specialist was 
commissioned by Company A to disassemble the plant in the USA and bring it to 
Australia. They were also asked to re-engineer it and engineer the supporting 





It was Company A’s intent that this would be the first of two plants to be built in 
Australia, as their research into the Asian market suggested an off-take well in 
excess of the capacity of the initial plant. Despite holding Letters of Intent, 
Company A was quickly overwhelmed by the billion-dollar drain from the project 
on their core business and the project was abandoned in December 2007.  
 
After the client's buy-out of Company A in March 2008 the project was 
resurrected in July 2008. The lead contractor, an engineering contractor, from the 
initial attempt was retained. The second attempt, this time by the new owner, was 
put on hold shortly after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in December 2008. 
This meant essentially slowing down, stopping and deferring expenditure on 
procurement activities. All site activities ceased and were de-mobilised, however 
there was quite a large volume of procured goods being bought that now needed 
to be placed in storage, held or stopped. Hard decisions had to be made on 
whether the client completely exited the project, took financial penalties or just 
slowed the project’s progress. At this time the project was being run by the 
engineering specialist from their head office on a straight-up cost-plus execution 
model.  
 
Tighter money markets and overall greater financial sensitivity, both results of the 
GFC, meant a further hiatus in the project as the client reviewed its status and 
considered their options. The economic benefit in terms of value to the client is 
the project’s net present value, discounted for risk (Turner & Müller 2003).  
 
The client was a chemical producer and had no experience or expertise in what 
was described in industry terms as an EPCM – an Engineer, Procure, Construct 
and Maintain project. Instead, the engineering specialist, mechanical-
construction specialist and civil-construction specialist, came to the client with an 





The client went through a process of negotiation with those specialist companies, 
to which they referred as the Alliance. The managing director of the engineering 
specialist was the key driver of the project's third iteration and the key influencer 
in all project decisions including people- selection. The alliance agreement was 
based on a cost-reimbursable model incorporating a risk-reward regime to 
ensure the best project outcomes.  The Alliance was committed to delivering 
Project North with zero injuries, under budget and ahead of schedule, using a 
“best for project” philosophy. The project's third attempt commenced in the first 
quarter of 2010 and ended in the third quarter of 2012. The construction 
workforce of 600 personnel peaked in the second and third quarters of 2011. The 
total value of the contract was estimated at approximately AU$935 million and 
the final cost was AU$1.45 billion. A major external environmental factor was 
resource availability. Despite the GFC, there was a resources boom in Australia 
and people – particularly those with high-quality skills and experience - were not 
readily available. 
 
1.6.2  The Project North Governance Structure 
 
Engineer, Procure, Construct and Maintain (EPCM) projects are typically 
undertaken with a principal contractor who manages the client and sub-contracts 
the work. Project North was unique in that the client took the lead role in the 
procurement and maintenance contracts in the project. The specifications and 
budget for maintenance did not fall within the scope of Project North; thus it was, 
in reality, an EPC project.  
Furthermore, although the three Alliance partners were said to have complete 
oversight of the total EPC work, this is questionable, as the engineering specialist 
was solely responsible for engineering. Because the client took control of 
procurement, the Alliance was realistically only for the construction component of 





There was a fixed price for engineering and a fixed profit, which was at risk for 
certain key performance indicators and a reimbursable plus an agreed margin for 
the construction component. The justification for this was that it was, according to 
the company’s website, 'the biggest commitment the company has ever made' in 
their corporate history. With all project stakeholders strongly invested in the 
project’s success (in other words, its profitability for Alliance members), there 
was very tight oversight of all activities. This led to a governance structure 
headed by what was called the Alliance Board, which was made up of three 
members of the client organisation and a senior person from each specialist 
company. The project director, head of the project leadership team (PLT), also 
sat in on most of the Board's meetings but had no voting rights and participated 
only in an advisory capacity. 
 
Figure 1.1 - Project North governance structure 
 






1.6.3  The Project North Leadership-team Structure 
 
Due to the history of the project and the investment that had been made by both 
the client and the lead contractor, the Project North Alliance venture from the 
outset quoted a stretch variation on the common project-delivery mantra of “on 
time, on budget, on specification”: specifically 'The Alliance is committed to 
delivering the North project with zero injuries, under budget and ahead of 
schedule' (Project North Executive Team briefing March 2010). The Alliance 
Board adopted a best for project philosophy to guide their behaviour and 
decision-making.  
 
They proactively carried this philosophy through all aspects of project 
management and operations. With this as the guide it would be expected that the 
critical decisions of filling the most senior roles on the project – the project 
leadership team (PLT) – would encompass a disciplined decision-making 
process. 
 
Figure 1.2 - Proposed Project North leadership team organisation structure 
 
 






The Alliance Board clearly defined the targets, budgets and key deliverables for 
the PLT. There was no expectation that these would vary significantly during the 
course of the project. The Board also developed incentives to achieve a 
reduction of up to AU$25m in the total cost of the project and an improvement of 
two months to mechanical completion. Cost targets were in the areas of 
procurement and onsite productivity; in other words, construction. Given the 
history of the project very few people believed that any incentive payment would 
be forthcoming. 
 
1.6.4  The Legacy of the Previous Attempts 
 
Legitimacy is a concept meant to capture the beliefs that bolster willing 
obedience (Levi et al. 2009). Projects need to gain legitimacy among external 
and internal stakeholders. Legitimacy is an important resource for gaining other 
resources. In this project legitimacy was the antidote to two previous failed 
attempts at securing investment. In this light, in buying out Company A the 
client's shareholders inherited a project-in-process (Project North V2) and 
assessed Project North V3 as a new venture as opposed to a partly complete 
project. However, those who were required to justify a third attempt at completing 
the project still needed to overcome the legacy of the illegitimacy that was 
associated with the previous failures. In uncertain situations such as the third 
attempt at Project North, social systems evolve prescribed scripts, rules, norms, 
values and models that are reinforced throughout the system and that come to 
be accepted by social actors, as legitimate, that is, acceptable, desirable and/or 
appropriate (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002). The client thus needed the Alliance 
members to accept their systems - rules, norms, values and models - as 
legitimate. Therefore it is unsurprising that of six Project North objectives, three 






Social constructivism emphasises that once social structures are constituted, 
they constrain actors’ choices to the limits of such structures (Boudourides 2003). 
Social structures have the best hold on actors when they seem to be rooted in 
the natural order; however, this was not the case here. The client redefined the 
project environment mostly after the contract was signed (it should be noted that 
the client changed the environment, not the contract) to carry their view of 
delegated legislation; these changes flowed from their Board and shareholders to 
permeate the organization and the Alliance. 
 
Generally legitimacy is constructed retrospectively: an action or behaviour is 
examined post-facto against cognitive and/or sociopolitical criteria (Brunsson 
2007). However, in this project legitimacy was a prerequisite, an in-project 
imperative and, for the individuals involved in particular, a requirement for their 
careers after the project, particularly as the project had already failed twice. 
Having received the endorsement from the client’s parent company to proceed 
with Project North V3, the legitimacy-resource positive-progress relationship was 
especially critical. Given that the client’s board had already shown their 
willingness to shut down the project if they were not satisfied with proceedings, 
this attempt needed to demonstrate that it was engaging in those processes that 
were considered legitimate. This included not only abiding by the rules and 
espousing the endorsed norms and values, but also building a project 
management team that had credentials and industry competence and operated 
in a low-risk manner. 
 
The client’s board were uncertain about the project's previous business model of 
a single major contractor sub-contracting work out. The board members believed 
that this would result in poor controls, including diluting the standard of work, 
making accountability ambiguous, creating poor project management reach to 





To gain legitimacy the engineering specialist company inserted its own definition 
of a legitimate business model, a manipulation strategy of legitimation highlighted 
by Oliver (1991). They proposed an Alliance of three contractors, all reputable 
and specialists in their own fields (engineering, civil construction and mechanical 
construction), all reporting directly to the client through the Alliance Board, on 
which all members of the Alliance had a seat.  
 
 
1.7  The Researcher's Role 
 
The researcher was employed by the project director as a consultant to this 
project between March 2010 and August 2012. The researcher’s role was to 
provide strategic advice on non-financial risk and to develop and implement a 
best-practice model for an organisation structure and processes for the working 
of the Alliance Board and PLT. To be able to undertake this role the researcher 
had open access to all project information. The researcher also collected data 
that included individuals’ personal information, such as psychological, interest 
and preferred work environment profiles, team characteristics, team fit and 
climate/culture surveys. This access was (and continues to be) protected by a 
significant commercial in confidence contract between the researcher and the 
Alliance group. The researcher sought and received permission from the owners 
to use the data, now de-identified, in the research. 
 
The opportunity to use the researcher’s involvement in this project for this study 
was twofold. First, there was a chance to study the elites and reduce the political-
ethical problem of solely doing research downwards (Alvesson 2003); and 
second, workplace ethnographies are usually carried out among blue-collar 
workers, not executives. There are a number of observational studies of senior 
executives en masse (Rosen et al. 2009), however, these studies of executives, 
they are usually sterilised interviews rather than boardroom meetings and day-to-





The researcher has tried, as Alvesson (2003) suggests, to avoid their personal-
political tastes in considering and developing themes from empirical material and 
interpreting them broadly. The fact that the researcher was both a researcher 




1.8  Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is presented in five chapters including the Introduction. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature on selection in project 
teams, and provides both a context and an identification of a gap in the literature. 
Two broad areas of research are investigated within the context of people- 
selection, including in a project environment. The first area looks at the context in 
which these decisions are made; in this case a project context further defined in 
that it is a single case of an alliance structure in a mega-infrastructure project in 
Australia. The second area looks at process, and at processes within processes; 
in particular, it examines decision-making within the selection process of the PLT. 
This context and these processes are defined by the research question and have 
critical impact for both the scope and the research methodology of the study. 
Relevant existing literature pertaining to these elements is surveyed in this 
literature review. 
 
Chapter 3 explicates the research design and methodology and illustrates why 
they are appropriate for exploring the research question that is at the centre of 
this study. This study is positioned in the qualitative genre and employs 
retroductive analysis (similar to a retrospective critical-incident approach) and 
ethnographic methods. These methods were selected due to their capacity to 
facilitate exploratory studies within real-world environments, making them 





The research question asked what factors influence the selection decisions for 
leadership teams in alliance mega-infrastructure projects and looked to thicken 
the descriptions of these influencing elements as a contribution to the overall 
research in a number of fields; for example, people-selection and decision-
making in specific contexts.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the findings of the of the three primary research sources: the 
post-project interviews, the in-project interviews and discussions, and the content 
analysis of data, both that in the public domain and that gathered throughout the 
researcher's time on the project. In accordance with the primary research 
question, the chapter examines the factors influencing the selection of those who 
initially occupied the six positions on the PLT. As the study is retroductive, the 
researcher is left with post-facto rationalising of a known result (that is, who was 
selected for the PLT). 
 
The chapter further develops, from a structural perspective the project 
environment that influences the behaviour of all stakeholders and ultimately 
underpins the selection decisions. The Alliance ideal is reviewed and the 
Alliance’s opportunity to make decisions, specifically on the selection of the PLT 
members, is examined through the lens of a highly controlling, non-empowering 
client. Finally, four broad themes - (i) Power and Control, (ii) Project Knowledge 
Management, (iii) Legitimacy and (iv) Relationship Capital - are considered in 
depth as elucidated the analysis of the research data.   
 
Chapter 5 brings an account of the dynamic context and fluid process of 
decision-making in people-selection that had hitherto been unavailable. It gives 
case-specific insights of how individuals and groups use their power to create 
legitimacy in their decisions. The findings of this study are synthesised in this 
chapter into a concentrated account of decision-making for the selection of 





The researcher concludes that although the evaluation of the data in this study is 
from a unique setting, it nevertheless brings to light a set of concepts that provide 
explanations of the process of selection decision-making. It is suggested that the 
exposition, particularly of the decision-making concepts, may also provide a 
fruitful  opportunity for future study for researchers interested in socially 
constructed decision processes in other subject areas.   
 
 
1.9  Summary  
 
This thesis is a retroductive analysis using an ethnographic method to study both 
the context and process of selection decision-making to appoint candidates to a 
leadership team in an alliance mega-infrastructure project in Australia. The study 
aims to assist in filling the gap in the research that exists for interpretivist 
research undertaken on the in-practice decision-making in the selection of project 
leadership teams. Analysis of the data collected examines context in both 
circumstance and structure as antecedent conditions for decisions. This is 
particularly apt in this study as context, in part at least, shapes how people gain 
positions of influence and respond to influence in a unique setting. This study 
shines a light on the real-world practices of selection in these specific 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant literature on the selection of 
project teams. The review provides a context and gap identification; however, 
this study is not literature-centric. As this study examines only one case, the 
findings and (as stated in section 1.2.1) conclusions are more organisation- and 
context-centric. Hence, there is the need in this literature to also address broader 
areas of context, such as alliance structures. The illustration below identifies the 
scope of the literature review. The illustration is offered as a heuristic device to 
conceptualise the scope of the review; it is not meant to reflect the total 
complexity of how these concepts relate to each other. Those associations 
relevant to the research question will be developed in chapter 5.  
 








The research investigates two broad areas: process and processes within 
processes, in particular the decision-making process within the selection 
process; and the context in which these decisions are made. Figure 2.2 provides 
a schema of the elements contained in this review of the context and process in 
the selection of key people for leadership teams in a mega- infrastructure project.  
 




    Infrastructure  
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       Alliance 
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2.2   Project Management 
 
The context of this case study is an industrial project environment, specifically in 
construction. Consequently, the first area explored in the literature is why 
organisations use project management and what its benefits are. In the 
construction industry project work is the normal mode of organisation  (Bresnen 
et al. 2003). Construction work is characteristically project-based and site-
specific. The traditional success criteria of meeting outcome, cost and schedule 
constraints are no longer considered adequate (Beth 2001). These criteria point 






2.2.1  The Changing Project Management Paradigm 
 
A paradigm in project management has two key drivers: (1) the move by many 
businesses to organise their work in a project structure and (2) the explosion in 
technology. A subtext of these key drivers is globalisation and the multi-site, 
multi-discipline endeavors common in project management today. When the 
opportunity to work with multiple partners to achieve business outcomes is 
considered as well, the traditional way of defining and managing projects has 
serious limitations (Beth 2001). 
 
Project management theory remains stuck in the 1960s time warp (Morris & 
Jamieson 2005) and the underlying theory of project management is obsolete 
(Koskela & Howell 2002). These perspectives suggest that understanding the 
implications for the functioning and consequent success of multidisciplinary 
project teams highlights the critical need to reconceptualise the boundaries of 
project teams (Ratcheva 2009). 
 
2.2.2  Project Management and Value Co-creation 
 
High-value project outcomes have been defined mostly in financial terms; for 
example: 'the benefit is the net present value of the project, discounted for risk' 
(Turner & Müller 2003, p. 2). However, the Project Management Institute 
identified and quantified project management’s value to the organisation in 
broader terms (Thomas & Mullaly 2008); an example would be the inter-project 
transfer of knowledge. Project management knowledge assets alone contribute 
to both the tangible and intangible outcomes of project management practices 
and clients (Walker & Christenson 2005, p. 276); however, the embodied in the 






Normann’s (1991) view of value-creation is that a company’s task is not to create 
value for its customers but to mobilise customers to create their own value from 
the company’s offerings. This moves away from the traditional industrial output or 
product-centric view of the customer relationship towards considering it a 
facilitation or input to customers’ value-creating process. Ramirez (1999) 
supports this position, stating that value is not simply added but is mutually 
created and re-created among actors. Most importantly, he advocates that this 
value cannot be reduced to a single metric. Ramirez summarised his two views 
of value as shown in Table 2.1.   
 
Table 2.1   Two views of value production 
 
Industrial view Co-production view 
Value creation is sequential, unidirectional 
and transitive, best described as value 
chains. 
Value creation is synchronic and 
interactive, best described as value 
constellations. 
All managed values can be measured in 
monetary terms. 
Some managed values cannot be 
measured or monetized.  
Value is added. Values are co-invented, combined and 
reconciled. 
Value a function of utility and rarity. Exchange the source of utility and rarity. 
Values are objective (exchange) and 
subjective (utility). 
Values are contingent and actual 
(established interactively). 
Customers destroy value. Customers (co-)create values. 
Value is realised in transactions, and only 
for the supplier (event-based). 
Value is co-produced, with customers, over 
time – for both co-producers (relationship-
based). 
Three-sector models are pertinent. Three-sector models are no longer 
pertinent. 
Services are a separate activity. Services are a framework for all activities 
considered to be co-produced. 
Consumption is not a factor of production. Consumers are managed as factors of 
production (assets). 
Economic actors are analysed as holding 
one primary role at a time. 
Economic actors are analysed as holding 
several different roles simultaneously. 
Firm and activity are units of analysis. Interactions (offerings) are units of analysis 
 





This literature can be summarized as contending that if the reason for 
undertaking a project is to progress the value of the organisation, all stakeholders 
should consciously and collectively take a broader view of value and the value 
co-creation process before, during and after the project initiative.   
 
 
2.3  Alliance Structures 
 
The alliance context is a specific arrangement and environment in which projects 
are undertaken. As “alliance” is often very broadly defined it is important to 
develop a definition that gives context and structure to this study. This section 
gathers many of the perspectives on the term from the literature and gives rise to 
a working definition for this case examination.  
 
Mutual support for survival, bonds between families (including marriage) and 
military arrangements are all familiar concepts of alliances. The term “alliance” 
suggests two or more parties that have a close relationship due to similarity or 
common interest. Four key issues can be synthesised to form the core of alliance 
arrangements: scope of action, limits or boundaries of input, value creation and 
stability procedures. These issues are discussed in further detail below. Although 
Koleva et al. (2002) suggest that 'joint ventures and licensing arrangements are 
the two most common examples of alliances' (p. 3), there is a need for clarity in 
the distinction between alliances and other forms of multi-organisation 







2.3.1  Defining Alliances 
 
In a business context alliances are purposive relationships between independent 
organisations (Franco & Haase 2015; Mohr & Spekman 1994). Being formed for 
a purpose, however, does not correlate to a common purpose although Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) do suggest that the organisations need to share compatible 
goals. They also emphasise the characteristics of mutual benefit and 
dependence. Supporting this view Ramu (1997) asserts that an alliance is about 
bringing together specific skills and resources without the complications of a 
merger. Ruma (1997) suggests a notable characteristic in that alliances are 
formed by rival companies. These perspectives might give the appearance that 
alliances are simplistic, commonsense arrangements; however, Bharat and 
Khanna (2000) point out that they are, in fact, complex organisation forms, 
viewed by some as incomplete contracts and fraught with ambiguity. Cullen et al. 
(2000) posit that the difficulty is not in bringing the parties together as an alliance 
but in managing them throughout the endeavour; specifically, the management of 
the soft side of the association – or, in other words the development and 
management of relationship capital. Table 2.2 gives a number of 







Table 2.2   Alliances defined - characterisation and context 
 
Characterisation Context Reference Applicability to 
mega-projects 
‘A mutual decision 
adopted by two or 
more independent 
firms in order to 
trade or share 
resources for mutual 
benefit’ 
Journal article of research 
conducted by Mario Franco, 
an assistant professor of 
Entrepreneurship and SME 
Administration, Department 
of Management and 
Economics, Beira Interior 
University, Portugal and 
Heiko Haase, Full Professor 
of Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Management, 
Department of Business 
Administration, University of 
Applied Science Jena, 
Germany. The article 
focuses on the importance of 
interfirm alliances for 
sustainable businesses’ 
development and success. 
Their research is 





In its generality 
the 
characterisation 
is applicable to 
mega-project, 
however as the 
study 
concentrates 
on SMEs the 
contextual gap 
in the research 
falls short. 
'Strategic alliances 







strive for mutual 
benefits and 
acknowledge a high 
level of mutual 
dependence' 
Journal article of research 
conducted by two authors: a 
Professor of Marketing, 
University of Montana, USA, 
and the Taylor Murphy 
Professor of Business 
Administration Emeritus, 
Darden School of Business, 
University of Virginia, USA. 
The articles focus is on 
strategic partnership 
success and communication 
(Mohr & 
Spekman 
1994, p. 135) 
The article’s 








It looks for 
prescription of 
behaviours but 
does not review 















typically involve the 
transfer of know-how 
between firms, a 




the alliance partners 
can rarely be fully 
prespecified' 
Journal article of research 
conducted by two authors 
from the Harvard Business 
School, USA. They 
investigate whether firms 
learn to manage inter-firm 
alliances as experience 
accumulates. They use 
contract-specific experience 
measures in a data set of 
over 2000 joint ventures and 
licensing agreements, and 
value-creation measures 
derived from the abnormal 
















premise of the 





working is not 
given 
relevance. 
'A firm will form an 
alliance with another 
firm in order to bring 
together specific 
skills and resources 
in such ways that 
may complement 
each other, without 
the complications 
and expenses 
associated with a 
merger …SBAs are 







lines of markets.' 
A book published by Sage 
Publications the author of 
which is a Professor at the 
Indian Institute of 
Management at Bangalore. 
The book examines 
alliances from perspectives 
of production, pricing, 
market structure, size 
distribution of firms, 

















in the market 
narrows the 
focus of the 
book as there 
are other 
reasons for 







Table 2.2   Alliances defined - characterisation and context (Cont’d) 
 
Characterisation Context Reference Applicability to 
mega-projects 
'In strategic alliances, 
the soft side of 
management refers to 
the development and 
management of 
relationship capital. In 
addition to making the 
investment of financial 
capital, partner firms 
... must invest in 
relationship capital 
…It involves the 
pattern of interaction 
between partner firms 
that facilitates and 
allows for the effective 
functioning of the 
alliance on a day-to-
day basis. It is 
through relationship 
capital that the 
alliance is actually 
enacted and 
implemented.' 
Journal article of research 
conducted by two authors 
from Washington State 
University, Pullman, WA, 
USA and one from Waseda 
University, Tokyo, Japan. 
Against an international 
backdrop, the article argues 
that the success of 
international strategic 
alliances requires attention 
not only to the hard side of 
alliance management (e.g., 
financial issues and other 
operational issues) but also 
to the soft side. 
(Cullen et 
al. 2000, p. 
224) 
The article is a 
high-level view 
of the ‘soft side’ 





capital and not 
on other latent 
factors that may 
also be called 
‘soft’. In meg-
projects hard 
and soft factors 
should be 
examined in the 




Significantly, these characteristics highlight noteworthy concerns about the 
workings alliances and decision-making as a process, and particularly about 
those who makes those decisions and their impact and outcomes. Alliances are 
'complex organizational forms'; 'viewed as incomplete contracts'; a 'process that 
is fraught with ambiguity'; and 'detailed interactions between the alliance partners 
[that] can rarely be fully prespecified' (Anand & Khanna 2000, p. 295). Alliances 
are 'qualitatively different from [joint ventures]' in that they are; 'formed by 
rivalling companies' (Ramu 1997, p. 204); and, characteristically there is  
'relationship capital [in] that the alliance is actually enacted and implemented' 





2.3.2  Differentiating between Alliances and Joint Ventures (JV) 
 
Strategic business alliances (SBAs) are qualitatively different from JVs (Ramu 
1997). They have some common elements, including two or more organisations 
joining together for a common purpose and the management imperative to build 
trust. The remainder of this section considers how they differ. 
 
The point of trust (or potential lack of it) is a nexus for the parties to choose either 
an alliance or a JV as the format for the collaborative activity. A new delivery 
mode, called ‘Integrated project delivery’ (IPD) (Lianying et al. 2016) does rely on 
high trust-based collaboration among project parties and in doing so goes some 
way to bridge one of the critical differences between JV’s and alliances. The JV 
involves the creation of a new entity, and the documented JV agreement is tightly 
constructed and contractual, with clear legal boundaries that define equity, 
apportion risk and reward up front, clearly define the extent of input knowledge 
and resource and legalise the ownership of newly created knowledge. This 
reflects the strong involvement by company boards in JVs (Reuer et al. 2014). In 
contrast, alliance management structures by nature depend on strong 
relationships and trust. They are exclusive partnerships with the boundaries 
defined by partnering organisations; significantly, they may not have any formal 
legalised document to support the cooperative. They are seen as incomplete 
contracts for this reason and because neither partner is necessarily required to 
invest equity in a newly formed separate entity. The participants pursue an 
objective while remaining independent organisations. Non-equity alliances are 
more effective for discovering knowledge and common language, and for 










Table 2.3 - Synopsis of differences between alliances and joint ventures 
 
 Alliances Joint ventures Applicability to 
mega-projects 
Definition  An exclusive 
partnership  
A company owned 
by two or more 
independent 
companies.  
Either or both  
Purpose  To some extent, 
partnering firms 
have a common 
purpose.  
The JV has a 
purpose; parent 
firms’ strategies 
might diverge.  
Either or both 
Boundaries  Defined by 
partnering firms.  
Clear, legal 
boundaries.  
Either or both 
Relation to 
knowledge  
Alliances are formed 
to learn from the 
partner. Knowledge 
is located in 
partners. 
JVs are formed to 
capitalise on 
knowledge in 
parent firms and to 
generate 
knowledge.  
Either or both 
Management 
imperative  
Avoid learning races, 










that depend on the 
relationship.  









and for exchange of 
information and 
knowledge. 
Best structural form 
to legalise 











One of the most attractive characteristics of an alliance structure is the flexibility it 
provides in operations without being bound to a legal contract. For example, a 
company can grow faster by using a partner’s distribution networks and taking 
advantage of a good brand image. Such partnerships can help to lower costs, 
especially in non-profit areas like research and development. Sharing knowledge, 
skills, brands, market knowledge, technical know-how and assets results in a 
pool of resources that is more valuable than a simple combination of the 
individual resources. 
  
Relational capital based on mutual trust and interaction at the individual level 
between alliance partners creates a basis for the transfer of learning and know-
how across the exchange interfaces (Kale et al. 2000). An issue with alliances 
centre on the difficulties of the informality of the cooperation settings. Alliances 
are problematic when decision-making powers are distributed unevenly; for 
example, the weaker partner might be forced to act according to the will of the 
more powerful partners. In a strategic alliance the partners must share skills and 
know-how. This can be critical if business secrets are included. Agreements can 
protect these secrets but the partner might not be willing to stick to such an 
agreement. 
 
2.3.3  Summary of Alliance Structures 
 
This synthesis of the literature suggests that working in an alliance structure 
offers great potential advantages: transfer of know-how, shared costs across 
organisations and mutually beneficial outcomes. For these advantages to accrue 
there must be shared compatible goals, openness and trust. Unlike a JVs an 
alliance allows the individual parties to keep their independence as organisations 
and still enhance their respective enterprises through the allied project or activity. 
These positive characteristics and advantages help define the opportunities that 





2.4   People-selection  
 
The core of the research question is people-selection. This section will examine 
the literature to gain a focus on the traditional and contemporary, the formal and 
informal, and the legitimate and less purist aspects of selection. As set out in 
Figure 2.3, Gatewood et al. (2016), documented a stepped approach in the 
development of a human resource (HR) selection program; this will be used as a 
traditional selection method from which to examine other selection approaches.  
 
Figure 2.3 Steps in the development of a selection program 
   









Gatewood et al.’s (2016) approach is the most common practice used by HR 
practitioners in people-selection. It has both qualitative and quantitative research 
to support its legitimacy and a positive track-record of real-world success to 
champion its continued use (Sanchez & Levine 2012). The steps in Figure 2.3 
show the first critical step of the process as job analysis: 'a purposeful, 
systematic process for collecting information on the important work-related 
aspects of a job' (Gatewood et al. 2016, p. 245). There are, however, alternatives 
to this step. Emerging trends in HR include personality-oriented work analysis, 
team and cognitive task analysis and strategic competency modeling. Many 
organisations have incorporated competency modelling (CM) instead of job 
analysis into their HR practices (Gatewood et al. 2016). 
 
2.4.1  Competency Modelling in People-selection  
 
Unlike job analysis (JA), CM focuses on overall goals and is less rigorous in data 
collection, detail, documentation and assessment of reliability (Schippmann et al. 
2000). Competencies are defined by Bartram (2005) as 'sets of behaviors that 
are instrumental in the delivery of desired results or outcomes' (p. 1187). This 
outcome focus allows a clearer understanding of CM and why a purely 
commercially oriented organisation would have a strong level of comfort with, 
and be predisposed to, this approach in the selection of its key personnel. 
However, while it has high face validity, this is ‘not a form of validity in a technical 
sense' (Gatewood et al. 2016, p. 146). CM also allows for competencies that all 
employees should possess in addition to their job-specific knowledge, skills and 
attributes. These consist of attributes that cut across tasks and are linked to 









Campion et al. (2011) list ten key differences between CM and JA. First, 
executives pay more attention to competency modelling. Second, CM is often 
intended to distinguish top performers from average performers. Third, CM often 
includes descriptions of how the competencies change or progress with 
employee level. Fourth, the knowledge, skills and attribute are usually linked to 
the business objectives and strategies. Fifth, CM is developed top down, rather 
than bottom up, as is job analysis. Sixth, CM may consider future job 
requirements either directly or indirectly. Seventh, CM is usually presented in a 
manner that facilitates ease of use. Eighth, in CM a finite number of 
competencies are typically identified and applied across multiple functions or job 
families. Ninth, CM is used actively to align HR systems. Tenth, CM is often more 
of an organisational development intervention that seeks broad organisational 
change, as opposed to a simple data-collection effort (Campion et al. 2011). As a 
consequence of these differences, CM is seen to have wider benefits for the 
organisation than JA. 
 
Within competence models, behavioural competency-based measures underpin 
levels of performance; consequently, when they are used in the selection 
process, they have the potential to predict future performance. Following Fowler 
et al. (2000), competence in the case under research is used in its broadest 
terms to include input, process and output perspectives. One of the limitations of 
behavioural-based competency constructs is that they are dynamic and 
sometimes difficult to identify (Fowler et al. 2000).  
  
2.4.2  People-selection and the Decision-making Process 
 
Based on Simon’s seminal work on bounded rationality in decision-making in the 
1980s and 90s (Simon 1985, 1993, 1999), in the selection process a rational 
decision invariably implies choosing the best person possible for the job, as well 
as using well-proven scientific assessment techniques that ensure an unbiased 





If this is not done and the decision is based on some form of personal 
attachment, efficiency will suffer (Blau & Meyer 1987). Therefore there seems to 
be no place in the discussion of rationality for employing a person due to 
relationship.  
 
Given the 'best for project' mantra, the bounded rationality perspective and the 
use of egalitarian norms, the question is, is equality relevant for legitimacy as 
well as justice in selection? The egalitarian view is that selection criteria are 
unjust when, without justification, some applicants face tougher selection criteria 
than others (Clayton 2012). Clayton (2012) elaborates on just criteria: 'The 
question of justice: What are the conditions the fulfillment of which renders a 
selection procedure fully just: that ensures that everyone fully enjoys the 
treatment [they] are due?' (p. 10). When equality is stressed, even if a hiring 
decision is permissible there remains a further morally relevant question: whether 
the selectors’ deliberations or motives are acceptable. A complete answer to that 
question assumes that, ideally, selectors are moved by the attitude of equal 
respect toward different individuals (Clayton 2012). This leads to the question of 
how the selectors deliberate. Conceptualising selection as a series of steps 
disguises the ongoing practical deliberations in the decision-making process 
(Bolander & Sandberg 2013). Bolander and Sandberg (2013), assert  that these 
deliberations involve 'four interrelated, discursive processes: assembling versions 
of candidates; establishing the versions of candidates as factual; reaching 
selections decisions; and using selection tools as sensemaking devices' (p. 285).  
 
Bolander and Sandberg (2013) attempt to look deeper into the selection 
decision- making process; however, their rationale is based on the assumption 
that there is a conscious, overt deliberation that allows initial agreement and/or 
disagreement on all or part of the candidates’ attributes for the position. Such 





The presumption that there is in fact any deliberation or, alternatively, that one 
party takes on the sole decision-making process and imposes their decision on 
all other parties is a significant area for examination. The use of selection tools 
as sense-making devices (Bolander & Sandberg 2013) to aid selection decisions 
implies that it is theoretically possible to predict performance on the job with 
near-perfect precision. Nevertheless, some people ‘have an inherent resistance 
to analytical approaches to selection because they fail to view selection as 
probabilistic and subject to error. Another [reason for not using selection aids] is 
the implicit belief that prediction of human behaviour is improved through 
experience. This myth of expertise results in an overreliance on intuition and a 
reluctance to undermine one’s own credibility by using a selection decision aid'  
(Highhouse 2008, p. 333).  
 
The discussion of the literature above highlights the abundance of frameworks 
and approaches through which the research data can be explored.  
 
 
2.5  People-selection in a Project Environment 
 
Figure 2.2 identifies the linkages in both context and process. This section 
examines the people-selection process in the context of the project environment 
to identify issues that may arise in this specific context. Probert (1997) states that 
the project management system or methodology is given higher priority than the 
selection and support of the project management team. 'It is untrue to say that 
total [project] failure is guaranteed in the other case, [the other case being a 
focus on project management systems or methodology] but it is much more likely'  
(Probert 1997, p. 142). Recruitment and selection in projects can be ad hoc with 







To assist project-based businesses the British Psychological Society and the 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development defined a best-practice 
approach to promote objectivity in selection through detailed taxonomies of job 
behaviours and techniques. These taxonomies focused on the use of project 
management tools, such as scheduling and cost estimation and tracking 
software. Behaviours covered issues where conflicts were most likely to occur: 
schedules, administrative procedures, personality conflicts and project priorities. 
Leadership was stated as one of the competencies, but the approach 
acknowledged that leadership means different things to different people. 'The 
overall findings of this paper imply that technical project management tools and 
methods are so well developed and widely used that now it is time to turn the 
focus on developing leadership skills' (Hyväri 2006, p. 223). The best-practice 
approach may act as a guide for trades and manual-labour roles in projects 
however little has been done on technical competencies and leadership in project 
management (Hyväri 2006). 
 
As human resources practices, such as selection systems, should reinforce the 
business’s core ideology, it is understandable that the selection process in a 
project environment goes far beyond the fit between person and person (Morley 
2007). Competency-based measures are increasingly being recognised as the 
best way to select and professionally develop project managers, particularly in 
the construction industry (Ahadzie et al. 2008). Functional/technical 
competencies measure performance against output-based criteria. As stated, in 
Section 2.4.1, behavioural competency-based measures underpin levels of 
performance; and consequently, when used in the selection process, they have 








However, Zingheim et al. (2003), highlight the similarity of definitions of 
competence across organisations and draw attention to the loss of competitive 
advantage by not defining the uniqueness of different positions in different 
organisations. The reason that competency-based approaches have become 
widely accepted in project management is their strategic importance. The iron 
triangle - on time, on budget, on specification - as the only measures of project 
performance perpetuates the myth of projects being one-off, short-term activities 
with no opportunities to develop individual career and organisation capability. 
This perspective (myth) was discussed earlier (section 2.2.2) from the standpoint 
of value co-creation and will be examined in detail in the findings in chapter 4. 
Competency-based measures support continuous performance improvement and 
thus contribute to superior performance levels (Bass 1990). 
 
2.5.1  People-selection for Project Teams 
 
Relational qualities need to be included in selection criteria to ensure that project 
partners accept collaborative arrangements around joint risk management 
(Rahman & Kumaraswamy 2005). With selection systems reinforcing the 
organisation’s core ideology (Collins & Porras 2002), the selection process itself 
can be a major source of value. Most projects are seen as one-off endeavours 
and consequently a number of roles, particularly at a senior level, are limited to 
only a few positions (Bass 1990).  
 
It is very cost-effective to purchase off-the-shelf instruments for selection as long 
as the predictor instruments have been strongly validated as generalisable to the 
knowledge, skills and attributes for the role being selected (Wienclaw 2013). 
Other than the debated premise that projects are one-off endeavours and 
consequently may be subject to less investment in in-depth selection practices, 
the literature does not differentiate between people-selection in a project 





2.6  Power and Control 
 
'Power aims to regulate free and autonomous actors who are acting on the 
 basis of different interests, motives and ideologies, but it does not aim to 
 strip the individual or collective actors of their capacity for free action'  
               (Braude 2010, p. 113).  
 
An examination of leadership selection decisions in project teams cannot be 
complete without discussion of the expertise that is embodied within that team. 
Expertise is a source of legitimate power (Raven and French, 1958). However, 
power does not stop with explicit expert power. ‘The execution of coercive and 
legitimate power by an authority assures cooperation and prohibits free-riding’ 
(Hofmann et al. 2017, p. 1) 
 
 This study considers what factors influence selection decisions in senior 
project leadership teams. The nature of influence is the capacity to have an effect 
on someone or something. This capacity is power, and 'is not a single entity. It 
represents a cluster of concepts' (Braude 2010, p. 3). The seminal work of Raven 
and French in the late 1950s investigated the effects of legitimate power as 
compared to coercion. They worked from earlier research that had defined five 
bases for social power: reward power, based on the individual's perception that 
another individual can mediate rewards for them; coercive power, based on the 
individual's perception that another individual has the ability to mediate 
punishments for them; legitimate power, based on the individual's perception that 
another individual has a legitimate right to prescribe behaviour for them; referent 
power, based on the individual's identification with another individual; and expert 
power, based on an individual's perception that another individual has some 






Raven and French (1958) then compared these types of power according to 
domain, degree of dependence of the given type of power upon the individual, 
importance of publicity in contributing toward influence, and effects of a given 
type of power on the continuing relationship between the individual and the agent 
(Raven & French 1958, p. 83). 
 
These early explanations do not define the actors in any specific form, although 
they establish a hierarchy with the powerful individual, or agent, having real or 
perceived authority over the other individual. In recent times this authority has 
been described 'as processes or individuals which organize the cooperation in a 
community by an assigned social position that allows to create and maintain 
environments and thereby influence the behavior of individuals' (Hofmann et al. 
2017, p. 1). These authorities can be a government, statutory and regulatory 
bodies, professional organisations and businesses. Through the use of legitimate 
power and coercive power these entities have the means to encourage 
cooperation. Cooperation using legitimate power comes from the authority using 
its position, expertise and/or policy to have others identify with it, whereas the 
authority uses coercive power in the form of control, monitoring and heavy 
punishment (Hofmann et al. 2017). 
 
Perceptions of power shape the way businesses and people develop and pursue 
their goals and objectives. Assuring cooperation and prohibiting performance 
deficit are benefits of an authority executing coercive and legitimate power. 
However, individuals’ perceptions of the businesses use of power affect the way 
they think about that business in terms of how it uses power and the impact of 
that on the team. For example, the three enabling factors for project-team 
knowledge management - team autonomy, performance measurement and 
incentive system and continuity – contribute to a team’s stability (Eppler & 






2.6.1  Power and Selection 
 
In terms of selection of project teams, particularly the project management team, 
the perception of the authority's influence through their use of their power, 
whether legitimate or coercive (or both), may elicit cooperation however, the 
underlying cognition may differ. 'The perception of these powers wielded by 
authorities stimulates specific cognitions: trust, relational climates and motives. 
Findings reveal that coercive power increases an antagonistic climate and 
enforced compliance, whereas legitimate power increases reason-based trust, a 
service climate and voluntary cooperation' (Hofmann et al. 2017, p. 1). This 
rationale offers the intuitive and reassuring insight that enforced compliance is 
less effective than voluntary cooperation. 
 
2.6.2  Power, Politics and Trust 
 
Landells and Albrecht (2017) develop the work of Raven and French by 
researching political behaviours and describing them in terms that relate to five 
established bases of organisational power: connection power, information power, 
coercive power, positional power and personal power. Rosen et al. (2009) define 
organisational politics as 'activities that are illegitimate, self-serving, and often 
harmful to the organization or its members' (p.203). However Landells and 
Albrecht (2017) suggest that organisational politics can be seen as ‘a useful 
strategy that helps to get things done (strategic), and as central to organizational 
functioning and decision-making (integrated)' (p.41). There are a number of 
beneficial outcomes of these political power behaviours including improved 
decision-making, improved communications and the achievement of 
organisational goals (Landells & Albrecht 2017). This approach highlights 
positive aspects of organisational politics which is usually viewed in a negative 
light; these positive aspects are worth taking into account when considering 





'Trust is regarded as a mediator between power and cooperative performance. 
Trust and power are considered to be two necessary mechanisms for promoting 
cooperation among construction partners.' (Lu & Hao 2013, p. 522). Further 
research suggests that the type of power used will have a significant impact on 
the outcome. Although Lu and Hao’s (2013) research is undertaken in a Chinese 
context, it is relevant in that the research framework is similar to the case under 
study: a supplier-client relationship in an industrial setting. Their results reveal 
that both trust and coercive power improve client and supplier integration. 
However when trust is low, coercive power reduces internal integration. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom that coercive power hinders cooperation, an earlier study 
found that coercive power improves integration, with or without the presence of 
trust (Yeung et al. 2009). It is also true that legitimate power can have an 
amplifying effect in an antagonistic climate and a strengthening effect on 
enforced compliance. However, solely reason-based trust, but not climate 
perceptions and motives, mediates the relationship between power and intended 
cooperation (Hofmann et al. 2017). In addition, it is expected that whereas the 
individual who exercises legitimate power will become more personally attractive 
to another, the coercive power figure will be less accepted (Yeung et al. 2009). 
 
2.6.3  Consequences of Exercising Power 
 
Raven and French (1958) conclude that 'the net effect of non-legitimate and 
coercive influence may be an increased discrepancy between private and public 
opinion and behavior, with its resulting tensions' (p. 83). More than a half-century 
later, the research focuses less on the distinction between power, politics and 
influence and more on the perspectives of organisational politics according to 







Understanding power and its use in organisational contexts opens up the debate 
regarding positive and negative outcomes of political behaviour. It cannot be 
assumed that when two parties are talking, witnessing or engaging in behaviours 
relating to power politics they are cognitively processing the same phenomenon. 
Research by Reiley and Jacobs (2016) found that leaders' use of power, (expert, 
referent and reward) had the greatest influence on performance when the 
followers perceived these leaders to be more ethical. 
 
Landells and Albrecht (2017) identify five kinds of organisational politics: build 
and use relationships; observe and interpret the decision-making context; 
manipulate and undermine others; control decisions and resources; and build 
personal reputation. Two characteristics of control of decisions and resources, 
are 'positioning yourself to control decisions' and 'disregarding others' advice' 
(Landells & Albrecht 2017, p. 50). This view strengthens the researchers’ 
assertion that decisions are not always rational.  
 
 
2.7  Legitimacy 
 
The efficiency of a project team can be enhanced if all members trust each other 
(Chow et al. 2012). They identify that trust building mechanisms and trust 
expectations must be legitimately built through inter-relational trust-building 
behaviours, citing self-awareness, responsiveness and value congruency, as 
seen by the trustor, as criteria for legitimate trust. As stated in section 2.6.2, 
Yeung et al. (2009) note that individuals who exercise legitimate power will 
become more personally attractive to another. The link therefore between 
legitimacy, power and trust must be examined in any study of factors in selection 







'Every authority system tries to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy' (Zelditch & 
Walker 2003, p. 219). Legitimacy is affected by internal power relations, in the 
sense that the ability to influence what is considered to be proper decision-
making procedures and proper justifications for decisions is a fundamental 
source of power (Gutiérrez & Magnusson 2014). Both of these premises, 
cultivating a belief in legitimacy and the effect of internal power relations on 
legitimacy, are examined in the case under study, as they provide the context of 
the selection of the project leadership team (PLT). The literature is loosely 
bracketed by a dichotomy of precise definition of Government regulation and 
procedural justice on the one hand and the esoteric thought-world of individuals' 
rationales on the other. At the extreme of the individual’s thought-world, 
legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder.  
 
2.7.1  Characteristics of Legitimacy 
 
As noted above, legitimacy is a concept meant to capture the beliefs that bolster 
willing obedience (Levi et al. 2009). Organisations need to gain legitimacy among 
external and internal stakeholders, and once attained it must be maintained and 
sometime repaired. Legitimacy is not directly observable; it is an abstract 
concept. Organisational legitimacy can be characterised in terms of social 
judgements and evaluated in terms of status and reputation. Evaluations of 
organisational legitimacy involve bounded rationality, along with cognitive and 
sociopolitical issues (Bitektine 2011). Legitimacy is a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions 
(Suchman 1995). The theme of the many definitions of legitimacy is that it is the 
relationship between what organisations say and what they do in the context of 





External actors need to have a belief or feeling that the organisation is worthy, 
effective, efficient, competent or even needed. Here again is the concept that 
legitimacy exists in the eye of the beholder.  
 
There are three types of legitimacy: regulative, normative and cognitive (Scott 
1995). Regulative is about complying with the laws of the land and the rulings of 
regulatory bodies, and being a good citizen. It indicates to stakeholders that the 
venture is acceptable even if little is known about how effective the rules are in 
meeting the desired end. Power based on legal-rational legitimacy remains the 
sine qua non of the rule of law. Normative legitimacy includes fair treatment of 
employees along with rationality, especially on a cost-benefit basis. It can be 
achieved through networks which mitigate the liability of newness and allow the 
recipient to piggyback on the endorsing organisation's legitimacy.  
 
Cognitive legitimacy addresses widely held beliefs and taken-for-granted 
assumptions that provide a framework for everyday routines, as well as more-
specialised, explicit and codified knowledge and belief systems. Actors learn 
more about their identities and what is expected of them (roles) and what the 
game is; hence cognitive legitimacy socially constructs reality for the participants. 
This is a summary of concepts from Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002, pp.418-21).  
 
2.7.2  Legitimate, Not Legitimate 
 
The discussion in the literature about legitimacy highlights a somewhat 
paradoxical theme in that there is a dichotomy between being legitimate or not, 
yet there are degrees of legitimacy. Zimmerman and Zeita (2002) suggest a 
threshold across which something is judged legitimate and once an entity has 
crossed that threshold, its legitimacy may be rated on a scale from low to high. 
However there is little discussion on what constitutes this threshold at the base 





Even those decision-making approaches that have passed the legitimacy 
threshold do not have the same legitimacy. There is an extent to which people 
accept the decision-making approaches; in other words, legitimate behaviour for 
decision-making is socially constructed through interpretation. It is widely 
accepted in decision-making theory that, because of cognitive limitations and the 
nature of decision situations, it is not always possible for people to make 
decisions in a purely rational way. Informal approaches to decision-making, 
based on interaction and learning, are necessary in the presence of uncertainty. 
Different levels of decision-making approaches encounter different levels of 
acceptance in organisations; these levels determine whether they are seen as 
legitimate (Gutiérrez & Magnusson 2014). 
 
One view of legitimacy has been that it operates largely at the subconscious or 
preconscious level, and therefore that there is little chance that organisations 
would be aware of it and/or use deliberate strategies to manipulate it (Suchman 
1995). However, legitimation, according to Jackson and Klobas (2008), is a 
process that organisations use to ensure that knowledge is authorised by people 
or groups who have power, and that meanings are validated and accepted as 
'correct' or 'standard' by others (Jackson & Klobas 2008, p. 331).  Strategic 
legitimation is a process that deploys evocative symbols to gain support. The 
organisation can take proactive steps to acquire legitimacy by changing itself 
and/or changing the environment (for example, changing the organisations 
operating in it). According to Suchman (1995), there are three basic legitimation 
strategies - conformance, selection and manipulation. Conformance, as the 
name suggests, is achieved by actors conforming to demands and expectations; 
it requires the least external change. Selection involves some level of conformity 







Manipulation is about preemptive intervention, 'to develop bases of support 
specifically tailored to the distinctive needs of the organization' (Suchman 1995, 
p. 591). It is about redefining legitimacy - 'as the purposeful and opportunistic 
attempt to co-opt, influence, or control institutional pressures and evaluations' 
(Oliver 1991, p. 157). 
 
2.7.3  Legitimacy in People-selection 
 
When considering people-selection, what conditions need to be fulfilled to 
generate reasons to comply with or accept a selection decision – in other words, 
what makes people-selection decisions legitimate?  There are two conditions of 
legitimate selection: procedural conditions of a selection policy have been 
decided and administered in the right way, and the decisions arising from the 
selection procedure is sufficiently just (Clayton 2012, p. 28).  
 
Engholm (2001) asserts: 'Legitimacy is also assumed if applicants know that 
assessment methods are fair and just, and skills, knowledge and experience are 
the pivotal elements to selection decisions' (p. 2). He goes on to say that, 'if 
rational behaviour guides the selection process in an organisation, it shall also 
promote legitimacy ... and legitimacy is also assumed if fairness and equality in 
the selection and recruitment procedure is ensured' (p. 2).  
 
2.7.3.1 Legitimacy in People-selection Decisions 
 
The prescriptive literature on people-selection is mainly based on rational 
decision-making. Max Weber (2000) defines rationality as 'increased 
management control over and coordination of the workforce, detachment of 
personal feelings and sentiments from decision-making, clear set rules and 
objectives, focus on knowledge and expertise, and the absence of traditional, 





Weber observes that modern organisations need to behave rationally to become 
more efficient and effective in an increasingly competitive capitalist market 
economy (Weber 2000). This goes to the essence of management credibility and 
meritocratic selection. Clayton (2012) suggests a flaw in this perspective: what 
he calls a 'stringency objection' that 'rests on a failure to distinguish between 
evaluating selection procedures from the perspective of justice and judging them 
according to the standards of legitimacy' (p. 10). He goes on to say that it does 
not follow that if a particular selection is unjust it is also illegitimate. A legitimate 
procedure gives rise to a legitimate decision but it does not follow that an 
illegitimate procedure gives rise to an illegitimate decision. Legitimacy is a less 
demanding notion than justice (Clayton 2012). Zimmerman and Zeita (2002) 
suggest that the concept, 'that legitimacy provides a basis for decision-making 
that is different from means-end rational' (p. 416) is key.  
 
Rational and formal decision-making processes are seen as more legitimate 
however making decisions only by rational and formal approaches lacks flexibility 
(Gutiérrez & Magnusson 2014). Rational decision-making approaches might be 
considered appropriate in situations when the quality of information enables 
people to seek out alternatives, state clear criteria based on preferences and 
make an optimal choice. The assumption is not only that consistent choices will 
be made through a formal and hierarchical decision-making processes, but that 
these choices will maximise the value of the firm, through systematic 
assessments of alternatives in comparison to predetermined criteria (Gutiérrez & 
Magnusson 2014). Gutierrez and Magnusson (2014) further state that decision-
makers deal with legitimacy by certain mechanisms that allow them to bypass 
approaches with high acceptance and legitimising decisions made using those 
with low acceptance. Legitimacy and how decision-makers deal with it, are key 






The research question asks for the factors that influence people-selection 
decision. In pursuit of legitimacy in people selection some constructs and 
consequences appear unavoidable. Brunsson states, 'Legitimacy is affected by 
internal power relations that allow some groups to influence what is considered 
proper decision-making procedures and proper justifications for decisions and by 
what is regarded as proper practices among external and internal stakeholders 
and by values rooted in a more general societal level'. (Brunsson 2007, p. 162).  
Therefore in examining the research question this review encourage a close look 
at the legitimacy of the decisions made through the prism of bounded rationality, 
along with cognitive and sociopolitical issues. 
 
 
2.8  Project Knowledge Management (PKM) 
 
The power perspectives included in the previous sections includes the concept of 
expert power, based on an individual's perception that another individual has 
some special knowledge or expertise (Raven & French 1958). The research 
question seeks to understand the elements of influence affecting the inputs to a 
selection decision. PKM is a key area of examination not only for its standalone 
impact in the project context but as a subset of power as identified by Raven and 
French (1958). 
 
There is an increasing appreciation that knowledge is a key organisational asset. 
Normann's (1991) work (previously discussed in Section 2.2.3) cited his own 
perspectives of knowledge and value. Knowledge, he argues, can be tangible 
products, effective instruments into which past activities can be frozen and made 
available to actors for their present and future value-creating activities. However, 
physical products are not the only way; rather, people (as a result of education 
and experience), manuals, systems, language and culture also carry knowledge. 
The product itself is a knowledge-carrying component of the entire knowledge-





The knowledge perspective here clearly supports the influence of PKM in the 
value-creation process in project environments. The benefits of knowledge 
management (KM) - cutting costs, reducing risk, preventing repeated mistakes, 
ensuring continuous improvement, safeguarding corporate memory, not ‘re-
inventing the wheel’, enabling quick response, facilitating the sharing of 
experience and fostering learning and favourable staffing - are well documented 
in the literature, particularly for project-based businesses (Eppler & Sukowski 
2000; Hanisch et al. 2009; Owen et al. 2004; Pretorius & Steyn 2005; Rokooei 
2015). Many studies emphasise that the capture and codification of knowledge 
through an information technology-based approach to PKM has limitations; for 
example, knowledge is often tacit and situated with particular social groups 
(Belout & Gauvreau 2004; Bresnen et al. 2003; Eppler & Sukowski 2000; Owen 
et al. 2004).  
 
2.8.1  Project Knowledge Management (PKM) and Project Portfolio  
  Management (PPM) 
 
Hanisch et al. (2009) and Bresnen, Edelman et al. (2003) characterize projects 
as unique and temporary undertakings; this downplays the role of project 
portfolio management (PPM) and the significance of PKM to effectiveness and 
competitive advantage. PPM is used, usually in project offices, to centrally 
manage processes, methods and technologies to analyse and collectively 
manage current or proposed projects. PPM through inter-project, close-to-real- 
time PKM, gives organisations the flexibility to develop emergent strategies. This 
ability is a particular asset in turbulent times when deliberate strategies rely on 
formal and rigid strategy processes (Kopmann et al. 2017). As discussed in 
Section 2.3, selection of alliance partners in projects is predominately based on 
what each party can bring in know-how, experience and expertise; these are all 
part of PKM, although not all of them are embodied in a concrete and systematic 





Hanisch et al. (2009) identify specific problems and challenges relating to KM, 
but do not identify how to manage knowledge in project-based businesses. This 
view may be a product of their simplistic, general definition of PKM as 'knowledge 
management in project situations, that is, both within projects and between 
projects' (Hanisch et al. 2009, p. 148). This suggests the ephemeral nature of the 
project structure but masks the fact that, particularly in project-based 
endeavours, knowledge is often tacit – in other words unspoken (Nonaka & 
Toyama 2003) – and, situated in social groups and situations (Bresnen et al. 
2003).  
 
2.8.2  PKM and Tacit Knowledge 
 
The focus on the management of explicit knowledge is widespread in project 
management; however, little attention is given to the sharing of tacit knowledge 
through human interaction (Pretorius & Steyn 2005). From a business and 
project perspective, where a great deal of knowledge is tacit by virtue of being 
situated in individuals, social groups and situations, this knowledge becomes 
much more difficult to exploit. Individuals and their networks, have significant 
capital intellectual and social capital. According to Nahaplet and Ghoshal (1998), 
social capital is 'the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the 
assets that may be mobilised through that network' (p. 243). These assets 







The value embedded in PKM is not only individuals’ knowledge, but also their 
willingness and ability to clearly articulate it through a system of meaning for 
understanding, acceptance and deployment. Due to constant interpretation and 
re-contextualisation, no (individually) stored knowledge can remain 
untransformed; social capital is the filter through which intellectual capital is 
accessed (Walker & Christenson 2005). In examining knowledge-sharing in 
engineering project design teams to achieve an efficient design, Zhang and 
Cheng (2015) investigate the role of the network component of social capital. The 
mediating role of social capital has a significant indirect effect on knowledge- 
sharing (Zhang & Cheng 2015). This has implications for selection decision-
making and the overall attraction and retention of these individual's and the 
capital they bring to the project. 
 
2.8.3  Project Knowledge-sharing Enablers 
 
In project-team KM terms, an incentive system, continuity and autonomy are the 
three enabling factors for individuals to share their knowledge, according to 
Eppler and Sukowski (2000). The incentive system needs to have direct effects 
on knowledge-sharing behaviour. Placing people into key roles that empower 
leadership and a positive team climate significantly influences individuals' 
knowledge-sharing behaviour by affecting their attitude toward sharing their 
information, insights and suggestions (Xue et al. 2011). This has practical 
implications for recruitment and team design to facilitate knowledge-sharing.  
 
Bresnen et al. (2003) contend that there is very little detailed analysis of social 
mechanisms that support knowledge-sharing across projects and the 
communities that link them together. In more recent times the inclusion of the 






Organisations that are predominantly project-based or have a single project of a 
size and history to justify its own project office, as in this study case, have moved 
some way to capturing hard data for use across projects (Walker & Christenson 
2005). However few companies have moved to people-warehouse the 
individuals' project knowledge. In other words, the significant function of PKM, 
that is its propagation, still sits with the individuals; in the majority of cases it 
migrates with them across projects and shapes their careers. Due to this 
embodied nature of knowledge within the skill sets and competencies of 
individuals and groups, overcoming barriers to effective PKM requires a range of 
interventions, which are broadly on a continuum of 'cognitive' to 'community' 
models of KM (Bresnen et al. 2003, p. 158). The cognitive models are 
information-technology-based for retention and circulation, whilst the community 
models focus on the tacit dimensions of knowledge, particularly, its stickiness to 
social groups and/or individuals.  
 
2.8.3.1 Project Knowledge-sharing Interventions 
 
Hanisch et al. (2009) develop project knowledge-sharing interventions, extracting 
four categories of success factors for PKM: information and communication 
technology; organization; methods; and culture and communication. Information 
and communication technology are identified as an enabler; methods, which they 
define broadly as easy-to-use project standards and processes, are more of a 
hygiene factor in PKM. Hanisch et al.’s (2009) discussion on PKM leads to what 
they conclude to be the fundamental important factor of PKM: culture. 
  
Owen et al. (2004) had previously reported this view of culture as an important 
factor of PKM, stating that effective PKM requires a strategic fit between social 
networks, technology, processes and corporate culture supported by a 





Using Bresnen et al.’s (2003) continuum (discussed earlier in this section) as a 
reference point, the research of Green and Aitken (2006), Jackson and Klobas 
(2008), Hanisch et al. (2009) and Guldberg et al. (2013) would suggest that the 
resources that organisations apply to PKM are strongly weighted toward 
cognitive models, but that project and business objectives would be better served 
by investment in community-based models. 
 
There is some evidence that cognitive/e-tool models of PKM are in fact growing 
in the commercial arena; examples include systems like Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) and Building Information Modeling (BIM) both of 
have been characterize as Computer Aided Design (CAD) meeting PKM 
(Rokooei 2015). However, the claim that, for example; the BIM system through 
its integrated project delivery 'recruits all parties involved in the project and 
makes them a coherent team' (Rokooei 2015, p. 89), is at best a marketing pitch 
rather than a reflection of any realistic capability of any system in today's world. 
Rokooei (2015) does integrate the human factor to some degree acknowledging 
that because mutual relationships are a feature of such systems, user 
characteristics do influence their effectiveness. Technology and structures can 
only enable bringing people together to share and create knowledge. Jackson 
and Klobas (2008) are strongly critical of organisations that 'continue to attempt 
to implement systems which ignore these social constructions' (Jackson & 
Klobas 2008, p. 336).  
 
2.8.4  PKM and Selection 
 
If individual and social constructs are so important in PKM, the selection 
challenge is to attract and retain people who can not only make tacit knowledge 
explicit but also to work out how social practices are played out within the project 
management team and find ways of aligning them. The selection challenge is 
further complicated in an alliance-executed project, where each partner 





While resources are very consciously applied to the alignment and integration of 
systems in these projects, in PKM terms the lens has little focus on people-
selection. Bresnen et al. (2003) suggest two reasons for this: First, because 
projects are highly task-focused they mitigate against the emergence of actor 
networks that establish a community based on shared understanding.  
 
Second, knowledge and learning 'inevitably cut across strong institutional, 
professional and contractual boundaries and demarcations' (Bresnen et al. 2003, 
p. 159). This environment is 'likely to have a negative effect on the 'absorptive 
capacity' of the organisation - its ability to recognise the value of new knowledge, 
assimilate it with existing knowledge, and apply it to commercial ends'  (Bresnen 
et al. 2003, p. 159). 
 
The mitigation of these two conditions, at least in part, lies within the 
characteristics and personalities of the individuals selected into project roles. The 
competency models and selection frameworks discussed earlier in this chapter 
need to take into account the individual's propensity to cultivate trust and share 
values across communities of practice (Bresnen et al. 2003). If this occurs, PKM 
objectives within the endeavour are more likely to be cultivated as knowledge is 
created, diffused, applied and influenced by context-in-practice through 
collaborative mechanisms such as joint work and dialogue. For PKM objectives 
to be achieved and leveraged to generate new intellectual capital, four conditions 
must be met: individual's must see an existing opportunity for combining or 
exchanging knowledge; they must anticipate value to be derived from the 
exchange; there must be motivation to share; and the organisation or individual 
must have a real or perceived capacity to learn or absorb new knowledge 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). This insight suggests a further focus on the project- 
environment and team-fit inputs to the selection decision-making framework, as 






2.8.4.1 PKM and Intra-project Selection  
 
The literature regarding PKM concentrates mainly on the management of 
knowledge across projects. Outside of the discussion around the project-office 
management of knowledge in projects of significant size, very little is mentioned 
about the knowledge transfer within any one project. This is a significant issue in 
mega-projects, as study phases often gradually morph into the execution phase 
rather than having a structured end and beginning.  This is not so much in the 
overt stage-gates of time, budget and specification in the project but certainly 
regarding individuals, networks and project social norms where, as discussed, a 
great deal of project knowledge resides and is transformed into project benefits 
through the retention of these soft assets. Eppler and Sukowski (2000) highlight 
continuity as one of three enabling factors of project-team KM, suggesting that a 
stable team composition leads to high levels of performance in projects. The 
other two factors are team autonomy and performance management and 
incentive systems. These enabling factors apply both between and within 
projects. 
 
Eppler and Sukowski (2000) suggest a more complete process of team 
knowledge auditing that could feed into a competency model for selection.  
Their suggestion is similar to a task analysis and matching process with 
individuals and applies to both new recruits and people currently on the project. 
The know-what, know-how, know-who approach for everyone on the project, 
particularly in the management group, helps avoid implied knowledge expertise 
due to time on the project alone; the flawed assumption being that length time on 







From this review there is evidence that at least two characteristics of PKM have 
significant impact on the people in senior project roles, yet are not, or not overtly 
at least, considered factors in their selection. Tacit knowledge because of its 
power to influence the outcome of a project needs further examination as a factor 
in the selection of the project leadership team. Similarly the intra-project 
knowledge transfer, including tacit knowledge, not only within the implementation 
phase of a project but also between phases, also needs examination as a 
foundation consideration for people-selection.      
 
 
2.9  Relationship Capital 
 
In the two previous sections relationships and their influence on selection 
decisions have appeared as a persistent theme. Section 2.6 - Power and Control 
made reference to referent power, based on the individual's identification with 
another individual (Raven & French 1958) and to building and using relationships 
(Landells & Albrecht 2017).  Section 2.8 - Project Knowledge Management  
highlighted the tacit dimensions of knowledge, particularly, its stickiness to social 
groups and/or individuals (Bresnen et al. 2003); it also highlighted that PKM 
requires a strategic fit between social networks, technology, processes and 
corporate culture supported by a preference for informal over formal networks 
(Owen et al. 2004). 
 
2.9.1  Relationship and Other Capital 
 
Relationship capital (RC) has for the most part, had a marketing skew in the 
business world. It is spoken of in terms of customers, suppliers and employees 
and measured, amongst other things, by business sustainability through 
customer retention, positive word-of-mouth referrals and better matching of 





RC is a part of the corporate lexicon along with intellectual capital (IC) and 
human capital (HC) and more recently has been considered to form a portion of 
the intangible assets by which businesses are measured, bought, and sold. A 
review of the literature reveals that the definition of RC is very diverse, on the 
spectrum from the very generic (encompassing all relationships) to the very 
specific, depending on the definer's background and context: industrial, 
economic, market, organisational or psychographical. Most of these descriptions 
show major differences in their concepts; however, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that RC will play a different role in a different milieu. Its definition is also 
clouded by the often loose conceptualisation of RC’s bond to other concepts, 
including IC and SC. 
  
The struggle in interpretation of the literature regarding RC, IC and SC is that 
sometimes they will appear to be on the same overarching human-capital ladder 
of abstraction and at other times appear quite divorced from it. In particular, RC 
and SC are used as proxies for each other in the literature (Belout & Gauvreau 
2004; Sarkar et al. 2001; Tansley & Newell 2007). These inadequate descriptions 
may be explained, to some degree, by the evolution of the terms and growing 
clarity about their meaning as greater insights are achieved through ongoing 
research. The bridging and bonding aspects of RC to SC are summarised in 
Table 2.4 below.     
   
2.9.2  The RC-SC Spectrum 
 
According to Peters (2015), RC is an open standard of accounting for the quality 
of the interactions between entities, including people, businesses, and products. 
Interactions include, commitments (actions) and perceptions (thoughts and 
feelings). Unlike most definitions of RC, this definition highlights perceptions as a 
part of RC and opens up how RC may be used by the group or individual who 





As relationships can be casual, fleeting and one-sided the capital is subjective. 
For example, a fan who has – and in fact is encouraged to have - a relationship 
with a pop-star or a football team is rarely known personally by the star or the 
team members, however the relationship value to that person is very positive in 
things like personal enjoyment, belonging, broader group recognition and shared 
satisfaction in the success of their star/team. Similar efficacy can also be found in 
an organisational context. In contrast SC is where psychological contracts are 
honoured and where genuine and positive reciprocity is central to the concept.  
 
Table 2.4 Social capital compared with relationship capital 
 
 Social Capital Relationship Capital  




Definition  The sum of the 
actual and potential 
resources embedded 
within, available 
through, and derived 
from the network of 
relationships 
possessed by an 
individual or social 
unit. Social capital 
thus comprises both 
the network and the 
assets that may be 
mobilised through 
that network.  
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
1998, p. 243) 
The value (real or 
perceived) of all 
relationships.  
(Ecclestone & Field 








to a large 
degree. 
Recognition Mutual; agreed on  Individual; subjective Agreed -vs- 
perceived  
Reciprocity Central to the 
concept;  genuine 
and positive 
A pretext based on 
expectation 






Table 2.4 Social capital compared with relationship capital (cont’d) 
    
Obligation Generalised for 
repayment in the 
future  
None required  As stated 
Foundation  Trust as the 
antecedent  
Perception of 
companion trust  
Genuine trust as 
opposed to 
perceived trust  
Benefit  Mutual e.g. open 
knowledge exchange 
Plethora of real 
and perceived 
benefits 
SC has a 
consciousness of 
the benefits 
whereas RC can 
be ‘eye of the 
beholder’ 
Need Reciprocal Belonging SC = 2 way; RC 
= 1 way 
Type of 
relationship 
Bonding Indirect casual to 
direct formal. Can 
even be fickle. 
SC = 2 way; RC 
= 1 way 
Strength of 
relationship 
Strong and usually 
long-term 
Very low to very 
strong depending 
on which party is 
measuring 
SC has a 
consciousness of 
the mutual 
strength of the 
relationship and 
value it;  whereas 




Interaction Developed and 
exploited 










expected to be 
honoured 
Genuine in the 
commitment to 
be honoured -v- a 
pretext. 
  





2.9.3  Characteristics of RC 
 
The calculation of RC includes: positional (role-based) power and personal 
influence; type of relationship; strength of relationship; and number of touch 
points (direct or indirect contact) on both sides (Ecclestone & Field 2003, p. 270). 
The strength of these characteristics may designate the value of RC and move 
the relationship toward SC. 'Over time, interaction and connections give rise to 
shared norms, trust and reciprocity which in turn fosters cooperation to achieve 
common ends ... social capital is defined in terms of relationships and 
collectivities' (Tansley & Newell 2007, p. 354). 
 
As noted in the previous section, trust is fundamental to the exploitation of project 
knowledge and social capital. Newell and Swan (2000) developed a three-fold 
typology of trust: commitment, companion and competency trust. Commitment 
trust is mostly formal agreement but can also be psychological, and is based on 
the parties’ expectations that, through cooperative relations, there will be mutual 
benefit. If a contract must be referenced by either party at any time the trust is 
already in decline or totally lost. Companion trust is developed over time and is 
more strongly based in morals and emotions. The parties expect honesty and 
openness due to the presence of goodwill or personal friendships. The loss of 
companion trust will cause the greatest rift between parties. Competence trust is 
based on an attitude of respect for the trustee's ability to undertake the task at 
hand. It is gained quickly but is fragile and can be just as quickly lost if the trustee 
does not perform (pp. 1295-6). Reflected in these characteristics is a spectrum 
based on the quality of interaction between SC and RC. At the RC end of the 
spectrum interaction can be casual, fleeting and one-sided; at the SC end, the 
interaction quality is increased to a level of shared norms, trust, reciprocity and 






RC in project management has both micro and macro meanings. In a macro 
sense it is the contacts, networks and experience of people and cultures that the 
individual may bring to the project. In contrast, micro RC is the positive 
personality traits, interests and skills that when invested in the project, bring 
positive working relationship and teamwork synergies. From some perspectives 
relationship capital is seen as organisational political capital. In the five 
categories of organisational political behaviour discussed in Section 2.6.2, to 
build and use relationships is the foremost. Significantly Landells and Albrecht 
(2017) report that one of the three main reasons for doing this is to 'build key 
relationships and networks for use in the future' (p. 48). As a consequence, when 
considering the factors that influence the selection of people for a project 
leadership team it is necessary to consider the value of relationships. 
 
 
2.10  Summary 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter the key objective of this study is to 
understand the factors that influence selection decisions in the leadership teams 
of alliance mega-project structures. The literature review was an iterative process 
beginning with this research question from an existing problem (how was the 
project leadership team selected?). Thus, an initial literature review was 
conducted based on the key words in the research question – selection, 
decision-making, mega-project management. This search revealed gaps in the 
literature, and informed a narrowing of the research question. The final version of 
the research question was formed to answer questions that were not adequately 
addressed in the existing literature. How do the eight multi-disciplinary literature 
streams discussed in this chapter support these objectives? As indicated in 
Chapter 1 (section 1.8) the case findings (Chapter 4) reflect the context in which 
the selections decisions occurred and the actors’ responses to the selection- 





The sections in this chapter on Project Management (Section 2.2), Alliance 
Projects (Section 2.3), People-selection (Section 2.4) and People-selection in a 
Project Environment (Section 2.5) support understanding of the pertinent 
contextual factors that influence the selection decisions in this case.  
 
Figure 2.4 Literature review context schema 
 
Project 
    Infrastructure  
       Mega 
       Alliance 
           Leadership Team 
 
The discussion of contextual factors from the literature highlights that although 
there has been some research into the macro issue of selection of alliance 
partners, there has been little or no research about how people who are to 
manage the alliance organisations are selected. There is recognition in the 
literature that a project environment is different from the conventional structure of 
business; however, there is little examination of the impact on selection decision-
making within this environment.   
 
In what has been called the biggest investment boom in history, mega-projects 
are constantly growing ever larger (Flyvbjerg 2017). The management of the 
supersized iron triangle (on time, on budget, on specification) of mega-projects is 
identified as a main challenge of mega-projects and has not improved positively 
(schedule delay, cost overrun and benefit shortfall) in the 90 years in which 
comparable data is available and too consistently is being conceded to the iron 
law of megaprojects; “over budget, overtime, under benefits, over and over 






The core of the research question is the factors influencing selection decisions. 
In his extensive research on mega-projects, including that on challenges, causes 
and cures, Flyvbjerg (2014, 2017) nowhere mentions the selection of people into 
roles on megaproject teams but does highlight the errors of these people in non-
delivery of project outcome. This after-the-fact view begs the question of, was the 
poor delivery in some way due to the factors in the selection of these people?  
Literature in this area spotlights bounded rationality and uses egalitarian norms 
of equality and justice in selection. Further, the literature examines the morally 
relevant question of whether selectors’ deliberations or motives are acceptable, 
and asserts that the answer must refer to the ideal of selectors being moved by 
the attitude of equal respect toward different individuals (Clayton 2012). There is 
a suggestion that this can be done by conceptualising selection as a series of 
steps for practical deliberations in decision-making: 'assembling versions of 
candidates; establishing the versions of candidates as factual; reaching 
selections decisions; and using selection tools as sensemaking devices' 
(Bolander & Sandberg 2013, p. 285).  
 
Figure 2.5 Literature review process schema 
 
People Selection 
               Decision-making 
 
The four literature streams (Sections 2.6 to 2.9) that feature in the dynamic 
processes that place each individual into their particular roles suggest that this is 
far from the reality. Stockholder and stakeholder dynamics, client power-in-use, 
leverage of tacit knowledge and relations and the effect of cognitive and 






As addressed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 the mega-project environment presents 
a unique context for these people-selection processes to gestate. This amalgam 
suggests a gap and highlights a unique opportunity for deeper research. 
 
The research question is as follows:  
What factors influence the selection decisions for leadership teams in 






CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter details the research design and methodology and illustrates why 
they are appropriate for exploring the research question. The terms “quantitative” 
and “qualitative” as applied to research methods are sometimes used 
dichotomously to indicate different ends of sociological field research. This study 
is positioned in the qualitative genre, as it employs retroductive analysis and 
ethnography methods. The selection of these methods is due to their capacity to 
facilitate exploratory studies within real-world environments as is the case in this 
research. The research question asked what factors influence selection decisions 
and looked to thicken the descriptions of these elements as a contribution to the 
overall research in a number of fields, including people-selection and decision-
making. 
 
For the first part the research opportunity and self-ethnographic approach were 
presented to the researcher as the unique situation of insider-research (Brannick 
& Coghlan 2007) through being employed as a consultant to work on the project 
rather than in the project. As Alvesson (2003) states, for this type of study, 
observing participation is better than participant observation. The retroductive 
interviews and content analysis completed the research methods and supplied 







3.2  Research Design and Methodology 
 
A number of valuable considerations identify the worth of a research study, 
including what issues are worthwhile for study, what explanations of the study 
observations are meaningful interpretations and what methods of gathering and 
analysing data are acceptable for use (Ledgerwood et al. 2017). These 
considerations structured the methodology of this research study. 
 
The research used a case-study approach to assess what factors were 
considered in what context when deciding to select individuals for a project 
leadership team. The six positions of the PLT as it was structured at the 
beginning of the project were the focus for the study.  
 
Chart 3.1 Project leadership team - organisation chart 
 
 




















The study followed a retroductive approach which combines elements of both 
inductive and deductive research.  Retroduction is 'the logic of inference 
espoused by critical realism. As such, it can provide the basis upon which 
different insights upon the same phenomenon can be sensibly combined' 
(Downward & Mearman 2007, p. 1). This approach to social research allows not 
only the overt representation of the study subject but also the opportunity to test 
these representations.  As Ragin (1994, p. 55) writes:  
 
'Social research involves a dialogue between ideas and evidence. Ideas 
help social researchers use evidence to extend, revise and test ideas. The 
end result of this dialogue is a representation of social life - evidence that 
has been shaped and reshaped by ideas, presented along with the 
thinking that guided the construction of the representation'  
  
Table 3.1 collates the interview approach to data collection for this study, 
including who was interviewed, the timing and frequency, and the structure and 
original objective for each of the interviews. Only the post-project, semi-
structured interviews were specifically undertaken in support of this study. The 
notes from all other interviews were included as documents in the overall content 
analysis. These notes of pre-project interviews and the notes of those interviews 
conducted during the project constituted secondary data. Because the same 
researcher conducted these interviews they provided a rich reminder of some of 
the context variables that influenced selection decisions. While secondary data 
can sometimes be problematic if the data was collected for a different purpose 
than the current research (Stewart 2012), in this case the data related to the 
same project and thus provided guidance on whom to interview and what topics 
to clarify in the present research. It should be further noted that the interviewees 
listed represent the total population (that is, all six members) of influencing and 






Table 3.1  Research interview approach 
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Table 3.1  Research interview approach (Cont’d) 
 
Interviewee Pre-project During Post-project 
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The initial data from the content analysis of the project documents was analysed 
at a meso-level; that is, examining localised meanings and themes within the 
project, which were then used to map the data. Gaps in data validation and 
selection process were filled with data from semi-structured interviews with the 
key managers themselves and those influencing and deciding on their 
appointment to the PLT positions. Any prompting in the interviews was to clarify 
understanding of the internal process. Themes and outputs from the literature 
review and research questions were used as discussion starters. Permission was 
sought to tape these interviews which were later transcribed.  
 
The transcripts of the interviews were then thematically coded. The coding 
scheme was bottom-up (as opposed to top-down, to help mitigate any 
preconceived categorization), mainly using the process of abductive reasoning, 
using an iterative process of identifying a phenomenon, interrogating the 
literature and using critical colleague discussion to reduce subjectivity. Coding 
led to constructs being extracted that were salient and relevant to the research 
question. For example: 
Quote:  
'They [the client] approved of it. They were consulted and they did actually 
veto, in other roles, some candidates.' 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
Category from research question:  
Decision-making 
Theme:  
Power and Control 
 
These constructs or themes are examined in detail in Chapter 4. To assist with 
the explanation of the results and to understand their contribution, Lewin’s five 








Table 3.2 Lewin’s five levels of explanation  
 
Source: Derived from Lewin (1994, pp. 19-27) 
 
This approach provided a way to describe patterns in the decision-making and 
selection processes, thus reaching Lewin's second level of explanation: 
taxonomy. There was no prior definition of what the themes would be; instead, 
the researcher kept an open mind to understand what the participants thought 
was relevant. As noted earlier, bottom-up, abductive reasoning, an iterative 
process and using critical colleague discussion helped the researcher keep an 
open mind. However, as Alvesson (2003) suggests 'generally there is a relatively 








3.3 Social Constructivism 
 
The theoretical framework of social constructivism was used in the research 
project because it has the potential to improve understanding of knowledge 
processes, including decision-making in projects. (Jackson & Klobas 2008) 
(Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) 
(Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) 
(Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) 
(Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) (Jackson & Klobas 2008) 
(Jackson & Klobas 2008) 'The social constructivist paradigm characterizes 
knowledge as the sets of beliefs or mental models people use to interpret actions 
and events in the world' (Jackson & Klobas 2008, p. 330). Different people have 
different versions of knowledge and reality and this reality is constructed through 
dialogue and social interactions over time. Language, artifacts and symbolic 
behaviour are key components of how socially constructed realities are shared 
(Berger & Luckmann 1967).   
 
Boudourides (2003) specifies four varieties of constructivism: philosophical, 
cybernetic, educational (also known as psychological) and sociological or social. 
Social constructivism 'is concerned with the public bodies of knowledge, the 
various disciplines of science and technology, and how they are socially 
constructed and interpreted in terms of changing social conditions and interests' 
(p. 1). Here it is argued that while the mind constructs reality in its relationships to 
the world, this mental process is significantly informed by influences from social 
relationships (Gergen 1991).  
 
Gergen's analysis of social constructivism, although sometimes controversial and 
overstated, has much merit (Mascolo & Dalto 1995). ‘Most central is the notion 





patterns of social discourse. Selves are inseparable from their social contexts 




Social frameworks structure people's observations including self-observation. 
Gergen (1991) asserts that social interaction shapes our decisions and suggests 
that through social saturation, in other words through individuals’ constant 
interactions with others, 'selves have become increasingly populated with the 
character of others' (p. 71). In the process of internalisation, by which external 
stimuli are translated into internal meaning, Vygotsky, 'believes that egocentric 
speech constitutes just a transitional step leading to the development of inner 
speech, corresponding to reasoning skills crucial to planning and problem-
solving’ (Williams 1989, p. 110). Mascolo and Dalto (1995) report that 'verbal 
mediation', another crucial element in Vygotskian theory, influences decisions 
through a 'silent dialectic' received from social interaction of 'generalisations' and 
'mature conceptualisations'. Strong memories of events, experiences, behaviours 
amplify this internalisation and give structure to and prioritise the multiplicity of 
selves. Meaning is a product of social constructivism. Social constructivism is an 
important construct in this study when considering that many of the interviews 
were conducted some time after the completion of the project. As a consequence 
the passing of time, subsequent interactions and silent dialectic may have 
affected the post-project interviewees recall and/or shaping of the circumstances 
and the decisions that were made. It is possible to collect documented data and 
compare the interviewees' statements as a part of this study to identify to what 
degree documents and their recall differs. 
 
 






The two key methods of research in this study were interviews and content 
analysis. While both are well-established and widely used research methods, 
their validity that is, whether the method actually measures what it is supposed 
to, lies in how the methods are used to produce the results. 
 
Although there is no focus on external validity in this social constructivist 
paradigm there is value in considering the premise that to gather data only from 
respondents ‘ignores all facets of events that are carried not in person, but in the 
situation, stimulus, or context’ (McGrath & Brinberg 1983, p. 122).  It is clear in 
this study that situation, stimulus and context all play crucial and complex roles in 
input, process and output of the selection decision-making processes under 
study. Therefore, the coupling of interview analysis and analysis of elements in 
context, such as documentary evidence of the selection processes (secondary 
data), increases the study's validity and adds to the significance of its outcomes. 
 
Interviews in themselves have significant problems (for example, the interview 
questions themselves and interviewer bias); however, even if these are 
accounted for, the interpretation of the interviews to make different kinds of 
empirical claims can also introduce inaccuracies (Alvesson 2003). Being 
conscious of these potential pitfalls and using critical colleague discussion helped 
alleviate these problems. Due to the mainly quantitative use of content analysis, 
face validity was often assumed, given that the method’s rigidly defined 
categories and coding give it a high degree of reliability (Nandy & Sarvela 1997). 
This is in contrast to the use of content analysis as a qualitative method to 
explore latent themes and other finer motifs, as in this study. How these issues 
were considered for the current research will be discussed relative to each 
method in Section 3.4.2.  
 
Both interviews and content analysis raised questions about breadth and depth. 





analysis represent the input, process and output of the subject being studied and 
do they go to the depth required for this study to have significance? All decision-
makers involved in the selection of the PLT were interviewed, along with a 
number of people who were influencers, and/or recommenders of people for the 
PLT.  
In the content analysis, there was a concerted attempt to analyse all of the 
content available; however, it is acknowledged that text source selection may still 
have suffered from human fallibilities and judgement errors on the part of both 
the researcher and those giving access to relevant sources. This secondary data, 
that is, data collected by someone else for some other purpose, yet being utilised 
by the researcher for another purpose, was a critical input to the study. No 
explicit weighting was given in the data analysis to one source over the other, 
that is, primary or secondary sources of data. To not accept and value inputs 
from all relevant sources, decision-makers, influencers, recommenders and all 





As reflected in the research design methodology, this piece of research, as does 
most qualitative research, required conducting and interpreting a number of 
interviews. Interviews were conducted at different stages of the project: before 
the project 'go live', during the project and after project completion. The post- 
project interviews were the primary source of data from this method, although it 
should be noted that they were only one of the sources, rather than central or 
primary to the data-gathering process. (The other sources are discussed later in 
this chapter.) This is not to deny the rich source of insights, the knowledge, 
unique perspectives and impressions of those interviewed for the study but to 
acknowledge the opportunity for a wider breath of data gathering and to minimise 











Having undertaken these interviews in different times and place was a contextual 
consideration for a retroductive study. An interview context always involves 
influences that cannot be minimised or controlled (Alvesson 2003). For example, 
the perspective of individuals who are still in the selection process for a particular 
role can be filtered by expectation and the unknown, and post-project interviews 
are influenced by the lived experience of the role. 
  
As the study employed social constructivism, as a research paradigm, by nature 
its value is in how the individual’s mind constructs its reality at the time, and in 
the individual’s social relationship within the entire situation. ‘All research 
information is contingent on the values of all variables - i.e., all facets of the 
events, concepts, and methods - under which that information was obtained’ 
(McGrath & Brinberg 1983, p. 119). 
 
As opposed to being an outsider in the research project, being involved as an 
insider in the project had benefits in having close personal contact with the 
interviewees and having ardent conversations with them. This makes the 
interview more morally sound and reliable, because it treats interviewees as 
equals and allows them to express personal feelings, and therefore presents a 
more realistic picture than can be uncovered using traditional interview methods 
(Denzin & Lincoln 1994, p. 371). However, there is also a possibility in this case 
that interviewees will select material that they think the interviewer is looking for 
because of their relationship with the interviewer. Retrospective accounts are 
selective and do not allow fine-tuned analysis of the type of discourse and 
conversation (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Silverman 1993). Even truth-telling ‘may 
be selective and guided by ideas of the individual and collective interests of the 
interviewee’ (Alvesson 2003, p. 170). It is seldom possible to separate the 
‘distortions’ from ‘authentic experiences’ or ‘correct information’ (Silverman 1993, 






There was some attempt in the post-project interviews to give some consistency 
in the interview structure using open stimulus questions. These questions were 
not meant in any way to shape the answers or to stifle the responses of the 
interviewees rather, they were intended to keep the interview process 
progressing. Transcripts of interviews that were not conducted by the researcher 
(for example, notes from employment interviews) have been treated as text and 
used as source documents in the content analysis. 
 
3.4.2 Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis has been defined as ‘a method of studying and analyzing 
communications – documents of all kinds, including existing documents and 
documents deliberately produced for research purposes, books, letters, and so 
on – in systematic, objective, and quantitative ways to measure variables or to 
accomplish other research purposes’ (Kerlinger 1979, p. 34). Content analysis is 
an established research tool with the purpose of providing knowledge, 
representing fact and providing new insight. As the definition suggests, content 
analysis has been used primarily as a quantitative tool; however, when it is used 
solely in this way the opportunity to explore and interpret significant finer themes 
and latent messages may be lost. ‘Content analysis, therefore, can be both 
quantitative and qualitative, descriptive and inferential, objective and systematic 
with generalizable qualities and functions’ (Nandy & Sarvela 1997, p. 225).  
 
Content analysis has an advantage over other research methods (such as 
interviews) in that it can be conducted without fear that the communicator may be 
biased by the researcher’s attention. Qualitative work studies look to the meaning 
and context of what is done or said or what is intended. The evocative data 
obtained from qualitative content analysis provides an opportunity for the 
researcher to see patterns in the relationship between variables, and further 





As stated, this study explores latent themes and other finer motifs using a social 
constructivist construct.  
 
The critical starting point with content analysis is the selection of the material to 
be analysed/studied. Due to the open access that the researcher had in this 
study, the units of analysis were all project documents, including meeting 
minutes, presentations, HR records, project schedules and relevant emails.  
This is analogous to the idea of “population” in other research studies. In a 
number of cases project presentations were used as sources for analysis. In 
situations where the researcher was present for the presentation, both the 
presentation slides and the researcher's notes from the oral presentation were 
analysed. When the researcher was not present, only the slides were analysed. 
However it should be noted that where significant content, e.g. a change in 
organisational structure, was gleaned from the slides, the researcher did have 
the opportunity to speak with the presenter and to some of those present at the 
presentation. 
 
Thematic analysis was conducted from the data gathered in both the 
documentary evidence and the interviews. While these themes are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4, the current chapter examines how they were established. The 
predominant guide for identifying the four themes that emerged from the analysis 
was the research question although the research was exploratory and flexible in 
nature. However, it was clear that variables identified by the content analysis in 
particular led to both priori variables (those that were probable outputs of the 
research) and inferred variables (those that are not directly observable but are 
inferred from other variables that have been observed). The theory-based 
variables - those supported by previous research and theories - had the most 
value in this study in assisting with a clear construction of the definition for each 
theme. This association to the theories gave a solid base from which to look at 





3.5 Writing Up the Text 
 
Transcribing interviews and observations of a complex reality into a research text 
is difficult. It becomes by nature an exercise in selection and discretion. This is 
even more the case when the discussion and observations have been conducted 
over a long period of time in a non-structured way. Moreover, behaviours and 
meanings may not be clearly reflected in a text (Alvesson 2003). 
 
The quality of the final text requires situational focus (Cicourel & Knorr-Cetina 
1981) on actors, behaviours, processes and (project) context. The writing itself 
adopts a particular style to create various effects – honesty, acceptability, genius. 
There is an strong awareness to be wary of  writing ‘in which the production of 
understanding and construction of the text are hidden by a form of account that 
purports to present what is described simply ‘as it appeared’; this being treated, 
with more or less conviction, as ‘how it is’ (Hammersley 1990, p. 606). 
 
 
3.6 Researcher and Actor 
 
As an applied researcher, the researcher is also aware that as a consultant to 
this project the researcher is also an actor. His conscious understanding of 
closeness versus distance is critical to both his interpretation of the data and the 
ultimate value of his research. The study thus takes a research approach of self-
ethnography, ‘a study and a text in which the researcher-author describes a 
cultural setting to which s/he has “natural access”, is an active participant, more 
or less on equal terms with other participants’ (Alvesson 2003, p. 174). Alvesson 
(2003) asserts that self-ethnography is especially relevant at sites where the 
researcher is engaged, such as universities, neighbourhoods, consultancy work, 






The researcher was in the unique situation of insider-research (Brannick & 
Coghlan 2007) through being employed as a consultant to work on the project 
rather than in the project. This set up an opportunity that many researchers never 
receive. His role on the project was primarily one of observation for the 
expressed purpose of reflecting back to participants the impact of their 
behaviours in the context of the situation and project goals. As Alvesson (2003) 
states, for this type of study, observing participation is better than participant 
observation. It is clear that many times in his role the researcher was closer to 
being a researcher than a consultant. The researcher was not involved in the 
project because of his desire to work in EPCM projects or his expertise in this 
area, but primarily as an observer and as a self-ethnographer to use the position 
the researcher was in to research the setting in which the researcher was 
participating. 
 
Other than self-ethnography offering good research economy (Alvesson 2003), 
its value is that it immediately establishes the study’s scope: that being the 
setting being studied. In this research that was the specific case under 
examination. Consequently, the researcher and the ultimate readers of the study 
findings are clear from the outset about the limits of the findings. McGrath and 
Brinberg (1983) argue that there is just as much useful information in identifying 
the limits of the findings as in the findings themselves. Knowledge is always 
knowledge of differences, and if a finding is unbounded, it cannot add to that 
knowledge (Runkel & McGrath 1972). The challenge for self-ethnographers is to 
liberate themselves from the scope to provide sufficient distance to get 
perspective and objective meaning on the subject.   
 
There is a need to clearly define the researcher’s role as a self-ethnographer, 
and not an auto-ethnographer. This study focuses on what went on around the 





The analysis, interpretations and findings are not a reflection of the researcher’s 
lived experience or introspective evaluation of the researcher’s time on the 
project. However the researcher does understand that no matter how conscious 
the researcher is of closeness and distance his set of observations, as such, are 
perspectives that only represent a partial view of events, and that his 
interpretations are inevitably coloured by his own values, interests and 
background. The dangers of this are a narrow line of sight and lack of objectivity 
creating bias. The term “bias” may be used to denote one particular source of 
systematic error: that deriving from the researcher’s conscious or unconscious 
tendency to produce data and/or interpret it in a way that inclines towards 
erroneous conclusions (Chenail 2011). 
  
In this case no research interest was decided upon in advance. Throughout the 
project the researcher did not step into and out of the role of researcher 
whenever the researcher encountered material to support his study; in fact, the 
material found him.  The researcher could not forgo the excellent access 
possibility for a self-ethnographic study. ‘The trick is more a matter of 
accomplishing a description and insightful, theoretical relevant ideas and 
comments out of the material’ (Alvesson 2003, p. 177). In other words despite 




3.7 Politics and Ethics 
 
As a part of the post-project interview protocols each interviewee was asked 
before the interview if they had any issues with the specific researcher 
conducting the interview based on the researcher’s position on the project. This 
question was specifically asked so that the researcher would be overt about his 
power or perceived power regarding their past or present positions and/or their 





This was significantly relevant, as in the researcher’s professional role as a 
consultant he works in and around their industry and has professional 
relationships with their employers, potential employers, clients and potential 
clients. All interviewees gave expressed consent, both written and verbal, not 
only to be interviewed but also for the study to be published. In support of this 
permission the interviewees were also assured, again both verbally and in 
writing, that their anonymity would be protected and the project in both time and 
type would be camouflaged. These measures were undertaken as a part of the 
downsides of coping with the ethics and politics of self-ethnography (Alvesson 
2003). They were also undertaken as required by the University's research ethics 
approval process.  
 
Alvesson (2003) highlights a consultant’s advantageous position to undertake 
self-ethnography research. The ethical, moral and professional protection of the 
research subjects is often highlighted, and it has been given a great deal of 
thought-space throughout this work. However, what is not addressed in depth is 
the protection of the insider-researcher. There is no anonymity for the researcher 
when they put their name to the published study. The politics of research in 
ethnography is complicated. Alvesson (2003) highlights the option for the 
ethnographer to write the study text in a positive light so as not to upset the 
subjects and to protect the researcher-author from any negative backlash. 
Alvesson (2003) also suggests that if the researcher takes a strong and direct 
approach ‘s/he may get more enemies at close distance’ (p.183).  
The implication is that a consultant, who relies on networks and relations to earn 
a living, requires discipline and courage to take on an ethnography research 
project and author a study that has value. The ethical problems as well as the 
commercial-in-confidence issues require delicate attention. There needs to be 
support for the insider-researcher’s sincere willingness to do something with the 
rich material available to them. This approach, therefore, hinges on mutual trust 





Without this connection there would be no access to the data and no way of 
studying the critical people-selection process for an alliance mega-infrastructure 
project at this depth. As reflected in the contribution of this study the positives 
outweigh the negatives, and as long as the researcher takes a suitably scholarly 





The field of research methods adopted in this study are data analysis through a 
social constructivism paradigm, retroductive analysis and the positioning of the 
study in the qualitative genre. The selection of these approaches is due to their 
capacity to facilitate exploratory studies within real-world environments, providing 
a means of gaining access to, and motivating interpretations in meso terms of, 
the social processes of this case. The research question asks what factors 
influence the selection decisions for leadership teams in alliance mega-
infrastructure projects and looks to thicken the descriptions of these elements as 
a contribution to the overall research in a number of fields, particularly people-
selection and decision-making. As all research methods have their limitations the 
researcher used for coding, interview reviews and content analysis a scheme of 
bottom-up, abductive reasoning and an iterative process - identifying a 
phenomenon, interrogating the literature and using critical colleague discussion - 
to mitigate these limitations. The discussion in this chapter provides a critical-
descriptive background of the research methods, including their limitations, as a 







CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the findings from an analysis the three primary research- 
gathering sources: the post-project interviews, the in-project interviews and 
discussions and the content analysis of data, both that in the public domain and 
that gathered throughout the researcher's time on the project. Guided by the 
primary research question, the chapter analyses (What have we got?), assesses 
(How much of it have we got?) and, to a lesser degree, evaluates (What is it 
worth?) the factors influencing the selection of those who initially occupied the six 
positions on the PLT. As the study is a retroductive one, the researcher is left 
with an ex post facto rationalisation of a known result (that is, which candidates 
were selected). 
 
This chapter contextually develops the project environment that influences the 
behaviour of all stakeholders and ultimately underpins the selection decisions. 
The Alliance ideal is reviewed in the light of the data. Its convener's philosophical 
view of alliances and his sell-in to the other Alliance members are appraised. The 
motivation of the Alliance members and the opportunity of the Alliance to make 
decisions, specifically on the selection of the PLT members, are examined 
through the lens of a highly controlling, non-empowering client. The HR 
manager's genuine attempt to bring professionalism and objectivity through the 
development of the project selection framework is explored. The use of this 
framework is scrutinised and its use in obtaining legitimacy, as opposed to its 
legitimate use, is investigated. Finally, four broad themes - power and control, 
legitimacy, project knowledge management (PKM) and relationship capital (RC) 







As discussed in the Section 2.1, the area of research to be investigated is people 
selection in a project environment. The first area is about the context in which 
these decisions are made; in this case a project context further defined in that it 
is a single case of an alliance structure in a mega-infrastructure project in 
Australia. The second area is about process and, in turn, processes within 
processes, particularly the decision-making process within the process of 
selecting the PLT. This chapter deals with the findings from the study of both 
components, starting with the context. 
 
 
4.2  The Environmental Context  
 
The circumstances in the business environment that were background factors to 
every decision made in Project North V3 have been discussed in some detail in 
Section 1.6.   The initial project context led to a project philosophy of “best for 
project” and a proposed governance structure as shown in Figure 1.1. Behind 
this structure were significant financial arrangements that augmented the 
circumstance for the Alliance members. 
 
There were quite complicated commercial arrangements. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
There was reasonably significant risk and reward component but that was 
capped as well. For the three parties. So if we had under-run, if we under-
run the agreed target the three parties would share the under-run and in 
some cases the client would get some of that as well. It was a scaled 
approach with a cap. And likewise if there was an over-run, the three 
parties would have to pay for a substantial portion of that over-run. 





The client, a chemical producer, was inexperienced in EPCM projects and this 
greenness showed very early. 
There were unrealistic expectations at the outset based on incomplete 
information. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
The client also had little experience in managing multi-site, multi-disciplined, 
multi-partner structures. 
 
 A big problem was that the previous project leadership team was all [other 
 side of Australia] based. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
 
4.3  The Structural Context  
 
4.3.1  The Alliance 
 
Alliances may be viewed through a number of different lenses including 
association, relationship and agreement. They can be between individuals, 
groups or nations, and are formed to achieve a common purpose or for mutual 
benefit, although they may or may not involve an explicit or documented 
agreement. Through the commercial lens, alliances are an increasingly promising 
business strategy (Walker & Christenson 2005), and the allied links in project 
undertakings are usually extraordinarily formalised through contracts and JV 
agreements. However, alliance relationships in multi-partner ventures that truly 
partner, bond and tie the cooperative effort and outcome are both difficult to 






In this case, the managing director of the Alliance engineering specialist , 
Alexander, who was the driving force behind bringing the alliance together, had a 
purist view on what Alliances were and how they could work. 
 
If you asked the experienced or the business people in the Alliance, they 
would say, ‘ah, yes, that project, it was that one that we followed 
Alexander’s ideal; a model to present, to offer a complete service from 
engineering through to commissioning.’ 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
From that perspective the model may have been turn-key for the client; however 
the critical aspect for the Alliance convener, Alexander, was that all resources, 
including the people resource at every level, came from within the Alliance. By 
virtue of this view he believed and convinced the other Alliance members to 
believe that all resource decisions would be made within the Alliance structure. 
From the outset this model was supported by all Alliance members. 
 
The alliance model is valid in this project. 
(In-project interview: Board member - Alliance mechanical construction 
specialist representative, 18th March 2010) 
 
[The] Alliance engineering specialist, Alliance mechanical construction 
specialist and Alliance civil construction specialist are well aligned. 
(In-project interview: Board member - Alliance mechanical construction 
specialist representative, 18th March 2010) 
 
Alexander left no doubt of his belief in the alliance model he had convened, 
stating that it would be an 'Australian Business Excellence Process' and 






There was a very strong lead in the period prior to the approval by Alliance 
engineering specialist to win this contract to demonstrate to the client that 
the Alliance could execute the contract and a very strong involvement by 
Alexander and people from within his organisation.  
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
  
The client had their own view on the Alliance model, from positive to guarded 
optimism. Referring to previous attempts to implement the project and their 
structures, a client representative said: 
 
Certain things won't happen again; [there is now a] better commercial 
model. 
(In-project interview: Client Project Controls Manager, 17th March 2010) 
 
Other client representatives commented on the alliance philosophy as a structure 
model: 
Even the alliance structure itself is not common, it is not unheard of, but 
making alliances work is pretty hard. It isn’t an equal partnership and 
having three parties, rather than one lead with subcontracts, that is a bit 
different as well. 
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member - client representative 1,  
30th March 2010) 
 
Alliance teams can have hidden agendas. Owners have a contract. That is 
all we are interested in. 
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member - client representative 2,  







Independent of any other reason for the support or otherwise of the model, there 
was a strong commercial rationale, if not a commercial imperative, for the 
resourcing to come from within the Alliance. The more people, equipment and 
time that each member put into the project the more profit they made for their 
respective companies. The construction-contract component of the project was 
costs reimbursable plus an agreed margin. This set a dynamic for the modus 
operandi of the three Alliance members. Adding to this dynamic was that the 
Alliance engineering specialist and Alliance mechanical construction specialist 
had worked together on previous iterations of the project.  
 
From the outset, on the surface at least, the three partners fulfilled a number of 
the characteristics of an alliance organisation. Referencing the descriptors shown 
in Table 2.2, they were exclusive; there were no partnering deals outside of the 
Alliance and no subcontractors. They had an agreement; based on a ‘handshake’ 
between the three. This style of agreement gave at least one of the members 
some solace; he quipped that, otherwise 'it could have been lawyers at 10 
paces'. They had a common purpose and objective that they pursued while 
remaining independent organisations. They agreed on boundaries; to a large 
degree these formalised by the project’s master schedule and the scope of 
works. They had trust in each other.  
  
So the Alliance Board which is the three JV partners and it had three 
members of the client team. And so it was evenly weighted so there 
couldn’t be … one group overriding the other. There were rules in place 
about majority and the likes. So there was a mandate or a charter that was 
developed to ensure that it wasn’t just one group out of that Board making 
all the decisions. It had to be a consensual decision. 






The client had a different perspective of the Alliance partners’ ability to work 
together: 
We saw challenges and continued to see challenges with that structure as 
we went through with the structure because managing and dealing with 
the competing commercial desires and expectations of those parties 
required constant management. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
In this context the first order of business was to configure, recruit and select the 
project management team; the group that would manage the project and make 
the day-to-day operational decisions to meet the project objectives. To be clear 
of this team's role, Turner and Muller's (2003) definition of project management is 
a good guide: 'an endeavour in which human, material and financial resources 
are organised in a novel way, to undertake a unique scope of work, of given 
specification, within constraints of cost and time, so as to achieve beneficial 
change defined by quantitative and qualitative objectives' (p. 1). The critical 
nature of getting this team right is reflected in a comment by one of the client 
members on the Alliance Board.  
  
 The key to success is getting the right capability at management level 








4.4 Resourcing the Project 
 
4.4.1 The Alliance's Initial Action 
 
As many projects are seen as one-off endeavours, a number of roles, particularly 
at a senior level, are often limited to only a few positions. The structure and 
people-selection of the project management team, called in this project the 
Project Leadership Team (PLT), was the purview of the Alliance members as 
they were the ones who, in the proposed arrangement, would nominate people to 
fill all of the roles. Although nominating people to be selected from one’s own 
organisation is not a traditional approach to recruitment and selection, the nature 
of this Alliance was such that all roles, in particular the senior roles, were 
expected to be filled by people from the Alliance group. As discussed in Section 
1.6.2 because of the unique circumstances of this EPCM project, in which the 
client took total responsibility for procurement and maintenance and Alliance 
engineering specialist being solely contracted for engineering, the Alliance was 
realistically for the construction component of the project only. 
 
 It is also part of the head person, Alexander, [starting] to pull together a 
 team and a plan to do this project and [he] had to present to the client a 
 skeleton of a team to demonstrate that they had the resources to carry on 
 the project and how it would kick off once the approval had been given. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
In what the Alliance group believed to be proving their legitimacy through 
resourcing the project they proposed version 1 of the management structure and 
began nominating candidates to fill the positions. The Alliance engineering 
specialist already had a number of people working on the project in a “holding 
pattern”; thus Alliance engineering specialist, with the implied endorsement of the 






Figure 4.1 Proposed PLT organisation structure with incumbents - Version 1 
 
 
Source: HR Records January 2010 
 
All but one position was covered; thus the first gap in the Alliance capability came 
when they were not able to propose a candidate for the construction manager’s 
role.  
 
The initial approach was to seek suitable candidates from each of the 
Alliance participants … and we actually canvassed quite hard and we 
didn’t even find someone, didn’t find anybody really in the Alliance 
partners that could do this role, so we then needed to look external[ly]. 
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member –  
Alliance engineering specialist representative, 30th March 2010) 
 
In keeping with the Alliance philosophy, the Alliance engineering specialist 
volunteered the services of a senior HR person to conduct an external search for 






It was expected that each of the Alliance partners would provide people 
from within their organisations to fill the roles on the team.  Well this 
proved to be a flawed hope in that those organisations didn’t have the 
people - didn’t have the people available, and there needed to be a 
substantial amount of recruiting done by the project to fill the positions on 
the project…because they don’t have the capability to do that. And so it 
was up to the project team to make up the gap in each of the Alliance 
partners. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016). 
 
In what may be considered an anti-egalitarian manner, the Alliance - or at least 
the Alliance engineering specialist - were very comfortable with their actions due 
to their position on the project and the energy (and funds) that they had invested 
to resurrect the project. This reflects an view that Clayton (2012) labels as  
'universal entitlement', 'which asserts that membership of a set, (a set of persons 
or citizens), entitles an individual to a certain type of goods or certain kind of 
treatment by others' (Clayton 2012, p. 9). 
 
4.4.2 The Client's Reaction 
 
The client considered that they would only get involved in those decisions that 
affected their legitimacy with those external to the project, mainly the client’s 
board and shareholders. They knew that these external actors needed to have 
an ongoing belief or feeling that the project was worthy, effective, efficient, 
competent, and/or needed. Having received the sign-off for the project to go 








We have no intention to micro-manage this project. Our involvement is 
 directly commensurate to the confidence in the decisions we are getting. 
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member - client representative,  
30th March 2010) 
 
 No, no and they didn’t seek to be decision-makers. They just, they had the 
 opportunity to voice concern, or to express their opinion or veto if you like, 
 but that didn’t arise. 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
At this initial stage the client needed, at a minimum, for the PLT, to be 
experienced and educated, hold respected credentials and be credible. The V1 
structure proposal and where the candidates would come from did not meet their 
criteria. The client reacted in a neo-paternal way: 
 
 Poor - lacks strong Project Director; they have ignored the baggage; 
 [there are no] project controls; Alliance engineering specialist are 
 looking after their own financial agenda; no Alliance mechanical 
 construction specialist or Alliance civil construction specialist. 
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member - client representative,  
30th March 2010) 
 
This quote highlights a number of weaknesses in the Alliance. First, the proposed 
placement of a young engineer who had been a part of all previous project 
iterations/failures as the project manager lacked credibility. Second, the Alliance 
engineering specialist, being a dominant part of previous failures, was supplying 
people for all but one role on the PLT. Third, it introduced suspicion about the 
lack of equality in the Alliance partnership and suggested a lack of capability, 
with no Alliance mechanical construction specialist or Alliance civil construction 





Fourth, there was a need to recruit a construction manager, a role that had been 
expected to be filled by one or another of the construction specialists. Five, there 
was no evidence of a 'controls' function in this structure. As one of the Alliance 
members stated: 
If you don't get the controls right you invite them [the client] in. 
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member - mechanical construction specialist  
representative,18th March 2010) 
 
As there was already an evident need to have a strong hand on the finances, the 
proposed structure and candidates for the PLT may well have been the critical 
incident that shaped and legitimised the client’s heavy-handed, interventionist 
approach to most ongoing decisions on the project.  
 
4.4.3 The Ongoing Impact of the Alliance's Initial Action 
 
The proposed PLT structure (V1) and suggested incumbents for these key 
leadership roles, had two major impacts on the Alliance; it diminished its 
legitimacy to make quality decisions; and, in some ways more importantly 
(particularly to stakeholders), it had negative financial consequences. The 
premise of the Alliance model that was presented to the client was that the three 
parties to the Alliance could resource the project. Independent of the Alliance 
engineering specialist’s dominance in the proposed PLT, the decisive issue was 
that none of the three had a nomination for the key role, in which all three had 
claimed to have mega-project expertise. The engineering specialist in particular, 
missed their first chance for internal legitimacy and lost the opportunity to exert 
the positional power they believed they had for future selection and other major 
decisions in the project. Legitimacy is affected by internal power relations, in the 
sense that the ability to influence what is considered to be proper decision-
making procedures and proper justifications for decisions is a fundamental 





Legitimacy and decision-makers’ use of it is a key challenge (Gutiérrez & 
Magnusson 2014). The Alliance now had to face the question of legitimacy in the 
PLT people-selection process: what conditions would generate acceptable 
reasons for the selection of a job incumbent? What explanations would be 
acceptable to the client? As previously cited, Clayton (2012) suggests two 
conditions of legitimate selection: procedural conditions of a selection policy are 
decided and administered in the right way; and the decision emerging from the 
selection procedure must be sufficiently just.  
 
With the client's project director attending the client’s monthly board meetings to 
report on the project, there was a need to strategically legitimise all of the 
project's actions. Strategic legitimation is a process that deploys evocative 
symbols to gain support. The organisation can take proactive steps to acquire 
legitimacy by changing itself and/or changing the environment; for example, by 
changing the organisations that operate within it. This was exactly the situation in 
Project North V3, where the Alliance engineering specialist did not invite the main 
subcontractor from V2 to be a part of the V3 Alliance. Strategic legitimation is 
defined as 'the purposeful and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence, or 
control institutional pressures and evaluations' (Oliver 1991, p. 157). 
 
The financial impact of not having a candidate to fill the construction manager's 
role was somewhat paradoxical for the Alliance partners. The Alliance business 
model had legitimacy for the client, but because each Alliance partner was in 
competition with the other partners for resources and financial gain (and each 
reported directly to the client), each partner attempted to legitimise its own 
position on the project with the client. This phenomenon was also found in a 
study where proponents explained their view in rational terms and the position of 
the competitor in non-rational terms such as speculation or personal loyalty to the 
master figure (Potter & Wetherell 1987); the master figure in project North V3 





This conflict over resources and legitimacy manifested itself in Alliance members 
lobbying the client for non-appointment of proposed candidates, even though 
they did not have an alternative candidate, and urging the commencement of an 
external search. Ironically, this flew in the face of the primary objective of the 
Alliance's existence.  One researcher calls this 'horizontal political-ethical 
dilemma....conflicts about power, prestige and cultural capital among groups in, 
broadly speaking, competitive relationships. Projects in which members of a 
community try to promote its position viz. other groups which compete in terms of 
prestige, power and resources' (Alvesson 2003, p. 179). 
 
This brought a new player in to share in Project North financially, as the project, a 
working entity itself, was now a direct employer. Bypassing all of the Alliance 
partners meant that no Alliance member could claim their costs plus margin on 
that resource. Informal cooperation settings are a disadvantage of alliances 
(Koleva et al. 2002), and Lianying et al. (2016) underline the challenges for 
alliances of engaging in frequent interaction to foster mutual cognition and trust 
regarding the sharing of capability, skills and know-how. These weaknesses 
were apparent very early in Project North. 
 
[It] proved to be a far more challenging and complex offering than is 
typical…I don’t believe any of those organisations would do that again… 
There wasn’t the depth of capability, resources in each of those partners 
or the consistency of systems to make those resources work effectively 
and all of that had to be developed on this project to make it work. People 
[needed to be] recruited and systems developed. 









4.5 Selection Decision-making in Alliance Mega-projects 
 
The Alliance model and, in particular, its decision-making process were tainted 
very early in the project. However, in an alliance milieu, the question is, to what 
degree does each organisation act appropriately for itself and the type of project 
in the context of project management? (Thomas & Mullaly 2008). In this case, 
doing the right thing was the Alliance Board’s pledge of ‘best for project’. 
However, it was initially unclear whether this covenant was shared to mutual the 
success of the client and each of the individual Alliance members, or there were 
now variations on the vow. What were the right things in regard to people- 
selection? 
 
4.5.1 The Project Selection Framework 
 
The earlier creation of the project selection framework by the HR manager (who 
was working as a secondee from the Alliance engineering specialist before 
eventually being appointed to the PLT in that role), went some way to meet both 
the client's and the Alliance’s strategic legitimisation agenda. The framework also 
supported Clayton's (2012) procedural conditions of a selection policy being 
decided and administered in the right way, and the decisions arising from the 
selection procedure being sufficiently just. There was a process - on paper, at 
least. It gave face validity to the selection process and the Project North 
Selection Framework (Figure 4.3) was consistently used as a legitimation of this 











Source: Project Protocols presentation 31st March 2010 
 
 
This selection framework constituted manipulation (Suchman 1995) of regulative 
legitimacy (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002) in that it indicated to stakeholders that the 
venture was adopting acceptable practices even if the stakeholders knew little 
about how effective the practices were in meeting the desired end. It suggested a 
rational decision-making approach where the quality of information enabled 
people to seek out alternatives, state clear criteria based on preferences and 
make an optimal choice.  
 
The Alliance group and the project director also maintained the accepted position 
regarding the selection framework in legitimising the final PLT composition. For 
example, the Alliance group proclaimed that they used psychometric testing as 






 I also did psychometric testing on each of the members of my team at the 
 outset.  So whilst I had done those tests, members of my team had  also 
 done those tests.  So the creation of that structure was done in the 
 knowledge of knowing the characteristics of those people.  
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
'Legitimacy is also assumed if applicants know that assessment methods are fair 
and just, and skills, knowledge and experience are the pivotal elements to 
selection decisions' and, 'if rational behaviour guides the selection process in an 
organisation, it shall also promote legitimacy...and legitimacy is also assumed if 
fairness and equality in the selection and recruitment procedure is ensured' 
(Engholm 2001, p. 2). As reflected in the post-project interview with the project 
director, post-hoc rationalisation of selection methods is another way of asserting 
legitimacy.  
 
4.5.2  The Validity of the Project Selection Framework 
 
Gatewood et al.’s (2016) schema (Figure 2.3, discussed in Section 2.4) is a 
conventional approach in developing a selection program. The project’s HR 
manager confirmed that the first three steps in the process were not done. 
Consequently the development of the selection framework and the purchase of 
assessment tools were undertaken without any job analysis to anchor the 
process. 'Where job analysis is incomplete, inaccurate, or simply not conducted, 
a selection system may be nothing more than a game of chance – a game that 
employer, employee, and job applicants alike may lose' (Gatewood et al. 2016, p. 
248). Gatewood et al.’s (2016) observation was affirmed in this project, where 
there was no job analysis. For example, the construction manager, was 
dismissed for performance after four months. The process of his selection is 






The Project North Selection Framework (Figure 4.3) does reflect the three major 
objects of job-analytic study: work behaviour, work attributes and context 
(Sanchez & Levine 2012). However, there are alternatives to job analysis. 
Emerging trends in HR include, personality-oriented work analysis, team and 
cognitive task analysis and strategic competency modelling (Gatewood et al. 
2016). Many organisations have incorporated competency modelling instead of 
job analysis into their HR practices, and this project selection framework may 
lend itself more to this approach than the process described by Gatewood et al. 
(2016). The reasons for this are two of the key differences between competency 
modelling and job analysis. First, 'executives typically pay more attention to 
competency modeling'; than JA; and second, 'competency models may be 
presented in a manner that facilitates ease of use (e.g., organisation-specific 
language, pictures, or schematics that facilitate memorableness)' (Campion et al. 
2011, p. 227). 
 
In the heuristic of the selection framework (Figure 4.3) the individual is located in 
the context of the work environment. Competency modelling allows for the 
context to include those behaviours that the organisation is trying to improve, or 
in this instance, the behaviours that they believe are critical to project success. 
They may include a collective composed of dimensions of culture or specifics; for 
example, style of communication or proactivity. The face validity of this selection 
framework is very high. However, face validity is not a form of validity in a 
technical sense (Gatewood et al. 2016, p. 146); rather, it serves more to comfort 
audiences and as the framework was being presented to audiences who were 
only interested in assessing if the PLT were ‘confidently in control’, this was all 









4.5.3  The Use of the Project Selection Framework 
 
In this project there was a clear attempt by the HR manager to develop a 
competency model for the selection of senior project managers. She also 
sourced highly credible predictor instruments to support the model. Although the 
selection framework was developed in mid-2009, it is not evident when or if the 
framework was promulgated to all stakeholders prior to the Project Protocols 
presentation on 31st March 2010. The HR manager did report, however, that the 
Alliance’s engineering specialist was using most of the tools in the framework for 
selection prior to this date; not necessarily for the selection of the candidates into 
the PLT roles, but using them all the same. However, the instruments were used 
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Project Director





Procurement & Contracts Manager
HR/IR Manager *




Senior Construction Manager - no 
appointment made - 1 candidate only










4.5.3.1 The Use of the Project Selection Framework - Interview   
  Approach 
 
Although no weightings were allocated to the predictors in the selection 
framework, there appeared to be a strong emphasis, as expressed in both 
resource allocation and areas of focus, on the selection interview. 'The most 
important characteristics of a structured interview include using job analysis as a 
basis for questions' (Gatewood et al. 2016, p. 423).  
As stated previously, there was no job analysis conducted with the cascading 
impact that no knowledge, skills and attributes could be identified to structure or 
validate the interview before its use. Project HR documents show that no 
structured interview format was developed and there was no formal process of 
reporting the results or impressions for collation to assist in the selection 
decision. It was the HR manager's view that the quality of decision-making 
strongly depends on a structured arrangement.  A note from the discussion with 
the HR manager reveals that she suggested that the quality would be covered by 
the quantity. By this she meant that applicants for all senior positions on the 
project were to be interviewed by the HR manager, the position's immediate 
manager and the one-up manager. For example, applicants for the construction 
manager position would be interviewed by the HR manager, the project director, 
the client and a representative from each of the Alliance partners – six one-on-
one interviews in all, and no panel interviews.   
 
The use of multiple interviewers can enhance reliability provided that there is not 
any influence on their ratings. Moreover, the predictive validity of unstructured 
interviews could be raised to that of a single structured interview by aggregating 
the hiring recommendations (Gatewood et al. 2016). It is also assumed that all 
the interviewers were adequately trained, although HR records confirming this 
were only available for two of the six prospective interviewers in the example 





Many executives believe that they are experienced recruiters and that they can 
make a decision based on meeting a person for a chat. However, the reality is 
that an unstructured interview, where a getting-to-know-you chat results in 
subjective and superficial data, offers no worthwhile input to a quality selection 
decision. As stated before, it is a game of chance (Gatewood et al. 2016). Pure 
judgement is a method in which judgmental predictor data are collected and 
combined subjectively for selection decision-making. There is in fact no objective 
data.  
 
In this instance the only data available to the decision-makers was the external 
candidate’s CV and the data from their unstructured interview(s). At best it was a 
'judgmental composite method where both judgmental and mechanical data are 
collected and then combined judgmentally' (Gatewood et al. 2016, p. 215). Either 
way, the opportunity afforded to the organisation by the quality implementation of 
the project’s selection framework was ignored. 
 
The use of multiple interviewers can help in the quality of the selection decision if 
there is input from a number of trained interviewers. Still using the construction 
manager position as an example, two of the Alliance representatives – from the 
mechanical civil construction specialist – had not met, let alone had the 
opportunity to interview, the external candidate prior to the announcement of his 
appointment to the position on 31st March 2010. The HR manager reported that 
she had prepared her interview for the candidate when he came to Australia in 
late March 2010 (he was a British national living in Spain); however she did not 
get to conduct the interview, as the project director advised her that the decision 
had already been made. Two other people, including the deputy project director, 
did have the opportunity to have an informal ‘chat’ with the candidate and both 






This evidence not only points out the flaws in the view that aggregating hiring 
recommendations yields increased predictive validity, but also calls into question 
the unity of the decision-making in the Alliance per se. This demands the 
question: who made the decision and what selection information was used in 
making it? The seeming disregard for the use of the competency modelling in 
making this critical selection decisions suggests that there is something else at 
play. The result is that the researcher is left with an ex post facto rationalising of 
a known result. This will be investigated and discussed in detail on a position-by-
position basis in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
 
4.6 The Selection Decisions - Themes and Responses 
 
The research study gave the opportunity to look at the selection process and 
decision-making not only for the external candidates but for the whole PLT. As 
stated in Section 3.2, the initial data from the content analysis of the project 
documents was analysed at a meso-level. That is, at the level of localised 
meanings and themes within the project, these themes were used to map the 
data. The project mantra of ‘best for project’ provided a way to explore how the 
actors linked (or did not link) their decisions.  
 
The research data analysis suggested four broad themes: 
1. Power and Control 
2. Legitimacy   
3. Project Knowledge Management (PKM) 









4.6.1 Power and Control 
 
The Project North overarching objective, which was prominently framed and 
displayed on the wall of every office, worksite, lunch room, canteen and donga 
(the private room of every employee), was 'Confidently in Control'. This and the 
Values as they were called that supported this objective, were the output of an 
Alignment Meeting in November 2009. The meeting was attended by at least one 
representative of each of the major stakeholders and was the precursor for the 
group that would from then on be known as the Alliance Board – three client 
members and one representative of each of the three Alliance members – six in 
all.  
 
Five Project North values supported the 'Confidently in Control' objective: Safety 
- zero harm to anyone or anything; People - listen, consult and take interest in 
people; Communication - clear consistent and honest; Productivity - no surprises 
in cost, schedule or quality; and Best for Project - clear goals that were common 
to all Alliance members. Notably of the five values, three mirrored exactly those 
of the client company. This may not be surprising considering that the tabled 
document, as a discussion starter in the client-facilitated November 2009 
meeting, was in fact the client company objectives and values. Individuals at all 
levels of the project disparaged this as convenient; thus for the client 
representatives on this project the values were a double-edged sword. Similarly, 
as the project objectives paralleled the client’s corporate objectives, the client’s 
board had an expectation that the key performance indicators would be 
monitored and reported using similar metrics. This immediately put tension on 
the compatibility of the project systems and the client’s systems, including HR 
systems of recruitment, performance and retention. This dynamic reflects the 






At the corporate level the client organisation had at least once before executed 
their power over by closing the project down; the client representative on the 
project not only lived with the potential but had seen this power enacted, and 
knew that it could be again. There is evidence that power, control, relationship all 
play some part in the selection process. As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the 
literature shows a large multidimensional spectrum of the people-selection 
process: structured, unstructured; decision aided, non-aided; conscious 
competence, unconscious incompetence; socially processed, authoritarianly 
prescribed. 
 
Working in this shadow the client representatives' power to can be generally 
analysed in terms of resources, both physical resources for the project and 
resources to make relationships work. It could be argued that the Project North 
values were more guiding principles than values; whatever the label, it was 
apparent from the outset that the client clearly was in control of the finances.  
As Ramirez (1999) points out, in the industrial view of value in business ventures 
all activities can be measured in monetary terms. As procurement required the 
biggest spend, this was the obvious place to start in the project. Having control of 
the two most financially draining parts of the projects - procurements and 
contracts - seemed both logical and prudent to the client representatives. 
 
There was clearly some aspect of commerciality in relation to avoiding 
margin and mark-up on procurement and this was an opportunity to do 
that so we could segregate parts of the project scope.   
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member - client representative,  







Having a view on  [an EPCM] model that says, ‘Actually we are going to 
carve out an amount of the procurement and the owner will do that 
procurement, it will run through the owner’s books rather than run through 
the Alliance books,’ it certainly contributed to the thinking on the PLT 
composition. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
The second comment was a statement made more as a client representative 
than as the procurement and contracts manager. The project director, in his 
interview (18th May 2016), gave a deeper insight into the selection of the 
procurement and contracts manager, which was viewed by most as a telling 
indication of the client’s high need to exert power by controlling the finances and 
in particular, procurement and contracts. 
 
The alliance had involved other partners in prior phases that were not 
involved at this stage, and it had been poorly managed from a client point 
of view. And the contractors had actually taken advantage of the client and 
spent a lot of money [that] perhaps they didn’t have to spend; paid a lot 
more for things they didn’t have to, engaged services and purchased 
equipment from their own stable [of] companies, at inflated prices. And the 
client was pretty upset about it all.  He wanted - and not only keen to 
ensure that it didn’t happen again - he wanted to claw back which meant 
some unfair and unjust practices, unjust decisions. And that was the 
background behind the appointment of their own person in procurement, 
irrespective of the fact that there was a mismatch in procurement 
systems.' 






Gummerus (2013) suggests that a customer view of value is assessed at a 
particular point of time. Here, the client’s input to the project management 
process was the product of ‘value as experience outcomes’ (Gummerus 2013); 
the experiences of the previous two attempts of the project and the behaviour of 
the previous alliance partners, some of whom were now part of the Alliance for 
Project North V3. The appointment of the client’s nominee to the position of 
procurement and contracts manager was a permanent reminder both initially and 
throughout the project of the client's high need for control. This client nomination 
was accompanied by a new proposed organisation chart. The client had noted 
that the original organisation chart (Fig 4.2) recommended by the Alliance 
engineering specialist did not have the procurement role as a part of the PLT, 
and that it was dominated by Alliance engineering specialist employees. Behind 
the titles in the original chart was the responsibility for the project contracts, 
which belonged to the project services manager.  
 
The second version of the PLT structure, which was proposed by the client, took 
back control of the PLT and the procurement and contracts function, and firmly 











Source: HR Records January 2010 
 
4.6.1.1 The Alliance's Reaction 
 
The appearance of the procurement manager’s role on the client’s version of the 
PLT structure caused further concern for the Alliance engineering specialist. The 
other Alliance members were more concerned about the other activities claimed 
by the client - facilities and travel - in this version of the structure. Although all of 
this was in line with the client's stated objective of keeping their hands on the 
purse-strings, as shown by the initial proposed structure (Figure 4.2) it was in 
conflict with the way the Alliance engineering specialist saw the scope of 





The proposed structure was also contrary to the way the Alliance engineering 
specialist had presented the opportunity to the other Alliance members to 
convince them to come on board to the project. Project contracts for support 
services like facilities and travel being handled by the Alliance members allowed 
them to supplement their mainstream construction roles and consequently their 
income in cash or kind from the services they supplied to the project.  
 
From the selection viewpoint, not only did this take away an opportunity to fill a 
senior role, but it was contrary to the way the Alliance engineering specialist had 
seen their employees’ roles. The backdrop to the initially proposed structure was 
that in the interval between Project North attempt two and attempt three, the 
Alliance engineering specialist had placed their employees in project roles on a 
full- or part-time basis. For example, they had a dedicated person accounts 
payable during the hiatus after the second project failure. Both the Alliance 
engineering specialist and that individual had an expectation that the individual 
would continue in this role when the project was resurrected. The client, as a part 
of its governance in the purchase of Company A completed a stock-take of 
facilities and equipment left by Project North V1. The client person who was 
brought into the procurement manager’s role was strongly reliant on the 
information from the Alliance engineering specialist employee. The consequent 
suggested appointment to the procurement manager’s role of this client person 
with the project services manager reporting to them was a surprise to Alliance 
engineering specialist and very unpalatable to the Alliance engineering specialist 
person concerned. The project director who had the role of managing the client 
employee as well as the dynamics of having a client employee on his team, had 
a very strong view of the selection decision. 
 So he was no decision for me. The client nominated that they wanted to 
 have their own person manage procurement. Now this is in my view a 
 very intrusive appointment. 





When asked how this appointment fitted with the 'best for project' mantra the 
project director replied: 
 Well I ask what does that mantra mean?  Why have this mantra? 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
4.6.1.2 The Client’s 'Power to'  
 
The analysis of the client's power, almost unquestioned, to insert a person into a 
role should not only be examined regarding its impact on others (relationships) 
but also as a property or ability. The final incumbent of the role was asked their 
perspective of their appointment to the position. 
  
I was recommended or proposed by [the client director], as candidate for 
the procurement and contracts manager, and that was agreed by the 
[Alliance Board and], the contractor’s representatives as well.  
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
When asked if the Alliance Board members had the power to disagree, he 
replied:  
 
 They did. Absolutely they did. So if they had a different candidate it would 
 have been an opportunity to do that. I guess that’s how I feel but they 
 might feel differently. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  







The client was very aware that the structure, the role and the person in the role 
were distasteful to the Alliance engineering specialist, the other Alliance 
members, other formative members of the PLT and other project personnel; 
however, when asked about these decisions, the client’s representative showed 
no compunction. 
  
  We just said, ‘That is what we are going to do.' 
(In-project interview: Alliance Board member - client representative,  
30th March 2010) 
 
In the research interviews the incumbent was specifically asked about why he 
thought that there was not a more overt reaction to the decision.  
 
 Some of it will have been conditioned by, ‘Well this is what the client has 
 said that they want to do.’  
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
Both of the last two statements show the real and perceived power exerted by 
the client in what they saw was their right within the project structure to control 
the finances, predominately through this role, on behalf of their own organisation 
and their shareholders. However, if the authenticity for the client's strong hand in 
the appointment of the procurement and contracts manager was centered on 
financial control, the question is, to what extent did they use this power to 







It was noted that throughout the interview of the procurement and contracts 
manager that he at times changed hats regarding the roles that he represented 
when he was on the project - procurement and contracts manager, PLT member 
and client representative. Early in the interview he was very clear regarding who 
made the selection decisions for the roles on the PLT. 
 
Without getting confused in the acronyms, the [Alliance] Board made the 
selection of the project leadership team members. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
The Alliance Board consisted of the client's three members plus one 
representative from each of the Alliance members. Later in the interview he was 
asked again regarding the control the client had over the ultimate decision of who 
would be recommended for positions on the PLT. 
 
 The client could reject a recommendation. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
When asked if the power was always with the client, he replied: 
 Yes. There was absolutely … there was power of veto. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
This ultimate control by the client over who filled the positions on the PLT was 
confirmed in the interview with the deputy project director. 
 
'They [the client] approved of it. They were consulted and they did actually 
veto, in other roles, some candidates.' 





As the appointment of the procurement and contracts manager was seen as an 
undeniable indicator of the control the client exerted on the project, the 
incumbent was also asked whether the decision to appoint him to the role was 
entirely about controlling the finances or whether he considered himself the best 
person for the role. 
 
I was not an experienced procurement and contracts manager, so my lack 
of experience…I did some things wrong in the job…I was learning on the 
job, so there were some things that cost us time and had impact on the 
project execution that perhaps someone with more experience wouldn’t 
have fallen in those holes. So the risk that I would make mistakes because 
of my inexperience, I think, potentially was under…was not considered to 
the extent that it could have been. They still gave me the job. I am not 
sure what to make of that. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
The most overt theme from the research was the client imposing their will on the 
key decisions within the project. Initially the major decision was who would fill the 
roles on the PLT, the group that would shape the construction and make the 
operational decisions on a day-to-day basis. This was an exercise in making the 
decisions about who would make those decisions. In that way the client 
progressed a long way to fulfilling their objective and cascading the client's 
corporate objective of being ‘confidently in control’. There is evidence that this 
controlling influence was not always direct or oppressive; nevertheless very well 
understood. 
 
No, no and they didn’t seek to be decision-makers. They just, they had the 
opportunity to voice concern, or to express their opinion or veto if you like. 





This paradoxical statement characterises power not only as a potential to act but 
also as the illusion of empowerment. The opportunity to 'voice concern' led to the 
project director producing five versions of the organisation’s PLT structure in the 
time leading up to 'go live' – (month 0 to month 2) and a further version in the first 
month of construction (month 3). 
 
4.6.2 Project Knowledge Management 
 
Due to the history of the project, specifically the stop-start of the three attempts 
spreading over the years since 2005, the challenge for the client was not to lose 
the investment into what had gone before. Due to the change in both client and 
some contractors over this period there was no project office, and no structured 
reservoir of information or history lessons from previous attempts. Some four 
years into the history of the project there was a Project North Transition Team 
(PNTT) set up in February 2009 to manage the slowdown, including the 
mitigation of a temporary reduction in employees. This team's primary focus was 
to manage through the hiatus brought on by the GFC; however one of its lower 
level objectives was ensuring key talent was retained.  
 
In the negotiations between the client and the Alliance group to initiate the third 
attempt, the Alliance reported the status of the project as engineering 50% 
complete; construction commenced on site; and procurement commenced and 
information readily available (Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager, 8th 







It was later reported: 
 Supposedly this engineering was 50% complete but it had been dropped 
 like a hot potato and rolled all over the floor and all the pieces had to be 
 picked up, and it took some time to pull this together; resources were not 
 necessarily working on our project that should have been. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
With engineering reportedly in this state, the client closely managing the 
procurement and contracts, the construction site in care and maintenance and 
the few project knowledge assets at best isolated, the overall status of the project 
was almost impossible to know. There was no tangible information or IT-based 
repository of what had gone before or what had been proposed in the project 
other than internal, mostly commercial-in-confidence, communications held by 
those involved in the previous project attempts. 
 
4.6.2.1 The Use of Project Knowledge Capital in Selection - Candidate  
  Successful  
 
Specific project knowledge as an asset in Project North was dispersed within 
networks and individuals and to a large degree, it was at the individuals’ 
discretion to make it available or not. From a business and project perspective, 
where a great deal of knowledge is tacit and situated in individuals, social groups 
and situations, this knowledge becomes much more difficult to exploit. Many 








 I actually started in January 2006. I started off as an area manager, 
 engineering manager and worked to a project manager and I guess part 
 of my long history and knowledge of the project was one of the 
 reasons why  I was asked to relocate to take on another role...I guess from 
 the selection process I had almost made myself indispensable in some 
 respect. 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
As discussed in Section 2.8.4.1, knowledge expertise due to time on the project 
alone can be inferred. However, the attribution error in this assumption is that 
length of time on the project does not necessarily mean greater knowledge. 
Independent of this potential failing, due to their time on the project, two 
individuals were considered to have significant project knowledge and were 
critical to retain.  
  
There were two key people on the project for a year and also in prior 
phases that were key to the knowledge base of the project…In relation to 
Phil and Mark let’s just clarify this, they were nominated people from the 
Alliance engineering specialist. They had all of the project knowledge in 
their systems and in their heads and they were key people in the early 
phases of the project so you would be crazy not to engage them in 
meaningful roles. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
There are significant terms in these comments. First, discussing the individuals' 
and project knowledge, the project director is clear that the knowledge resides in 
their, the individuals', systems and in their, the individuals', heads, and 






The second significant term is 'meaningful roles'. Phil had an expectation that 
because of his project knowledge he would be the project director, and this was 
reinforced by the project organisation structure (Figure 4.2) proposed by Alliance 
engineering specialist. It became clear with the client revisions to the project 
organisation structure (Figure 4.4) that this was not their view, and although the 
client agreed that Phil was key to the project they saw him as a natural selection 
for the engineering manager's role.  
 
Notes from discussions with the HR manager reflect that, after being asked to 
take on the engineering role and not the project director's role, Phil, who had 
already relocated across the continent, asked to be relocated back to his original 
home and to be taken off the project. Phil stated that the engineering role was a 
backward step in his career. The HR manager further commented that, to 
preserve the relationship with the client, Phil was told by the Alliance engineering 
specialist director on the project that the psychometric testing Phil had 
undertaken in mid-2009 did not indicate that he would be a good fit for the role of 
project director. This discussion was reinforced later when Phil declined a 
request to share the results of his psychometric testing stating that they had been 
‘used against him’.  
 
When the externally recruited project director joined the project, he was faced 
with this situation and knew that Phil was key, in the early phases of the project 
at least. 
 Phil essentially had been with the project from day dot. He was a part the 
 de-mobilisation…the disassembly of the second-hand plant that started 
 in 2006. 







The new project director was also acutely aware that continuity was a crucial 
factor in the success of the project. Eppler and Sukowski (2000) state that 
continuity is one of three enabling factors of project-team knowledge 
management suggesting that a stable team composition leads to high 
performance in projects. 
 
There are two things here. It is important that there is continuity between 
phases. There is the study phase and the execution phase. If you have a 
discontinuity between the two, you can have someone appointed in the 
execution phase and totally disown something that was done in the study 
phase such that you win the work, you base your quote, you’re quoting on 
the basis of the study work and then you have the execution person come 
along and say that’s all rubbish, it’s going to take twice as long, twice as 
much, this is unsatisfactory discontinuity. So you do try maintaining 
continuity. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
 In other contexts, in other projects I have sort to make continuity between 
 study team and execution team. And by doing that, people - when they put 
 together the study, if they know that they are going to be responsible for 
 executing it, they will give you realistic projections; they will do the 
 necessary work such that they can be confident that they can deliver what 
 they forecast. I think that that is important. If you don’t have that, then that 
 is when projects become shaky. 









Underlying both of these quotes is the ‘elephant in the room’: as the organisation 
goes to the external market to fill key roles, internal individuals’ project 
knowledge capital increases, as less continuity equates to less understanding by 
the new people of what had happened in the past. This is amplified here due to 
the fact that this project was picking up the pieces of two previous attempts. 
 
Faced with this dilemma, the new project manager was dressed with the role of 
finding Phil's measures of quid-pro-quo. For PKM objectives to be achieved and 
leveraged to generate new intellectual capital, four conditions must be met: 
individuals must see an existing opportunity for combining or exchanging 
knowledge; they must anticipate value to be derived from the exchange; there 
must be motivation to share; and the organisation must have a real or perceived 
capacity to learn or absorb the knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998).  
 
Reflecting on Nahapiet and Ghoshal's (1998) conditions in this case is 
worthwhile. Phil certainly saw that there was an existing opportunity for 
combining or exchanging knowledge; he understood the value of the knowledge 
to the project and understood his own project knowledge capital, but the 
anticipated value to be derived from the exchange - that is, the expectation that 
he would be project director - was not forthcoming. What was the motivation to 
share, and what was the organisation’s real or perceived capacity to learn or 
absorb the knowledge? He believed that if this third attempt was not to go the 
way of the previous two, it was critical that the project take all of his knowledge 
on board. With the scenario of Phil’s shattered expectations and no meaningful 
role offer, yet his strong views regarding his own indispensability, the Alliance 
Board, although they understood the project imperative of continuity, decided that 
Phil would be a key member of the PLT, but not in what role. 
 
 He didn’t have a title; he may have had an expectation to be the project 
 director. 





The project director put forward a further version of the organisation structure 
that did appease Phil. 
 
Figure 4.4 Proposed PLT organisation structure with incumbents - Version 3 
 
 






When asked about the selection decision, including the process and tools that 
had been used in appointing him to the role of deputy project director, Phil 
reflected that there was no vex. 
 
So I guess the factors why I was brought on were my experience, my 
desire to take the next steps as well as my previous history on the 
projects. For me personally there were no tools [HR selection] tools like 
that because I was already engaged. The three parties, there was the 
most senior people of each three of the businesses [who] endorsed that 
role. 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
4.6.2.2 The Use of Project Knowledge Capital in Selection - Candidate  
  Unsuccessful 
 
The parties may have endorsed the role of deputy project director but not the 
structure. The PLT Organisation Structure - V3 proposal had major ramifications 
for Mark who had also been advised that he was not to be offered, in his view, 
his job of right: construction manager. He, too, believed that he had a great deal 
of project knowledge capital and deserved the role, or at least a meaningful role 
that included substance, seniority and leadership opportunity.   
 
 I was actually part of the build-up for the actual tender, so I was actually 
 part of the process prior to the start-up for actually building the price and 
 all the project controls documents and presentations. Basically the whole 
 set up of the project.  
(Post-project interview: Mark, Project Services Manager,  







Mark was offered the project services manager position, and was still considering 
the offer when the third version of the structure was proposed. Seeing that the 
project services role was fourth-level management, with no participation in the 
PLT and that the two most significant responsibilities of the role, travel and 
facilities, had been removed, he declined the role. Mark had already relocated 
across the continent and now asked to be relocated back to his original home 
and to be taken off the project. Significantly, the HR manager began to action his 
request to return home. This suggested that the project knowledge capital that 
Mark believed he had plus the project director having stated that 'you would be 
crazy not to engage them [Phil and Mark] in meaningful roles', (Kingsley, Project 
Director, 18th May 2016), was still not enough to assure a PLT role for Mark. The 
significance to Mark of this lower-level offer (project services manager) was lost 
on some of the PLT and the covert negotiations that followed were of little 
consequence to them. 
 
 So Mark had a role and subsequently was promoted and took a 
 different role in terms of his controls manager.'  
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
When speaking of the selection decision-making process for the deputy project 
director, project services manager and his role, the procurement and contracts 
manager was appeared unconcerned. 
 
 The three of us who started first potentially had…we didn’t have a formal 
 appointment process; nobody ran us through psychometrics and put us in 
 an interview room and had us down to the last two and all that sort of fun 
 stuff. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  






Although the foibles of the selection decision-making processes for these two 
roles were discussed in the same interview (18th May 2016) the project director 
was confident that both the project and the individuals were satisfied with the 
outcome.   
 
 As I said they became natural fits for their roles to start with, so those two 
 were reasonably clear. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
4.6.2.3 Intra-project Knowledge and Inter-project Knowledge 
 
All of the attention regarding PKM in the selection of people onto the PLT was 
focused on intra-project knowledge. However, the literature overwhelmingly 
discusses inter-project knowledge. The deputy project director and project 
services manager, perhaps in a desire to protect their knowledge capital, would 
suggest that the third iteration of the project was just the next phase. However, 
others would argue that a new client, new budget, new schedule and some new 
contractors results in a new project. As stated in Section 1.5.2, the client board 
certainly did see Project North as a completely new project. 
 
The question of whether Project North was a new project or the next phase of an 
ongoing project was irrelevant to most, other than those who had a stake in the 
semantics. The more pertinent question for those recruited from outside of the 
stakeholder group (client and Alliance members), what was their project 
knowledge input and, specifically for this study, what part of that influenced their 
selection to the PLT? Consciously or unconsciously the selection decision-
makers had recruited the project knowledge of the external applicants. Overtly, 
the selectors could access an understanding of the extent of this knowledge 
through CVs, interviews and reference checks. A little harder to assess was the 






One of the immediate changes to the PLT structure came soon after the project 
director took up his position. He asked for a full-time, direct report for the position 
of HR manager.  
 
I think it re-enforces a view I’ve developed in my days, project experience, 
 that critical element of the success of the project, of any project, is the 
 quality of the execution team. And because the speed and complexity of 
 decision making is in order of magnitude greater than it is in a standard 
 operating environment and we need to resource for this both in terms of 
 the quantity, the number of positions in our chart but also the quality of 
 people we put into our chart. And that is re-enforced to me in this project. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
There was little to no objection as the project to was to 'go live' within one month 
and 600 trades people needed to be recruited to start on the first day. It was 
obvious that the most important and urgent activities had to do with the people 
side of the project. At that stage recruitment was being undertaken by a fourth- 
level, part-time HR person. The project director proposed that as the HR role was 
a critical part of the project, it should report to him. The client worked suggested 
that both people and finances, (specifically, procurement and contracts) were 
both critical, and both should report to the project director. PLT structure V4 was 








Figure 4.5 Proposed PLT organisation structure with incumbents - Version 4 
 
 
Source: HR Records February 2010 
 
The PLT structure was again approved; however, the person to fill the HR role 
was still undecided. Marie, the Alliance engineering specialist employee who had 
been undertaking the role, albeit on a part-time basis, expected to be appointed 
to the role. The difference between Marie and the project services candidate was 
that both the client and the Alliance members considered Marie to have little 
project knowledge; however, she had in fact worked on the project since 
February 2009 as part of the Project North Transition Team (PNTT), which made 
her the candidate with the second longest time on the project other than Phil, the 
deputy project director. Marie had intimate knowledge of the project but because 
her role was less obvious to the client her lack of visibility essentially made her 







[Marie] was under a fair bit of scrutiny because she was an unknown 
entity...We did look at the suitability of Marie versus other candidates 
[whom] the other clients, the other parties were proposing 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
Three distinct perspectives of PKM were used as inputs to the selection decision 
for the roles of deputy project director, project services manager and HR 
manager. The selection influence in the first two roles was the intra-project 
knowledge that the candidates used as knowledge capital to leverage selection 
to the PLT. For Phil this was enough to secure a meaningful role as the deputy 
project director; however, Mark's knowledge capital was not enough in itself. The 
more common PKM use is inter-project (Owen et al. 2004); in this instance it was 
introduced when the externally recruited project director demanded that HR role 
be a part of the PLT. Independent of the depth of Marie’s project knowledge, her 
lack of visibility to the client and the Alliance members gave her little opportunity 
to use her knowledge to influence her selection to the position. She had been 
working on the project’s HR issues in an office that was completely 
geographically divorced from both the client and the engineering and 
procurement group. As described in the interviews she was not a known entity, 
which suggests that her project knowledge was not enough without proximity to 
the group of the influencers and decision-makers for her to be seen to have, and 








4.6.3 Relationship Capital 
 
The post-project interviews consistently included claims that, for five of the six 
positions on the PLT (the exception being the construction manager), the 
decision to hire particular individuals was influenced by their direct or network 
relationships with the selection decision-makers. 
 
 For me, purely somebody that you know, somebody that the team has 
 seen…others in the team, or they have worked for somebody else and 
 they have recommended [them]. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
RC has been defined as '[t]he value (real or perceived) of all relationships' 
(Ecclestone & Field 2003, p. 268). This study asks: what are the characteristics 
of RC (type, strength, amount needed) required for a candidate to be selected for 
a position on the PLT. The discussions in the previous two sections - Power and 
Control and Project Knowledge Management - reported that selection for the 
position of deputy project director was influenced by project knowledge and the 
selection for procurement and contracts manager was influenced to some degree 
by the client’s insistence on control in the project, but also by that person’s RC 
with the client (as indicated by the position power, type of relationship and 
strength of the relationship - all inputs to calculating RC).  
 
 The fact that I had the confidence of the client project director was 
 certainly a…it was an unstated expectation that if I’ve got the client’s 
 project director confident in my abilities that’s something that [the 
 Alliance Board] should be confident in too. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  






Melvin indicated that his relationship with the client project director was a 
significant reason for his ascension into the role. Was this confidence in his 
abilities real or just his perception? As discussed in Section 4.6.1.2, the client 
was emphatic that the role of procurement and contracts manager would only be 
filled by someone from the client group. However, given Melvin’s own revelation 
that, 'I was not an experienced procurement and contracts manager', (Melvin, 
Procurement and Contracts Manager, 8th June 2016), was his appointment due 
to his RC with the client director, or was it just a case of his being in the right 
place at the right time to support the client’s power and insistence on control? As 
discussed in Section 4.6.1.2, the researcher contends that the selection decision 
was based mostly on the latter. Given the opportunity in the interview to ruminate 
on the proceedings leading up to his appointment, Melvin reflected: 
 
 So some of it was absolutely opportunity. I was available and familiar. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
For some of the other positions, the influence of RC was more overt. The 
appointment of the eventual incumbent to the deputy project director’s role was, 
as discussed in Section 4.6.2.1 due to his project knowledge. However, he had 
internal RC with the engineering group that no other person brought to the 
project: his relationship was specifically role-based (peer to peer, engineer to 
engineer) and incorporated both companion and competency trust (Newell & 
Swan 2000). Combined with his project knowledge capital, this competency trust 
was a strong foundation for his claim to a senior position on the project. The 
number and strength of the touch points on both sides of the relationship 






This may have been the basis for his claim to be 'indispensable in some respect.' 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016).  
 
Later in the interview he explained the process somewhat less dramatically: 
 
 I think there were differing levels of scrutiny, because people like myself 
 had been working on the project for so long and we had developed a
 relationship with the Alliance members and the client team at the time, so 
 there was a level of comfort there already. So the amount of scrutiny for 
 me to take that role on was definitely less than the scrutiny level put on by 
 anybody who didn’t have that history. 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
The people who were eventually appointed as the project director and the HR 
manager were introduced to the project through their networks: the former 
through an external network and the latter a network internal to the Alliance 
engineering specialist. For both of these people their RC alone was not enough 
to assure them their respective roles; however, without it there would have been 
no foot in the door. 
 
I was presented by another person within the Alliance engineering 
specialist who, someone known to me in the past; someone I’d known 
since university, actually, and he knew I had returned from the Middle 
East, had been floating around for a couple of months and hadn’t settled 
on doing something new and he presented my CV 







The role of RC in the appointment of the project services manager is somewhat 
more complex. It involves real and perceived RC from a number of parties, 
expectation management, obligation, commitment trust, psychological contracts 
and reciprocity. As reported in Section 4.6.2.2, Mark was offered the project 
services manager position, but declined because the role was fourth-level 
management, outside the PLT and of little substance. There was no role for him 
to return to in his previous home.  
 
Mark believed that he had played to his strength – his project knowledge - for the 
project services manager role, but that had been insufficient. Regardless, he 
believed that he was owed the role. Interviews with Mark never indicated that he 
understood it as RC; however, when he cited three instances to support his claim 
to what he believed was owed him, RC may, in fact, have played a significant 
role. This assertion is supported by the presence in this situation of the 
characteristics of RC (Table 2.4): obligation, reciprocity and real or perceived 
relationship capital, as the Alliance engineering specialist CEO had been the face 
of the Alliance engineering specialist in a complex business situation.   
 
 I had just been through a rather complex project. We had a fatality and I 
 handled a lot of different situations. 
(Post-project interview: Mark, Project Services Manager,  
27th June 2016) 
 
Mark also indicated the presence of obligation, commitment trust and a 
psychological contract:  
 The CEO at the time approached me and said there was an opportunity 
 for a rather large project. He at the time thought I wasn’t…didn’t have 
 enough experience for the site manager’s role. He said that the project 
 services role was a good role for me in my career and pitched it at me.  
(Post-project interview: Mark, Project Services Manager,  





This demonstrates expectation management, obligation, commitment trust and 
psychological contract, as the CEO had shown him the draft version of the 
Project North organisation chart as a part of the pitch to urge him to apply for the 
project services role. 
 




Source: HR Records January 2010 
 
Mark’s comments reflect an obvious level of trust and a statement of belief in the 
strength of the relationship with the CEO. However, as Tansley and Newell 
(2007) report, trust is not always reciprocal: 'Trust in a supervisor can be defined 
as a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on 







Mark's protestations about the nature of the role had mostly been disregarded 
until they researched a ‘friend in high places’ in the Alliance engineering 
specialist who suggested to the Alliance engineering specialist member of the 
Alliance Board that the project services role should report directly to the project 
director. The role was made more substantial with the addition of project controls 
and accounts, and a new (and fifth) version of the Project North organisation 
structure was duly communicated. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Proposed Project North organisation structure – Version 5 
  
 
Source: HR Records March 2010 
 
There are obvious benefits to having RC, one being the ultimate securing of a 
particular role. Indeed, a number of the post-project interviewees highlighted the 
significant advantages that RC brought to them, and noted that others who did 





I think yet again if we look back through the roles that came later got 
 successively  more scrutiny. So as I said, the three of us who started 
 first potentially had…we didn’t have a formal appointment process; 
 nobody ran us through psychometrics and put us in an interview room and 
 had us down to the last two and all that sort of fun stuff. I know we did
 follow that process [for other positions]. There was an interview process, 
 there was a testing and referee review process that occurred, and my 
 reflection on that would be that, that was because they were unknowns - 
 people who weren’t intimately engaged and embedded in Alliance parties, 
 if you like. As soon as we stepped outside of their already known and 
 direct employees…there was a formal selection process followed   
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
Reflected in this comment is the belief that the procurement and contracts 
manager, project services manager and deputy project director, because of their 
relationships, had greater legitimacy in being selected into their role on the 
project than those who went through a more formal process. 
 
 
4.6.4  Legitimacy  
  
In section 4.4 the discussion of legitimacy was centred at the organisation level: it 
concerned the relationship between the client and their shareholders and the 
new project structure, where legitimacy was a prerequisite and an in-project 
necessity. This was in the light of previous project attempts, which made the 
legitimacy-resource-positive progress relationship was especially critical. The 
overall selection of a quality project management team (analysed in Section 4.5) 
was a critical part of this. For the individuals involved in this project, legitimate 






As is evidenced by the post project interviews, the actors in this project were able 
to post-rationalise the project actions and promote the total project as a 
commercial success. Working from this platform, the individuals had the 
opportunity to retrospectively construct their selection, and hence give legitimacy 
to why they held their position on the project. 
 
4.6.4.1 Individual/Personal Legitimacy  
 
Each of the post-project interviewees legitimised their own selection in their own 
way. For example, the project director said: 
 
 I think that there was a reasonably cautious approach adopted in my 
 selection and good measures in assessment in terms of psychometrics 
 etc. Referee checking that was quite well done and retrospectively that 
 wouldn’t have shown up anything that wasn’t delivered.  
 (Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
This quote regarding the selection is meant to show some form of normative 
legitimacy. It highlights rationality in the selection decision, although in reality the 
selection was achieved through networks that mitigated the liability of newness; 
in other words, whom you know influences judgements. While Kingsley implied 
that all candidates were treated fairly through testing, the HR records show that 
the final incumbent rated below average on all test instruments. (Source: HR 
Records January 2010) 
 
The deputy project director said: 
 Three companies endorsed my position well before I relocated over. So, I 
 guess really they sort of thought because of the history it made a lot of 
 sense.  





Notably the three companies, who were the Alliance members, endorsed Phil for 
the project director's role, that decision/endorsement being later overturned by 
the client. Ironically, in his interview Phil said that the client's veto rights were 
never used. However, the decision was legitimized through authorisation by 
people or groups who had power, and whose meanings were validated and 
accepted as correct or standard by others (Jackson and Klobas 2008). The 
rationale was: if the Alliance group endorses my selection, then it must be 
legitimate. 
 
The procurement and contracts manager said:  
 There was a vacancy, we were going to have to recruit that key 
 leadership role for the execution and because of my background and 
 experience, the fact that I already knew and understood the vast majority 
 of the procurement packages; I was offered the opportunity to take that 
 role.  
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
In Section 4.6.3 the perspective of the procurement and contracts manager may 
be flawed, as the client’s motives for appointing a person with no experience in 
such a role in any project, let alone a mega-project was always under question 
by the Alliance members and other members of the PLT. 
 
The project services manager said:  
 My runs on the board previously in the company [Alliance engineering 
 specialist] I suppose were  well known. I think they thought I had the right 
 credentials and experience, so I didn’t have any … much HR input in 
 selection. It was more around reputation and previous runs on the board. 
(Post-project interview: Mark, Project Services Manager,  





Both the procurement and contracts manager and project services manager 
claimed cognitive legitimacy (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002) which addresses widely 
held beliefs and take-for-granted assumptions. In this case the candidates’ 
beliefs and assumptions provided a framework for everyday routines, as well as 
the more specialised, explicit and codified knowledge and belief systems.  
 
The deputy project director and the project director said of the construction 
manager’s role: 
 It was a very quick process ... it was a hot market 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
 Well essentially it was my appointment. We were reasonably desperate 
 by the time we had to make this appointment because it took some time 
 and we needed to have a lead construction person on site. 
 (Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
In this appointment the project director was dealing with his own legitimacy to 
make the decision as, in project terms, the stage-gate model (Conforto & Amaral 
2016) was not used; that is, the endorsement from the Alliance Board was not 
sought before making the appointment. However, decisions made in informal 
ways, as this one was, are generally forced to undergo a formal process later, in 
accordance with the project values and to placate the Alliance Board regarding 
legitimacy. In times of uncertainty, instead of choosing the best alternative, 
decision-makers choose the alternative that exceeds some other criterion 
(Gutiérrez & Magnusson 2014). In this instance the project director switched 
paradigms: to mitigate anxiety and frustrations, the hot employment market was 
highlighted and the project director, describe the context as dynamic with the 
pending 'go-live' date looming. Placing conditions on the rationale for the 
decision by reference to other values or reasons is a familiar tactic in moral and 





The project director, knew the imminent 'go-live' date would appeal to the client, 
who, unlike two of the Alliance partners had at least met the candidate. Not 
meeting the first critical date for on-site construction would have been a disaster 
for the client's legitimacy with their board.  
 
Several interviewees spoke about the HR Manager role: 
 We did look at the suitability of Marie versus other candidates the other 
 parties were proposing and Marie was the most suitable. 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
 Marie did face some more competition from the other partners but as I 
 said, at the end of the day the calibre…they couldn’t come up with 
 anyone of similar calibre. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
 I think that I would say that Marie was probably…was under a fair bit of 
 scrutiny. 
(Post-project interview: Mark, Project Services Manager,  
27th June 2016) 
 
A nomination from Alliance engineering specialist [was] accepted by the 
other alliance partners. 








Many of these quotes display characteristics of the regulative, normative and 
cognitive types of legitimacy (Scott 1995). As evidenced by the interviewees’ 
polarising comments and their binary view of legitimacy, they seemed are solely 
concerned with crossing the threshold between legitimacy and illegitimacy 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002) and unconcerned with the scale (low to high) of how 
legitimate the decisions were. 
 
4.6.4.2 Illegitimate Procedure, Illegitimate Decision? 
 
One of the interview questions asked was: did support roles attract more or less 
attention in the selection process than the line roles of engineering, procurement 
and construction? The answer was generally no, with most interviewees giving 
the example of the selection of the project services manager. However, 
examining the specific discussion on each role individually and as reflected in the 
quotes above it seems that the HR role did come under a fair amount of scrutiny. 
This was largely because the construction component of the project was costs 
reimbursable plus an agreed margin for each of the Alliance partners. In simple 
terms, the more people, equipment and time that each member put into the 
project the more profit they made for their respective companies. Understanding 
that the HR role was the central influencer of staff planning and recruitment, 
based on the logic of financial consequences and in competition for resources, 
each member of the Alliance attempted to fill this role with their candidate. As 
discussed earlier, this is a manifestation of the horizontal political-ethical dilemma 
(Alvesson 2003), embodying conflicts about power and competitive relationships, 
the paradox of the alliance model. 
 
Although none of the selection approaches goes near to filling Collins’s (2012) 
conditions for legitimate selection, her assertion being that a legitimate procedure 
gives rise to a legitimate decision, it does not follow that an illegitimate procedure 





There is support for informal approaches to decision-making, based on 
interaction and learning; such approaches may be necessary, or at least justified 
in the presence of uncertainty and unusual circumstances. They fit more with 
Gutierrez and Magnusson’s (2014) view that decision-makers deal with 
legitimacy by certain mechanisms that allow them to bypass approaches with 
high acceptance and legitimise decisions made by those with low acceptance. 
The means-end rationale for a number of these decisions which highlights that a 
selection might be objectionable, whether or not it is permissible. Most of the 
interviewees understood the rationale, even if they did not totally agree with the 
espoused legitimacy of the selection of the PLT members, including their own 
appointment.  
 
 For me that was…I didn’t come pre-set, with a set of technical skills but I 
 did come with an attitude and a methodology and a work appetite that 
 meant that I could learn and pick it up quickly. Having said that I made 
 some mistakes and we could have had an even better outcome had we 
 not. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
However, one interviewee, albeit after the fact, did have very strong feelings 
about the process. 
 
 There should have been official documents so there is no … at least then 
 a year or two later when you’re looking back there is no favouritism, there 
 is no … it is all just a well-documented, legal process. If you get what I am 
 saying. The old days of just picking people and then moving on should be 
 a thing of the past.     
(Post-project interview: Mark, Project Services Manager,  





This goes to the essence of management credibility and meritocratic selection. 
Clayton (2012) suggests a flaw in this perspective, what he calls a 'stringency 
objection' that 'rests on a failure to distinguish between evaluating selection 
procedures from the perspective of justice and judging them according to the 
standards of legitimacy' (p. 10). He goes on to say that it does not follow that if a 
particular selection is unjust it is also illegitimate. Zimmerman and Zeita (2002) 
suggest that this is a key concept, 'that legitimacy provides a basis for decision-
making that is different from means-end rationale' (p. 416). It would seem, from 
the client's standpoint at least, that there was an attempt in this case to have a 
foot in both camps; means-end rationale from an internal perspective and 





This chapter examined the two broad areas of research investigated: people- 
selection in a project environment and decision-making in an alliance structure. 
The findings in both context and processes, defined by the research question, 
were discussed starting with the context. 
 
The environment or context in which the selection decisions for those who 
occupied the six positions on the PLT, were examined. The project environment 
influenced the behaviour of all stakeholders and ultimately underpinned the 
selection decisions. The Alliance ideal was reviewed and its convener's 
philosophical view of alliances and his sell-in to the other Alliance members was 
reviewed in the light of some of the Alliance's initial decisions. The Alliance 
members’ motivation and their opportunity to make decisions, specifically on the 
selection of the PLT members, was assessed in relation to the behaviours of a 






The selection process and the processes within processes, in particular the 
decision-making within the selection process of the project leadership team were 
scrutinised. The initial attempt of the HR manager to bring professionalism and 
objectivity to the selection process through the development of the project 
selection framework was examined. Finally, the four broad themes - Power and 
Control, Project Knowledge Management, Relationship Capital and Legitimacy - 
emerging from the analysis of the research data as factors influencing the 
selection decisions of key people in the management of mega-infrastructure 






CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This thesis gives an account of the dynamic context and fluid process of people- 
selection decision-making hitherto unavailable, and offers case-specific insights 
into how individuals and groups go about using their power to legitimise their 
decisions. As a retroductive (similar to critical incident review), ethnographical 
study, it examined the case of the selection decision-making of a project 
leadership team (PLT) for an Alliance organisation tasked with the construction of 
a mega-infrastructure project in Australia. 
 
The findings of this study have been synthesised in this chapter into a 
concentrated account of the decision-making for the selection of six people into 
the six positions on the PLT. The chapter asks: why these people (and not 
others)? How did the decision-making process play out in each case? Although 
the evaluation of the data in this study is from a unique setting, it nevertheless 
brings to light a set of concepts that have implications for explaining the process 
of selection decision-making. This elucidation of the concepts may also provide a 
potentially fruitful opportunity for future study for researchers interested in socially 
constructed decision processes in other subject areas; for example, corporate 








5.2  Summary of the Research Process 
 
After reviewing relevant literature in the two main areas of people-selection 
decision-making - the decision-making context and the decision-making process 
- the available documentation from the project, including that gathered before 
and during project interviews with the key influencers and the decision-makers, 
underwent content analysis. The initial data from the content analysis was 
analysed at a meso-level; that is, it examined localised meanings and themes 
within the project. This data was mapped using these themes. Data validation 
and selection process gaps were filled by post-project, semi-structured interviews 
with the key managers themselves and those influencing and deciding on their 
appointment to the PLT positions.  
 
The case findings are presented in Chapter 4; these comprise the context in 
which the selections decisions occurred and the explanations of the actors 
regarding the processes of the selection decisions. The sections in Chapter 4 on 
the Environmental Context (Section 4.2), the Structural Context (Section 4.3), 
Resourcing the Project (Section 4.4) and Selection Decision-making in Alliance 
Mega-projects (Section 4.5) support the understanding of the pertinent contextual 
factors which influence the selection decisions in this case. The four decision-
process themes that emerged were: Power and Control (Section 4.6.1); Project 
Knowledge Management (Section 4.6.2); Relationship Capital (Section 4.6.3); 








5.3  Summary and Discussion of the Findings Regarding Factors 
 
Bolander and Sandberg (2013) assert that 'existing literature on employee 
selection contains an abundance of knowledge of how selection should take 
place but almost nothing about how it occurs in practice' (p.285).  Having 
undertaken a similar review of the existing literature on employee selection, the 
researcher would support this assertion. However the review cannot support the 
main findings of Bolander and Sandberg (2013) that suggest that selection 
decision-making is characterised by ongoing practical deliberation (Bolander & 
Sandberg 2013). Instead, this study suggests that the selection decision-making 
is characterised by contextual shaping of mostly latent factors. 
 
The core of the research question is the factors influencing selection decisions in 
a specific context: alliance-based mega-infrastructure projects focused solely on 
the PLT. The discussion of contextual factors of decision-making as found in the 
literature highlights that although there has been some research undertaken into 
the macro issues of selecting alliance partners, there has been little or no study 
of what happens once those alliance organisations are confirmed (be it in a 
project environment or not), and how the people to manage those organisations 
are selected.  
 
Figure 5.1 reveals the findings of this study regarding the factors in the selection 












The contextual factors are antecedent conditions for the selection decision. The 
findings suggest two contextual domains. The first is the environment external to 
the project; this includes issues and circumstances that for the most part the 
project participants have little control over. The second is the project context, 
specifically the internal context in which Project North V3 was incubated and 
operated. These process factors appear as both selection-process and decision-
process factors. The selection-process factors reflect some of the conventional 
approaches to selection, whereas, the decision-process factors have been 
brought to the surface by this study. The four decision process factors discussed 
here are not the only factors, nor are they mutually exclusive; however, they have 







5.4  Context Factors 
 
Contextual factors in this study refer to trends, causes, issues or circumstances 
that may threaten the success of the project, or even of the client's business. 
These may be macro, external to the client organisation, including legal and 
institutional environment factors or they may be internal, for example the 
business culture led by the Board, whether entrepreneurial or conservative. 
These are antecedent conditions for all decisions. 
 
5.4.1  Business Environment Factors 
 
The client, as with most manufacturers, placed its business focus on size, 
economies of scale and capital requirements as integral to the building of 
structural elements as sources of advantage and drivers of performance 
(Galbreath & Galvin 2008). The opportunity to enter an already lucrative and 
growing international market and to provide competition to an Australian 
monopoly fitted with the client’s horizontal-integration objectives. From a strong 
financial base, the buy-out of Company A in March 2008 gave the client the point 
of entry into that market through the purchase of the retrofitable chemical plant. 
At that time the most concerning factor for the client was the Federal 
Government’s scrutiny of the plant and in particular the product it would 
eventually produce. Government scrutiny had focused on import regulations, not 
home-soil production. This focus opened up a government/industry/client 
dialogue that could result in burdensome regulations, particularly in security and 







The GFC in December 2008 crippled the global financial industry and eventually 
led to the 2008-2012 global recession (Virakul 2015). Paradoxically, Australia 
was in the midst of a mining boom; consequently there was a hot employment 
market. Within this environment, the impact of the GFC was that Project North V2 
was abandoned, as the client, who were chemical producers with no experience 
in building chemical plants, took a cautious approach. The client 's ongoing 
concern with any further iteration of the project was now also with the 'firm factor' 
versus the 'industry factor' (Galbreath & Galvin 2008, p. 110), that is their 
company (firm) would be working within the unfamiliar construction industry, the 
representatives of which had been a party to two previous attempts to construct 
the project that had been abandoned.  
 
 5.4.2  Project Context Factors 
 
Many researchers recognise that a project environment is different from the 
conventional structure of business; however, there is little examination of the 
impact of this environment on selection decision-making. Throughout this study 
Turner and Muller's (2003) definition of project management has been used: 'an 
endeavour in which human, material and financial resources are organised in a 
novel way, to undertake a unique scope of work, of given specification, within 
constraints of cost and time, so as to achieve beneficial change defined by 
quantitative and qualitative objectives' (p. 1). The quantitative objectives in this 
project were stated in this way; 'The Alliance is committed to delivering the North 
project with zero injuries, under budget and ahead of schedule' (Project North 
Executive Team briefing March 2010). The perspective of how to deliver these 
objectives was unusually complicated given the two previous attempts at the 
project; however, the Alliance engineering specialist, who were contracted from 
the project's first beginnings, needed to see the project to its completion for both 






The managing director of the Alliance engineering specialist, who had initiated 
the Alliance, had had no previous exposure to or in-depth knowledge of alliance-
based projects. He was unaware or completely dismissive of the Alliance 
characteristics that were described in numerous ways that indicated their 
complex nature: 'complex organizational forms'; 'viewed as incomplete contracts'; 
a 'process that is fraught with ambiguity'; consisting of 'detailed interactions 
between the alliance partners [that] can rarely be fully prespecified' (Anand & 
Khanna 2000, p. 295); 'qualitatively different from JV'; 'formed by rivalling 
companies' (Ramu 1997, p. 204); and,'relationship capital that [causes] the 
alliance [to be] actually enacted and implemented' (Cullen et al. 2000, p. 224). 
The Alliance engineering specialist organisation had worked in many projects 
with hybrid structures, mainly primary contractor and sub-contractor 
arrangements, but had never worked in any form of alliance organisation to 
undertake a project. Yet Alexander, the managing director of the Alliance 
engineering specialist, left no doubt of his belief in this Alliance model he had 
convened, stating that it would be an 'Australian Business Excellence Process' 
and that he expected that 'awards' would ensue. 
 
The factors that resulted in this case in characteristics stated above had 
reciprocal causation and were antecedent in the people-selection and other 
decisions made in the project. Independent of the organisation structure, there 
was client discomfort with the fact that two of the three contractors (the Alliance 
engineering specialist and mechanical construction specialist) were also involved 
in the previous two failed attempts to complete the project. The managing 
director of the Alliance engineering specialist attempted to appease the client by 
replacing one of the contractors who had been involved in the first two attempts 







Although the Alliance members went to the client with a whole-of-project, turn-
key solution, the client took the procurement and maintenance components out 
of the EPCM project as a part of their response to their discomfort with the 
previous failures. Another mitigation of the client’s discomfort with the previous 
arrangement was now having a completely separate arrangement with the 
Alliance engineering specialist for all engineering work to the exclusion of the 
other two contractors. Consequently, although the Alliance Board was set up to 
oversee and make decisions on the total EPCM project, the only real decisions 
were in the construction component of the project. This meant that the partnering 
firms in the Alliance had a diluted common purpose; this put the Alliance 
engineering specialist in a dominant position in the Alliance. Also, one of the 
main characteristics of an alliance is that boundaries are defined by the 
partnering firms; however, in this case the boundaries were defined by the client. 
One of the most significant boundaries was that each of the Alliance partners 
reported direct to the client rather than through the Alliance Board that had 
ostensibly been set up for such governance.  
 
This reflects that in uncertain situations, prescribed scripts, rules, norms, values 
and models emerge from social systems (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002). The client 
was faced with the uncertainty of the third attempt at this project and they needed 
the Alliance members to accept their systems - rules, norms, values and models 
- as legitimate. Social constructivism emphasises that once these structures are 
constituted, they constrain actors in their choices to within the limits of the 
prescripts. Social structures have the best hold on actors when they seem to be 
rooted in the natural order. However this was not the case here. The client 
redefined the project environment mostly after the contract was signed (note - 
they changed the environment, not the contract) to support the social structure as 
it carried their view of delegated legislation from their board and shareholders to 






The results of the research show that although the client and the Alliance 
partners said that they were comfortable with the Alliance approach, all four 
parties went into this arrangement from different thought-worlds. The Alliance 
Board’s belief that they were in control of the inputs, particularly when it came to 
people, was unsound from the start, not only because of the partners’ lack of 
capacity but also because of the client’s high need for control, which affected all 
selection decisions. The first example to support the client's assertion of control 
was the Alliance’s inability to even suggest a nominee for the construction 
manager’s role, let alone fill it. This caused great concern to all stakeholders, 
particularly the Alliance and the client. 
 
 
5.5  Process Factors 
 
Intangible assets and capabilities explain performance variation, while tangible 
resources do not (Galbreath & Galvin 2008). A critical reason for this is that 
intangible resources are usually not on the balance sheet, they cannot be 
protected by legal property rights and they can have a high level of specificity, all 
of which makes them likely sources of competitive advantage. Quality business 
processes that manage an organisation’s resources are a part of those intangible 
assets and capabilities. Having these processes in place are required for the 
organisation’s efficiency and good governance. 
 
5.5.1  People-selection Process Factors 
 
Having the requisite human capital is important for project success. Competency-
based measures are increasingly being recognised as the best way to select and 
professionally develop project managers, particularly in the construction industry 
(Ahadzie et al. 2008). Functional/technical competencies measure performance 





Behavioural competency-based measures underpin levels of performance; 
consequently, when they are used in the selection process, they have the 
potential to predict future performance. They are not to be confused with 
competence (which is output-based): competency, according to mainstream 
project management practice, means the personal attributes that individuals draw 
upon as part of their work activities (Mei et al. 2005).   
  
The reason that competency-based approaches have become widely accepted in 
project management is their strategic importance. The iron triangle - on time, on 
budget, on spec - as the only measures of project performance perpetuates the 
myth of projects being one-off, short-term activities with no opportunities for 
individual career and organisation capability development. Competency-based 
measures support continuous performance improvement and thus contribute to 
superior performance levels (Bass 1990). However, behavioural-based 
competency measures have the disadvantage that behaviours are dynamic and 
sometimes difficult to identify (Fowler et al. 2000).  
 
The Project North Selection Framework (Figure 4.3) was a competency 
framework that reflected most of the criteria discussed above. Constructed by the 
HR manager, during her time on the Project North Transition Team in early 2009, 
this was her professional attempt to add objectivity and rigor to the selection 
process. Her HR specialist view was the value-in-use of the framework, and she 
believed that its use or lack of use in the selection process put into question any 
value the framework may have had. However for other actors it may have been 
the exact value they required. The framework’s existence allowed the convener 
and other stakeholders. Both control and legitimacy were scarce and precious, 
particularly in the early stages of the project. The framework made its first public 






Although this stretch of the ‘value-in-use’ concept may not have been palatable 
to the HR specialist, it gave the illusion of authenticity to the PLT selection 
process. 'The objective valuation (often) depends on context, e.g. what the 
environment can supply' (Thyssen et al. 2010, p. 21).  
 
The value to the project under study in this thesis was that without the existence 
of the selection framework, there would have been no opportunity to gain deeper 
insights to the decision-makers’ conscious or unconscious actions in either 
process or rationale. For example: 
 
I also did psychometric testing on each of the members of my team at the 
outset.  
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
The postscript to this comment is the 'stretch truth' shown in Table 4.1. First, it 
should be noted that the table, which was supplied by the HR manager, was 'As 
at 12th March 2010'; in other words, at a time when all but in one incumbent 
(construction manager) had taken up their new roles. The table shows that only 
four of the six incumbents were administered any psychometric testing, and for 
two of those the testing was not done for any particular position on the project. 
The project director’s assertion is flawed at all levels. The HR manager asserted 
that no knowledge, skills or attributes were identified for any role. Psychometric 
testing is of value in a selection process as long as the predictor instruments 
have high validity when they are applied to the knowledge, skills and attributes 







Table 4.1 further shows that the instruments from the framework most 
consistently used as decision aids were interviews and CV/personnel records. 
However, again the research findings show that for the most part those 
interviews that actually were conducted were unstructured, and little more than a 
'getting-to-know you chat'. This puts a great deal of emphasis on CV/personnel 
records as decision aids, but there is little supporting evidence for their proper 
use. In fact, it could be said of all selection-process factors that many were not 
available and of those that were, there is little evidence that they were used 
appropriately if at all to assist in the final decision. This illustrates a perspective 
presented by Clayton (2012) who stated, 'Whilst a selection procedure can be 
unjust by virtue of its effects, it can also be unjust regardless of its effects' (p.9). 
 
The literature in this area spotlights bounded rationality and uses egalitarian 
norms of equality and justice in selection. Further, the morally relevant question 
of whether the deliberations and motives of the selectors are acceptable as just 
must refer to the ideal of selectors being moved by the attitude of equal respect 
toward different individuals (Clayton 2012). Clayton (2012) goes on to suggest 
that it is sufficient to appeal to non-egalitarian reasons in judging the 
permissibility of different selections. In this case the evidence suggests that 
although a people-selection framework and some decision-making aids did exist 
they were not factors that were significant in the people-selection process.    
 
5.5.2  Decision-making Process Factors 
 
Every project exists to support business goals, strategies and priorities. To align 
with these goals, projects evolve as a result of a decision chain. A pivotal reason 
for flawed decisions is that many project leaders think about decisions as events 
rather than processes. 'Decisions are a long social process involving a series of 
interactions carried out by different people, unfolding over time and across 





The selection decisions made in this case were incubated in the contextual 
factors discussed previously in this chapter. The social dynamic between the 
client and the Alliance partners, and among the partners themselves, unfolded 
through circumstance, interaction over time and multiple touch-points. Heuristics 
built up in these conditions as people adapted their rationalisations, making 
estimations or choosing which logic of decision-making to rely on. Such decisions 
are not free of biases; however, heuristic and inductive logic may often lead to 
effective decisions. The factors highlighted in the findings reflect the heuristic and 
inductive logic of the influencers and decision-makers in this case.  
 
5.5.2.1 Power and Control 
 
The client/contractor arrangement in most projects is based on the principal-
agent model; 'the principal (or uninformed player) signs a contract with the agent 
(or the informed player) for the latter to carry out the wishes of former' (Braude 
2010, p. 44). However, although a contract did exist in this project, the perception 
of the principal as being informed or uninformed was the nexus of the 
relationship between the client and the Alliance members. The track record of the 
informed player, the Alliance, suggested that the Alliance members knew how 
EPCM projects worked. More importantly, they believed that the client did not 
know; thus when it came to decisions within the scope of the project the client 
had a credibility gap.  
 
To fill that gap the client used their power. 'Power is a matter of efficacy, the 
capacity of individual and groups to achieve their own ends and/or frustrate those 
of others' (Braude 2010, p. 152). The 'best for project' mantra that the client used 
to justify their behaviour suggests that the client believed that they needed to 
exercise power over the Alliance against their perceived preferences but in their 
real interests which were assumed to be project completion on time, on budget 





The Alliance members, through the power structures of dominance and 
constraints imposed by the client, were forced into 'organised hypocrisy'; ideas, 
actions, justifications and hypocrisy as alternatives to control (Brunsson 2007). 
This reciprocal causation manifested itself for example, in one of the Alliance 
members lobbying the client not to select a nomination from another Alliance 
member for a position even though they had no alternative candidate.    
 
5.5.2.2 Project Knowledge Management 
 
Projects need to create an optimal environment for the creation and sharing of 
knowledge (Jackson & Klobas 2008). Cohesive, innovative teams with members 
trusting one another and led by empowering leaders will have a higher level of 
knowledge-sharing (Xue et al. 2011). The Alliance Board and the PLT were a 
community-of-practice professionals with both inter- and intra-project knowledge 
that could have been shared for the common good. However the results of this 
research show that neither the community model (Section 2.8.3) nor the cognitive 
model (Section 2.8.3.1) of PKM were evident in this project. Project knowledge, 
at least as far as the people-selection decision-making went, was seen and used 
as capital. Because projects are highly task-focused they mitigate against the 
emergence of actor networks that establish a community based on shared 
understanding. Moreover, knowledge and learning 'inevitably cut across strong 
institutional, professional and contractual boundaries and demarcations' 
(Bresnen et al. 2003, p. 159). 
 
The question that this study highlights is not what was there but what was not 
there to produce the optimal environment for the creation and sharing of 
knowledge; consequently project knowledge was turned into a mere bargaining 
chip. Part of the answer comes from the two parties in the Alliance Board - the 





Section 5.4.2 asserted that the client was faced with the uncertainty of a third 
attempt at this project, and that when actors are faced with uncertainty, social 
systems prescribe rules. This environment of overt position power trumps all 
other forms of power. The most unpalatable part of this power play to the Alliance 
members was the lack of respect given to their experience and expertise. This 
was not conducive to creating a community of professionals. Some of the 
Alliance characteristics (Section 2.3.1) certainly did not contribute to fostering the 
optimal environment needed for the creation and sharing of knowledge.  
 
From an individual perspective for PKM objectives to be achieved and applied to 
generate new intellectual capital, four conditions must be met. Individuals must 
see an existing opportunity for combining or exchanging knowledge; they must 
anticipate value to be derived from the exchange; there must be motivation to 
share; and, the organization must have a real or perceived capacity to learn or 
absorb the knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). As discussed in Section 
4.6.2.1, these conditions were not evident. Another element that reduced project 
knowledge to a bargaining chip was the client's limited view of what constituted 
project knowledge. For them it consisted mostly of technical knowledge of the 
plant, its engineering and the progress on its construction from the previous two 
attempts.  
 
The client viewed only intra-project knowledge as valuable, which meant that it 
could be leveraged by any group or individual backed by continuity and 
knowledge, the extent of which was assumed to equate to length of time on the 
project. This project knowledge currency, in this circumstance, was further 
amplified by the hot employment market. The client's limited perspective gave at 
least one individual a 'first-picked' entry into the PLT and the opportunity to 






 I guess from  the selection process I had almost made myself 
 indispensable in some respect. 
(Post-project interview: Phil, Deputy Project Director, 10th June 2016) 
 
PKM is critical in any project, and inter- or intra-project knowledge would be an 
expected selection criterion in selection for most project roles; thus it is no 
surprise that the research highlighted this as one of the factors in the selection of 
people onto the PLT.  However project knowledge should not be limited to 
individuals' technical knowledge; each individual's knowledge diversity is also of 
value. For example, in a multi-disciplinary project an individual’s knowledge 
across disciplines makes for both ease and quality of communication and 




As discussed in Section 2.7.1, broad definitions of legitimacy suffer from some 
vagueness. However, one characteristic of legitimacy is consistently present, 
either explicitly or implied, in every definition: that it has a context (Bitektine 2011; 
Pfeffer 1981; Suchman 1995). The 'best for project' mantra was the client's 
attempt to define the context for every decision, including the PLT selection 
decisions.  
 
This mantra defined the legitimacy of every decision by ‘formulating its meaning 
by enumerating the objects or phenomena that fall under the definition of the 
concept in question' (Bitektine 2011, p. 153); the concept in question here being 
the decision-making process and the legitimacy of its outcome. For the client this 








With external scrutiny anticipated from both stockholders (Friedman & Singh 
1989) and the client’s board on behalf of company shareholders and 
stakeholders (Freeman & Reed 1983), in particular the Australian Government 
and security agencies, legitimacy in a number of forms was critical. Structural 
and procedural legitimacy (Suchman 1995) based on the evaluation of the 
organisation's structure and soundness of procedures and regulatory legitimacy 
(Deephouse 1996) that is - legitimacy with government regulators - were 
essential.  
 
Based on rhetoric, discursive means and collective action, all characteristics of 
institutional theory (Biesenthal et al. 2018; Cardinale 2018; Zhao et al. 2017), the 
Alliance Board members were led by the client to comply with and support, 
reluctantly or otherwise, of all actions bearing on external legitimacy (Kostova & 
Roth 2002). The impacts on the selection of the PLT were manifold. The 
overarching rationale was that if the Alliance Board endorsed the selection, it 
must be legitimate. However, the process of making the decision must also be 
seen as legitimate. The two most obvious starting points for this were the need 
for selection procedural legitimacy, afforded here by the existence (not 
necessarily the use) of the Project North Selection Framework and technical 
legitimacy (Ruef & Scott 1998) based on technology, quality and qualifications. 
Both of these reflect what should be cognitive legitimacy (Zimmerman & Zeitz 
2002) based on taken-for-grantedness: basic protocols, features or dimensions 
that would be expected in a project organisation of this magnitude. However, this 
was not so in all cases. Section 5.5.1 examined the use of the Project North 
Selection Framework in detail. In people-selection terms its value was in its use. 
However, in this case its value was in its very existence, as it was used as 
pragmatic legitimacy based on the client’s self-interest, and later that of the PLT 
members themselves, to point to the procedural legitimacy of their own selection 
and the selection decisions they made or influenced. Technical legitimacy (or 





  For me that was…I didn’t come pre-set, with a set of technical skills. 
(Post-project interview: Melvin, Procurement and Contracts Manager,  
8th June 2016) 
 
As discussed in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.7.1, evaluations of organisational legitimacy 
involve bounded rationality, along with cognitive and socio-political issues. 
Legitimacy as a property conferred is distinct from legitimation which emphasises 
the process of social construction of legitimacy (Bitektine 2011). The findings 
from the research suggest that the decisions made in selecting people for the 
PLT were made emphasising the process of social construction of legitimacy: a 
decision-legitimation process that emerged from the individual organisation's 
norms and logic. The choice between seeking more information to make the 
decision and using heuristics and inductive logic does not appear to have ever 
been a part of the decision-making process. 
 
5.5.2.4 Relationship Capital 
 
As discussed in Section 4.6.3, in the post-project interviews there was a 
consistent claim that, in five of the six positions on the PLT (the exception being 
the construction manager), decisions were influenced and people given positions 
(or not) due to their direct or network relationships with the selection decision-
makers. Relations within the context of cognitive and sociopolitical issues all put 
pressure on the theoretical model of selection decision-making. Commitments 
(actions) and perceptions (thoughts and feelings) are interactions that help define 
relationship capital (Peters 2015) and create physical and psychological touch 
points between entities, including people, businesses and products. This 
definition opens up how groups or individuals who have or believe they have 







This study found that RC was used to varying degrees ranging from none to 
extensive in selecting the PLT members. RC was based on trust on the part of 
either the candidate or the influencer/decision-maker (or both): for some it was 
competence trust, and for others commitment trust (Newell & Swan 2000). 
Employee recommendations used in conjunction with other methods are a 
commonly used source in recruitment to gather a group of candidates for 
selection. The use of employee recommendations as a selection cast-net or a 
'foot in the door' is for the most part legitimate. Both the project director's role and 
the HR manager's role were recruited in this way. The competence trust from 
their networks was based on an attitude of respect for the trustee's ability to 
undertake the task at hand.  
 
In two other instances, the selection processes for the procurement and 
contracts manager and the project services manager were based more on 
commitment trust. The former was based mostly on a formal agreement: the 
candidate's employment contract, which made him a client employee first and a 
member of the PLT second; and the commitment trust was based on the parties’ 
expectations that, through cooperative relations, there would be mutual benefits.  
 
 So he was no decision for me. The client nominated that they wanted to 
 have their own person manage procurement. Now this is in my view a 
 very intrusive appointment. 
(Post-project interview: Kingsley, Project Director, 18th May 2016) 
 
From these perspectives, RC is seen as organisational political capital (Landells 
& Albrecht 2013). The selection of the project services manager was also based 
on commitment trust but psychological rather than contractual, still strongly 
based on the parties’ expectations that, through cooperative relations, there will 





The cooperative relations in this case were things that the candidate had done in 
the past, as explained in Section 4.6.3, and for this obligation, reciprocity, 
psychological contract and real/perceived relationship capital was currency for 
the expected appointment to a role on the PLT. In contrast to social capital, 
where psychological contracts are honoured and where genuine and positive 
reciprocity is central to the concept, as Tansley and Newell (2007) report, in RC, 
trust may not be reciprocal.  
 
5.5.2.5 Summary of Decision-making Process Factors 
 
Male et al. (2007) discuss value management as an approach to auditing 
decisions against a value system determined by the client. However, in this case 
value involved more than a client-centric, narrow industrial view based on the 
‘iron triangle’. All of the decision-making process themes from this case's 
research incorporate perspectives of value. RC and PKM are by nature value 
constituents. Legitimacy along with power and control as discussed previously, 
were objectives of many of the actors in this project. The interactions between 
these themes reinforce and amplify each other when they come together in the 
project dynamic. In the most positive sense, this is exactly what the managing 
director of the Alliance engineering specialist had in mind when boasting at the 
outset that the new Alliance model would be an 'Australian Business Excellence 
Process'. He believed that the advantages and value of relational partnerships as 
an alternative to traditional project-delivery methods were yet to be realised by 
the wider construction industry. However, for this relational partnerships delivery 
mechanism to be successful all parties need to work together as a cohesive team 







The accounts of the selection decisions (Section 4.6) reflect an overt, 
overarching premise for the client’s high need for control over most, if not all, 
decisions, independent of the quality of or trust in those decisions. Sections 4.6.2 
to 4.6.4 are tied strongly to the initial theme of Power and Control (Section 4.6.1). 
Closer examination of that power shows that it can influence cognition-based 
trust even though affect-based trust has a significantly greater positive influence 
on cooperative performance (Lu & Hao 2013). In the context of this project, the 
need for affect-based trust was something that the client either was unaware of 
or believed to be unnecessary, as they had client-rights (that is, veto power) over 
all decisions ,and were able to impose their own definition of what was of value 
on the project. 
 
As far back as Perry (1914) researchers have attempted to create a broad 
definition of value. In this case each of the eventual incumbents of the roles of 
the PLT were clients of the broad project recruitment and selection process. The 
nuisances and quality of that process may have little relevance when the parties 
in that endeavour - the Alliance and the client - were willing to accept the 
resulting product and, for the most part, use it to create their own constructs of 
worth. To all of the stakeholders the components and features of the selection 
decision-making process were somewhat moot: because they were actors, in 
part or full, in the input, process and output of the selections, they were complicit 
in the impact of all promulgation - personal, organisational and environmental - 








5.6 Summary of Selection-decision Factors 
 
Normative selection approaches in this project are difficult to identify. The 
dynamic processes that resulted in each individual's selection into their particular 
role suggests that stockholder, stakeholder dynamics, client power-in-use, 
leverage of tacit knowledge and the use and abuse of relationships were more 
prominent factors in selection decisions. The risk of bias in decisions, a lack of 
transparency in decision-making and activities that altered the planning of 
resource allocation contributed to the end result. Such interpretations may be 
appropriate and sensible within the perpetrators' means-end approach, but 
difficult to defend legally, ethically or morally. However, deeper analysis of the 
case evidence raises the question: were these internal power players in the 
project the puppet masters or the marionettes? 'The involuntarist nature of 
conditions' and consequently 'the involuntarism of action and reflection available 
to actors' (Taylor 2006, p. 484) address the antecedence of context for selection 
decisions. Context both external to the project environment and internal to 
Project North V3 inflates the role and status of the individual in the constitution of 
social reality through interactionism (Archer 1995).  
 
 
5.7  Thesis Summary  
 
The decision-making literature recognises the critical role that organisational 
context plays in providing antecedent conditions for decisions (see, for example, 
(Clayton 2012; Gutiérrez & Magnusson 2014; Landells & Albrecht 2017). Chapter 
4 examined the situational, environmental and contextual setting in which the 
selections decisions were incubated. An appropriate parallel in history is the Star 
Chamber, where the context may quasi-formalise, if not legitimise, the client 
exercising domination, a particular form of power-based on neither incentives nor 





The Star Chamber, which became a synonym for secrecy, severity and extreme 
injustice, had its origins during the personal rule of Great Britain’s Charles I, 
when the Court was used to coercively enforce laws against religious dissent and 
seditious libel. The Long Parliament abolished the Court on the grounds that it 
had exceeded its jurisdiction, permitted its proceedings to become arbitrary, and 
inflicted cruel and excessive punishment (Zande 2008). Similarly, while the client 
representative on the project would not agree that they exceeded their 
jurisdiction or ‘inflicted’ anything that they did not have a right to, at a minimum 
their 'social norms' were invoked and imposed on others. 
 
As the study is of one case, the findings and conclusions are organisation-centric 
and situation-centric. However, this chapter outlines the study’s contributions to 
the selection decision-making literature, albeit in a specific set of circumstances. 
This interpretivist research is undertaken on the in-practice decision-making in 
the selection of alliance-structured, mega-project leadership teams, where until 
now little has been done (Bolander & Sandberg 2013). This study shines a light 
on the real-world practices of selection in these specific environments and gives 
some insight to the success or otherwise of some of these practices.  
 
5.7.1  Contribution of the Study 
 
This study has presented an account of the findings from one case regarding the 
factors that influence the selection decisions for leadership teams in an alliance 
mega-infrastructure project. The unique details such as the conflict between the 
client and the Alliance members over the selection of specific individuals may 
have little or no significance for interpreting other cases of people-selection. 
However, the notion of context - external and internal - significantly impacting 
selection and decision processes can be taken as an explanation of the general 





Context, as a point of departure for the ultimate decision, incubates the 
conscious and sometimes unconscious bifurcated path of traditional and/or latent 
processes taken.  
 
In an attempt to generalise the learning from the research Figure 5.2 gives a 
synoptic heuristic of figure 5.1, showing the paths and interactions of context and 
processes that prefix a final decision; in this case the selection decision. The 
figure (5.2) extends the understanding of the decision-making process, including 
implications beyond the project management discipline. 
 
Figure 5.2  Overview of selection-decision factors 
 
 
This study suggests that selection decision-making is characterised by contextual 
shaping of mostly latent factors, hence the solid line from context to latent 
processes to outcome. The dotted line between traditional processes and 
outcome reflects a weaker influence on the outcome due to heavy influences 
from the context and latent processes. The contextual factors are antecedent 





The selection-process factors reflect some of the conventional approaches to 
selection, whereas latent factors have been brought to the surface by this study.  
 
Returning to the literature, traditional people-selection and decision-making 
processes (Gatewood et al. 2016; Sanchez & Levine 2012; Schippmann et al. 
2000) often encompass approaches to the processes that specify sets of rules 
and heuristics. Practitioners often describe difficulties that they experience in the 
application of these methods; it is thus unsurprising that others build their own 
heuristics to adapt their rationality, making estimations or choosing which logic 
for the path they will rely on for their required outcome. As discussed in Section 
5.5.2, these heuristics and inductive logic may often lead to effective decisions. 
 
In the future the themes highlighted and examined in this study - power and 
control, project knowledge management, legitimacy and relationship capital - 
may or may not be significant, nor of the magnitude that brought them to the fore 
in this study; however, this study does reinforce that latent factors will exist in all 
decision-making processes and will shape the ultimate outcome. These latent 
factors may not always be ethical, moral or legal yet they may still be effective as 
a means-end rationale and give a pragmatic view of decision-making. 
 
Section 1.3 explained that there is little interpretivist research on in-practice 
decision-making in the selection of project leadership teams (Bolander & 
Sandberg 2013).  This study, through real-world practices of selection in a 
specific environment, shone a light on the success (or otherwise) of some of 
these practices.  A summary of the theoretical (table 1.1), methodological (table 
1.2) and substantive (table 1.3) contributions of this study was set out in section 
1.3 and these contributions are expanded below incorporating collaborating 








 Table 5.1 (T1)  Theoretical contributions 
 
  
Scholars in the area people-selection 'are concerned with organisational and 
social dynamics that recruitment and selection support and reflect rather than 
managerial efficacy of activities' (Taylor 2006, p. 481). This case reinforces 
Taylor’s theory that selection is a social process that is affected by and has 
effects within and beyond organisations. It extends this theory by demonstrating 
that latent agendas override conventional people-selection processes and are 
legitimised through the lens of the stakeholders.  
 




This study demonstrates that situation, stimulus and context all play crucial and 
complex roles in selection decision-making processes. The study extends current 
selection theory, which as shown in chapter 2 privileges job analysis and people-
organisation fit, by suggesting that selection decisions are strongly influenced by 







Table 5.2 (M1) Methodological contributions 
 
As stated in section 3.3, this study was conducted in a social constructivist 
paradigm, valuing the premise that to gather data only from respondents ‘ignores 
all facets of events that are carried not in person, but in the situation, stimulus, or 
context’ (McGrath & Brinberg 1983, p. 122). This study not only supports this 
view but advocates that any methodology in a study of this type must incorporate 
a thorough examination of the context in which the study is being assayed. The 
study expands the social constructivist paradigm into the unique situations, 
stimulus and context of mega-projects. 
 
Table 5.2 (M2) Methodological contributions 
 
 
As stated in section 3.4, it is clear in this study that situation, stimulus and 
context all play crucial and complex roles in input, process and output of the 
selection decision-making processes under study. To not accept and value inputs 
from all relevant sources, decision-makers, influencers, recommenders and all 
content available would downplay the rich vein of data and perspectives in this 












The evidence in this case supports previous research that 'structural conditions 
and expectations of rational action need not be followed by managerial agents; 
indeed they are often actively avoided, undermined or ignored' (Taylor 2006, p. 
481). The dynamic of project/client/alliance/business environment exponentially 
impacts the commercial situation and as a consequence the subtleties is the 
critical starting point for any similar study. The contribution of this research is 








The accounts of the selection decisions (Section 4.6) reflect an overt, 
overarching premise of the client’s high need for control over most, if not all, 
decisions, independent of the quality of or trust in those decisions. All decisions 
were made under the ubiquitous cloud of client rights (that is, veto power) over all 
decisions. The uncompromising client-centric decision-making power, privileges 






This finding contributes to the literature in that it substantially changes the focus 
from rational decision-making to power-based decision-making; the study 








As stated in section 4.5, in the alliance model of a project the question is, to what 
degree does each organisation act appropriately for itself and the type of project 
in the context of project management? (Thomas & Mullaly 2008). In this case, 
doing the right thing was the Alliance Board’s pledge of ‘best for project’. The 
client’s domination of most decisions and the structure of each alliance member 
reporting directly to the client blurred the opportunity to examine selecting project 
leadership teams through the uncontaminated intra-alliance member dynamic.  
This macro perspective phenomenon is insightful of alliance organisations in 
decision-making, including the selection of project leadership teams in mega-
projects. 
 
5.7.2  Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
As stated in the opening chapter, conventional wisdom that a case study cannot 
provide reliable information about the broader class 'is so oversimplified as to be 





Understanding the implications for the functioning and consequent success of 
multidisciplinary project teams highlights the critical need to reconceptualise their 
boundaries (Ratcheva 2009); this study set out to help reconceptualise the 
boundaries of selection decision-making as it applies to alliance mega-
infrastructure project leadership teams. 
 
Approximately 4% of the total global GDP (USD 3.4 trillion per year) will be spent 
on  global (mega/giga) infrastructure projects for 2013-2030 according to the 
McKinsey Company (McKinsey 2013). Similarly it was estimated that in emerging 
economies alone, USD 2.2 trillion annually would be spent on mega-
infrastructure projects in the period 2009-2018 (Economist 2008, p. 80). Despite 
the exponential grow of these projects globally, research into mega-projects is 
sparse. What research that has been undertaken does not take into account the 
selection of the leadership teams in these projects. The researcher, as 
expressed in the summary (section 2.10) of the literature review, rather than 
viewing this as a limitation, saw this as an opportunity to add to the discipline. 
  
The researcher had the privilege of being able to conduct insider-research 
(Brannick & Coghlan 2007) through being employed as a consultant to work on 
the project rather than in the project. In methodology terms the limitations of 
ethnographic work are well researched (Alvesson 2003; Hammersley 1990; Seru 
2014) and the researcher’s mitigation of these limitations were discussed in detail 
throughout Chapter 3. However, 'hardly any social setting comes out of an 
ethnographic study unblemished' (Alvesson 2003, p. 180). Ambiguity is a state of 
confusion not necessarily related to the amount or quality of information but more 








As an applied piece of research, a researcher's conscious understanding of 
closeness and distance is critical to both the researcher's interpretation of the 
data and the ultimate value of the research. The value of self-ethnography is that 
it immediately establishes a scope of the study, that being the setting being 
studied; in this research this was the specific case under examination. 
Consequently the researcher and the ultimate readers of the study findings can 
be clear from the outset about the limits of the findings. No matter how conscious 
researchers are of closeness and distance, their set of observations, as such, are 
perspectives that only represent a partial view of events and that the 
interpretations are inevitably coloured by their own values, interests and 
background. The dangers of this are a narrow line of sight and lack of objectivity 
creating bias.  
 
In the context of this study, McGrath and Brinberg (1983) note: 
  
 ‘The individual researcher, carrying out a study that fits his or her interests 
 or purposes, is in no way obliged to conduct research along any other 
 path or in any other portion of the research “space” than the one 
 proposed. The individual researcher is obliged only to do each study as 
 well as possible within the available resources, and to present it publicly 
 for what it is: one study, in one part of the overall research processes, 
 bearing on the state focal problem in certain limited ways’ 
 (McGrath & Brinberg 1983, p. 123). 
 
None of these limitations is fatal and the researcher has been conscious to 
mitigate where possible the limitations in scope, methodology, findings 
interpretation and contributions. The researcher has taken a scholarly and 
reflective attitude in regard to the study and in doing so has returned meaningful 






The contribution of this study is in part practical - giving a perspective on 
decision-making and a practice orientation regarding selection in a specific 
environment - and part theoretical in its application of project and selection 
domains. The opportunity that this study highlights is that, rather than focusing on 
the technical or economic efficacy of selection practices, future research can 
explore the ethical or political effects of this managerial activity, not only in 
people-selection decision-making but in the broadest form of stakeholder 
influence, agreement, recommendation and ultimate decision.    
 
This study has shown that complex factors influence the way senior leaders are 
chosen for mega-infrastructure projects. Orthodox selection processes do not 
adequately explain how such appointments are made. This study, using a 
combination of semi-structured interviews, documentary evidence and insider 
observations of the team-formation processes, asserts that latent factors affect 
selection decisions more so than the espoused traditional selection techniques.  
 
These latent factors, such as the relative power of key stakeholders, the 
commitment of key decision-makers to long-term learning from alliance partners, 
and the nature of the relationship between alliance partners, are rarely 
considered and difficult to measure. Having highlighted these latent factors there 
is opportunity for further studies into these and other factors that influence the 
selection decision-making processes not only in mega-infrastructure projects but 
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